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JOHNSON, AOSTRE NANCY. ED.D. The Development of Creative 
Thinking and Its Educational Implications. (1989) Directed 
by Dr. David Purpel. 196 pp. 
This dissertation proposes a theory of the development 
of creative thinking in the context of major psychological, 
philosophical, and religious perspectives on thinking and 
human development. This study then suggests some 
implications of the proposed theory for educational theory 
and practice. 
• 
Two aspects of thought are proposed and referred to as 
qualitative thought and quantitative thought. It is argued 
that qualitative thought is our most direct experience of 
reality. Qualitative thought has emotional and intuitive 
aspects, and it precedes and provides the shaping power or 
meaningful context for quantitative thought. Quantitative 
thought is seen as a secondary thought process that defines 
and delineates experience by dividing it into distinct 
objects, properties, names, and relationships. 
This dissertation suggests that qualitative and 
quantitative thought together comprise creative thought. 
Creative thought is the most natural form of human thought. 
Human beings are born with the ability to think 
qualitatively, and quantitative thinking ability expands 
rapidly from birth. 
Theories dominating the field of human development 
today generally understand thought as quantitative thought 
and omit qualitative thought. This misunderstanding leads 
to developmental perspectives that are hierarchical in 
nature and that value later stages of development more than 
earlier stages of development. This dissertation examines 
each stage and discovers a unique way of understanding and 
valuing each in the context of whole, creative thinking. 
This study concludes that the majority of traditional 
and current educational practices emphasize the development 
of quantitative thinking skills and discourage the 
development of whole, creative thinking skills. Educational 
practices are recommended for each stage of development that 
encourage the development of creative thinking. 
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THE PERSONAL JOURNEY 
... what exactly was Anna? A child certainly, a 
very intelligent and a very gifted child, but what 
was she? Everybody who came in contact with Anna 
recognized in her some strangeness, something 
that marked her as different from other children... 
Certainly Anna had a gift, but it turned out to be 
nothing spooky, nothing out of this world. In a 
very deep sense it was at once as mysterious as it 
was simple. She had an immediate grasp of pattern, 
of structure, of the way that bits and pieces were 
organized into a whole. Unexplainable as this gift 
might be, it was always well and truly earthed in 
the nature of things. As simple and as mysterious 
as a spider's web, as ordinary as a spiral 
seashell. Anna could see patterns where others 
just saw muddles, and this was Anna's gift.l 
This dissertation is about ways of thinking and 
knowing. The meanings and common usages of these words are 
both different and overlapping. The word think usually 
implies using the mind in logical ways, the process of 
conscious rational activity. However, it is also used to 
mean less considered mental activity, such as beliefs of 
which we are unsure or unconscious mental activity of which 
we are unaware. It has been used less frequently but for 
centuries in certain philosphical and religious systems to 
mean a depth of thought, a uniting of "heart, mind, and 
soul" in an understanding of some basic truth. 
The word know is also used in a variety of ways from 
the more mundane, such as "I know how to do algebra 
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problems" to the more profound, like "I know my child well" 
or "I know God." But the word know does tend to be used in 
a way that is less dependent on rational thought processes 
than the word think. It often implies direct perception, 
direct experience of the nature of something, deep awareness 
of truth. 
In this dissertation the words think and know 
become synonymous because of the nature of my theory. I am 
proposing that there are two profoundly different aspects of 
thinking that are in relationship to each other 
approximately as the visible tip of the iceberg is to its 
massive hidden underside. The visible tip might be thought 
of as logical thought and the hidden mass might be referred 
to as a depth*of knowing. But in actuality both can be 
referred to as aspects of thinking or kinds of knowing. 
Since most modern psychological theories do not postulate 
the existence of this hidden depth of thought, this profound 
depth of knowing, a great misunderstanding about the nature 
of human thinking and knowing exists in our culture today. 
I will also be writing about the repercussions of those 
misconceptions about thinking and knowing on the fields of 
developmental psychology, child rearing and education. I 
believe that current practices based on incomplete theories 
lead to a limiting of the immense possibilities for thought 
and achievement innate in all human beings. 
I believe that those human beings who grow up 
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retaining access to both aspects of thinking mentioned above 
are those that we call geniuses or gifted individuals, those 
with remarkable talents who have the potential to make major 
contributions to some area of human endeavor, whether 
artistic, scientific, business, academic or humanitarian. 
These people may be well-known internationally or 
nationally, or they may be merely "famous" in their 
workplace, school, community or home for their ability to 
create and accomplish. They are characterized by the 
presence of a sense of purpose, a deep conviction that their 
lives have meaning, and their ability to see with fresh and 
broad vision, to discover new ways of understanding the 
world and doing things. The introductory quotation to this 
chapter is about such a person, a young child named Anna. 
"Anna could see patterns where others just saw muddles, and 
this was Anna's gift." 
Anna's informal education was overseen by a young man 
who understood and respected the ability of this chilri to 
absorb and make sense of the world. He provided her with 
access to information; she demanded more information, 
digested it, constructed her own meaningful patterns out of 
it. 
After the evening meal I always read to Anna, 
books on all manner of subjects from poetry to 
astronomy. After a year of reading, she ended 
up with three favorite books. The first was a 
large picture book with nothing in it but 
photographs of snnwfTakes and frost patterns. The 
second was Cruden's Complete Concordance. and the 
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third, of all the strange books to choose, was 
Manning's Geometry of Four Dimensions. Each of 
these books had a catalytic effect on Anna. She 
devoured them utterly, and out of their digestion 
she produced her own philosophy. 
One of her pleasures was my reading to her 
that part of the Concordance given over to the 
meaning of proper names. Each name was read in 
strict alphabetical order and the meaning given. 
After each name had been tasted and thought over 
she made her decision as to its rightness. Most 
times she shook her head sadly and disappointedly; 
it wasn't good enough. Sometimes it was just 
right; the person, the meaning, all fitted 
perfectly for her and, with a burst of excitement, 
she would bounce up and down on my lap and say, 
"Put it down, put it down." This meant writing the 
name in large block capitals on a slip of paper, 
which she would stare at with complete concenration 
for a minute or two and then place in one of her 
many boxes.2 
This type of approach to thinking and learning is not 
the prevalent one in this country or in most educational 
systems of the world. Most people in formal educational 
systems are fed information but are not encouraged or 
allowed to think, to know in the deepest sense, in the way 
that we are born able and equipped to do. The result is a 
profound alienation from our truest inclinations and 
abilities, a form of intellectual and emotional suicide. 
Martin Buber wrote: "The simple truth is that the 
wretchedness of our world is grounded in its resistance to 
the entrance of the holy into lived life."3 The word holy 
is derived from the word whole. When we abandon our 
connection to our whole selves and to the whole of life, we 
betray our deepest selves. I believe that we all come into 
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life equipped with the capacity to experience a "holy" 
connection with our particular life's purpose and with all 
of life. The particular methods of socialization common to 
technological Western culture encourage us to abandon this 
connection in our earliest years and to remain ignorant of 
it for the rest of our lives. 
I believe that this profound misunderstanding about 
the nature of human knowing has greatly contributed to a 
short-sighted, narrow vision of human beings and our role in 
the world that has resulted in rampant destruction and 
needless suffering, Including such well-documented phenomena 
as the hurried-child syndrome, the rise of depression, drug 
abuse and suicide among children and adolescents, the break 
down of family and community support systems, and the 
emphasis on material success rather than emotional, social 
and spiritual well-being in modern enacted value systems. I 
believe that this constricted vision of human knowing is 
also partly indirectly responsible for the massive build-up 
of nuclear weapons and the destruction of the natural 
resources- of the earth. 
This dissertation will not attempt to . deal directly 
with the more overt political aspects of this situation, 
but I do not deny their existence. I accept the argument 
that a part of the reason that we socialize children to 
obedience and conformity in school systems is that our 
nation requires a great number of obedient and conforming 
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workers to keep the factories and the McDonald's running 
smoothly. However, I do not believe that these values are 
explicity held by most educators, nor do I believe that it 
is the main reason why we usually opt for conformity over 
creativity, alienation over deep self-knowledge. 
I believe that the primary cause is ignorance about 
the true nature of our humanity and the deep repression and 
denial of it that has followed this ignorance. Adults who 
have repressed and denied their own deepest sense of 
knowledge and meaning of the purpose of their lives have a 
great deal of unconscious investment in denying It and 
repressing it in children. There is tremendous pain in 
recognizing that we have missed a vast beauty and meaning in 
our lives, a senue of deep purpose and connection with other 
lives and with the universe. Thus we deny the potential 
holiness, wholeness of our lives and the livps of others to 
protect ourselves from the pain of that knowledge. 
It is difficult to separate ignorance from denial. To 
what degree does increasing knowledge allow us to change our 
behavior? This is a critical and debated isssue in 
psychology, philosophy and history. I believe that the 
more we know about the true nature of thought, and the more 
we reflect upon its repressed aspects in our lives, the more 
we will be able to overcome our resistance to genuine 
thought and to encourage it in ourselves and in others. 
The two aspects of thinking that I propose are not 
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two distinct kinds of thought. They are two. different 
components of the type of human activity that is called 
thought or cognition or mental processing, the activity 
through which we seek to understand ourselves and the world. 
Philosophers, psychologists and educators have attempted to 
comprehend these different aspects of thought by postulating 
contrasting modes of understanding, dualities that attempt 
to come to terms with the wide scope of our thinking 
abilities. These include: logic/intuition; conscious 
thought/unconscious thought; right brain thinking/left 
brain thinking; ontological reason/ technical reason; 
mystical thought/logical thought; explicit knowing/tacit 
knowing; feminine thought/masculine thought; and 
qualitative thinking/quantitative thinking. Although I am 
not claiming that all of these metaphors are analagous, they 
do all attempt to come to terms with the contrasting aspects 
of thinking, and I believe that they grapple with 
overlapping, and in some cases identical, concepts. 
I have spent many years of my life exploring the 
meaning of these contrasting metaphors about thinking. My 
conscious involvement with an attempt to understand the 
processes of human thought began during my high school years 
when I collected and studied the dreams of hundreds of 
children and adolescents in my school system. I was struck 
then by the existence of two very different modes of 
thinking. Like mild-mannered Clark Kent by day, our 
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conscious minds reported the "daily news" of our personal 
lives. But at night the "unconscious" featured Superwoman 
or Superman fighting lions or monsters, powerful emotional 
knowing alchemically changed into vivid imagery. 
My college psychology studies focused on two main 
themes: cognition and its development, centering around the 
acquisition of rational, sequential analytical thought 
processes; and personality and its development, including 
the ego and emotions. After achieving a basic 
understanding of the principles of behavioristic psychology, 
I avoided courses grounded in behaviorism. Behaviorists 
were interested only in observable behavior, which omitted 
all of the areas that interested me the most: dreams, 
ideas, imagination, thoughts, feeling, personality. 
Behaviorists argued that human activity can be explained 
without these mystic concepts that can only "muddy the 
water." 
However, in turning to the field of cognitive 
psychology, I was disappointed to find a corresponding bias. 
Cognitive processes were generally defined as logical, 
linear thought processes, and there were few attempts to 
relate or include the role of such things as emotion, 
intuition, or imagination. Cognition and emotion seemed to 
be accepted as two distinct processes, minimally and 
mechanistically related. Ironically, my studies took place 
in William James Hall, named after the psychologist-
9 
philosopher who had written this about the process of 
think ing: 
It is by the interest and importance that 
experiences have for us, by the emotions they 
excite, arid the purposes they subserve, by their 
affective values, in short, that their consecution 
in our several conscious streams of ours as 
'thoughts' of ours is mainly ruled.4 
This tendency to separate cognition from emotion may be 
even stronger today in academic psychology than it was 
twenty years ago. In his 1985 book The Mind's New Science: 
A History of the Cognitive Revolution,. Howard Gardner 
describes the distinguishing features of cognitive science: 
The third feature of cognitive science is the 
deliberate decision to de-emphasize factors which 
may be important for cognitive functioning but 
whose inclusion at this point would unnecessarily 
complicate the cognitive-scientific enterprise. 
These factors include the influence of affective 
factors or emotions.5 
It seems to me that cognitive psychologists have turned the 
same blind eye to emotional factors in cognition that 
behaviorists had turned to mental factors in behavior. 
I did briefly encounter the concept of intuition 
several times during my undergraduate years. My 
"cognitive processes" professor, Dr. Jerome Bruner, 
postulated the existence of intuitive thought in contrast 
to linear, analytic thought. He suggested: "Intuition 
implies the act of grasping the meaning or significance or 
structure of a problem without explicit reliance of the 
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analytic apparatus of one's craft."6 I also studied 
theories of personality with Dr. Alexander, a quest lecturer 
from The Jungian Institute in Zurich, learning about Jung's 
theory of four basic human intellectual functions: 
cognitive, intuitive, affective and physical-sensory. The 
ideas of Bruner and Jung gave shape to rny quest for an 
• 
integrated theory of mind. I began to realize that I was 
attempting to account for the relationship between rational 
cognition, emotion, and intuition in human knowing. 
By the late 1960's a small but significant group of 
psychologists and philosophers were addressing questions 
pertaining to "altered states of consciousness" which 
included dreams, visions, drug-induced states, religious and 
mystical experiences, parapsychological experiences and 
intuition. I enthusiastically studied these theories, but I 
was concerned about the attempts of some to denigrate 
rational thought processes. I began to formulate a belief 
that a valid theory of thinking would give equal homage to 
all facets of the mind. 
During my undergraduate years I also began a study of 
developmental psychology that has continued for twenty four 
years. My search for a comprehensive theory of mind 
dovetailed with my interests in the developing human being. 
I began to ask specific questions relating to mental 
abilities at different stages of development: What kinds of 
thinking skills are we born with? Which are acquired? To 
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what degree is the enfoldment of thinking skills innate and 
to what degree doe?5 it depend on specific experiences? Does 
individual variation depend more on heredity or experience? 
How do we consciously attempt to arrange experiences to 
affect the development of thinking in formal and informal 
educational environments? Do our limited models of the of 
thinking, our lack of understanding of its full scope, get 
translated into educational practices in ways which limit 
the possible results? Are we damaging minds by our lack of 
unders tand i ng? 
For a few years I worked on research projects relating 
to the thought of young children. Then, after receiving 
a master's degree, I began a sixteen year teaching career 
with and about young children. I started schools, designed 
educational systems, taught young children, raised my own 
child, directed schools and trained teachers of young 
children. During all of these years I was teaching 
children. Obviously my relationships with children 
profoundly influenced the study and development of a 
comprehensive theory of mind. I believe that the most 
important implications of ray theoretical constructs about 
knowing relate to an understanding of the human 
developmental process arid to the implications of ' that for 
the ways in which we educate. 
My relationships with children inspired a profound 
respect for their knowing. I felt that I was learner as 
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much as teacher, and that we were exchanging knowledge 
gleaned in different ways. I sensed the kind of knowing 
characteristic of children as I observed their enormous 
capacity to imagine, to wonder, to believe, to hope, to be 
joyful, to trust, to enter wholly and joyfully into learning 
and experience, and to absorb information that interested 
them rapidly. As I wrote during my first student teaching 
experience, "it's a'cliche, but it's true. Being with 
little children brings honesty, simplicity, joy, energy. 
That's the way they are--and they bring out the hidden- part 
in me that is still that way." 
The longer I spent teaching young children, the more I 
became convinced that typical child development textbook 
descriptions of young children were missing an essential 
dimension of understanding. These textbooks are based on 
the assumption that human development procedes in 
hierarchical stages, with the attainment- of increasingly 
higher and more complete levels being the goal of the 
developmental process. This way of thinking leads to the 
conclusion that adults are inherently better equipped to 
understand and experience the world than children are, that 
the main importance of childhood lies in its function as 
preparation for competent adulthood. My own experience 
increasingly told me that this was only partially true. 
Adults are not better equipped but differently equipped to 
understand reality. The "average" child and the "average" 
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adult of my acquaintance seemed to have strong 
comprehensions of different aspects of reality. Each seemed 
to grasp a part of what I felt to be the whole "truth" about 
the world. It seemed likely to me that these different 
understandings stemmed from different types of thinking. 
Another observation that I began to make was that 
theories of child development seemed to consistently 
underestimate the abilities of the infants and children that 
I knew. For example, my college child development textbook 
reported: "By age two some children may play alongside 
others, but there is little interest in the activity of 
peers, cooperative games, or conversation...It is only 
during the preschool years (3 to 5) that more cooperative 
play begins and the child shows a desire for group 
activity."7 The majority of young two year olds in the 
schools in which I taught played cooperatively, and some two 
years olds related in ways that I felt were exceptional for 
people of any age. For example, as young two year olds, 
Seth and Naomi consistently waited for the other to arrive 
each morning, shared toys and food with each other, played 
imaginative games with the other and protected and 
empathized with each other. The fact that they also 
occasionally argued and fought over toys, as "typical" two 
year olds do, only highlights their capacity to behave in 
more "advanced" ways. 
Child development literature suggested that young 
preschoolers are egocentric and unable to see the world from 
the perspective o£ another, developmentally unable to be 
anything but "selfish." Yet I and many others who live and 
work with preschoolers note the apparent ability of young 
children to sense the emotions of others, to offer empathy 
and support to those in need. This is true despite the fact 
that they frequently are "selfish" and do need to be taught 
methods of peaceful conflict resolution. I remember three 
year old Monty who would ask me each Monday how my week-end 
had been and ask me each lunch time if my sandwich tasted 
good, waiting patiently for and commenting thoughtfully on 
my answers. 
Prevelant theories of child development also seemed to 
underestimate the cognitive capacities of many young 
children. Preschool children were not supposed to be 
capable of abstract theorizing and reasoning. Yet 
Consider these statements and behaviors of my daughter at 
three years of age, drawn from the journal I kept of her 
development. 
3 years, 2 months: "The moon must have wheels because 
it follows us—or maybe it runs by its light—like the light 
in my body is helping me to grow." 
3 years, 3 months: "I dreamed I cut myself on a piece 
of glass, but it really hurt for real." ("What do you 
mean?" I asked.) "I dreamed I cut myself, but I didn't 
really cut myself in this world (pointing down), it was in 
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this world (pointing up) where the cutting was real, but in 
this world (pointing down) the cut wasn't real, but the 
hurting was." 
3 years, 3 months: (after a long period of silence 
while playing outside in the mud) "I understand! God 
controls everything in the world except people and he lets 
us do whatever we like so we can be like him!". 
3 years, 4 months: (while working in an extremely 
concentrated and joyful way on constructing giant life-size 
people in a huge sand box, with a friend): "Now I know 
exactly how God felt when he made us!" 
3 years, 5 months: (after working on a unit on Native 
Americans in her preschool) "Indians know that God is 
never far away but we forget it sometimes and it makes us 
sad. We think he's far away, but he's really not." 
3 years, 5 months: "Is God dead?" ( "No, God is not 
dead, I answer.) "I can't see (naming a person who 
is dead) because he's dead. What's the reason I can't see 
God?" 
3 years, 7 months: "Did God make himself?" 
3 years, 8 months: (while driving up the driveway and 
noticing Elsie, the cow) "It's too bad about Elsie. She 
doesn't know that God is inside of her. 
3 years. 8 months: (while contemplating a large mud 
puddle) "To an ant, this would be as big as an ocean, so 
I'll call it an ocean. Watch me jump across this ocean!" 
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This three year old was reasoning in a manner 
considered by the norms of developmental psychology to be 
many years beyond her predicted abilities. She was also 
expressing sophisticated philosophical and theological 
opinions. Skeptics may argue that she was merely repeating 
what she had heard adults say, but because I had been with 
her consistently since her birth I am convinced that this is 
not true. And at this time I also began to discover other 
accounts of young children expressing complex reasoning 
about scientific, philosophical and religious issues. Some 
of these findings will be discussed in later chapters. 
In the past decade one aspect of young children's 
mental abilities has begun to gain academic and popular 
recognition as having more potential for acceleration than 
previously recognized. Adults began to discover that 
preschoolers and even some babies can learn nearly every 
known mental discipline. Books about how to teach your 
baby to read and do arithmentic began to be popular. 
Parents purchased a wide variety of toys and games and 
flashcards designed to accelerate the learning process. 
Many preschool programs featured formal teaching of reading, 
writing, math, science and foreign languages. Some parents 
began to show concern if children weren't reading before 
entering kindergarten. Kindergarten classrooms, initially 
designed to be "gardens" of play and informal learning, 
frequently became like the more formal first grades had 
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been, taking on the "3 R's" as the top priority. Experts 
in child development began to express concern over the 
pressures being put on babies and children. The "hurried 
child" syndrome emerged. 
I was certainly not surprised to learn that young 
children are capable of thinking in ways and performing 
skills requiring great complexity and sophistication. The 
question for me and for many other child development 
professionals increasingly became "What is appropriate for 
us to teach young children to enhance thinking and overall 
development?" rather than "What are young children capable 
of learning and doing?" My interest in the process of 
thinking also led me increasingly to reflect on the question 
"What is it about the thought of young children that 
allows most of them to be so open to learning?" 
I believe that human beings are born with the ability 
to think in a way that I will call qualitative, borrowing a 
term from the philosopher John Dewey. Qualitative thought 
has characteristics that we may refer to as emotional or 
intuitive, but I am not necessarily using these words in 
their most commonly understood forms. Qualitative thought 
is our most direct experience of reality. It is the shaping 
and integrating force that guides quantitative thought, the 
secondary thought process that defines and delineates 
experience by dividing it into distinct objects, names, 
properties, and relationships. Logical thought is one kind 
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of quantitative thought. Quantitative thought begins 
immediately after birth (or before) and continues to expand 
and be refined throughout adulthood. 
In Chapter Two I will further describe the concepts of 
qualitative and quantitative thought. I will also examine a 
variety of other psychological, religious and scientific 
metaphors and theories that attempt to come to terms with 
this duality. I will demonstrate that most of these 
theories are concerned with the same dual aspects of 
thinking. 
Creative thought is the result of the combination of 
qualitative and quantitative thought. Creative thought 
allows human beings to make meaning of the world and to 
change the world. In Chapter Three, I will describe how 
the qualitative and quantitative thought unite in the 
richness of the creative processs. 
The development of quantitative thought has been 
extensively researched and documented, particularly by Jean 
Piaget. Piaget's theories have made an invaluable 
contribution to our understanding of how thinking in young 
children changes and develops. Similarly Freud has offered 
tremendous insight into the growth and development of 
emotions in the human life cycle. In Chapter Four, I will 
briefly outline the contributions of these and other 
contemporary developmental frameworks to our understanding 
of development, and I will also argue that the 
misunderstanding o£ the whole creative nature of thinking 
has led a profound misunderstanding about the process of 
human development. Some developmental theorists have 
attempted to view thought in a broader, more wholistic 
sense. This distinct minority of theorists emerges from 
a variety of traditions, including clinical psychology, 
philosophy and religion. I will summarize the offerings of 
these "alternative" thinkers in the field of human 
development. 
In Chapter Five I will examine each unique stage of 
human development in light of my theory of creative 
thinking, describing the basic ways of thinking and knowing 
characteristic of each stage. I will suggests ways in which 
traditional developmental theorists have not adequately 
understood the development of thinking. 
Then in Chapter Six, ^ I will write about the 
implications of this theory for the ways in which we 
raise and educate human beings. I believe that it is 
imperative that we consciously base parenting and educating 
children on an understanding of whole, creative thinking, 
because in neglecting this we are preventing access to our 
full human capacity, to our sensing of the wholeness of 
ourselves and others and to our abilities to create a more 
harmonious and beautiful world. 
20 
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CHAPTER TWO 
QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE THOUGHT 
I hold that association depends in a much greater 
degree on the recurrence of states of feelings than 
on trains of ideas. Believe me, Southey! A 
metaphysical solution that does not tell you 
something in the heart is grievously suspected as 
apocryphal. I almost think that ideas never recall 
ideas, as far as they are ideas, any more than 
leaves in a forest create each other's motion. The 
breeze it is that runs through them--it is the soul, 
the state of feeling. 1 
John Dewev's Theory 
Samuel Taylor Coleridge wrote the introductory words in 
a letter to a friend. Coleridge's theory, that intellectual 
thought is powered or run by "the soul," by feeling, is 
remarkably similar to John Dewey's theory about thinking. 
Dewey's theory describes two types of thinking, one of 
which is the "ground" out of which the other arises. Dewey 
names these two types of thought "qualitative" and 
"quantitative." Qualitative thought is like the breeze, an 
emotional power that shapes intellectual thought as wind 
rearranges leaves on trees. In Art as Experience and in 
the essay "Qualitative Thought," (in Philosophy and 
Civilization). Dewey asserts that a qualitative "background" 
underlies all types of thought: 
But any experience, the most ordinary, has an 
indefinite total setting. Things, objects, are 
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only focal points of a here and now in a whole that 
stretches out indefinitely. This is the 
qualitative "background" which is defined and made 
definitely conscious in particular objects and 
specified properties and qualities.2 
When the qualitative background is delineated into 
specifics, it becomes "quantitative thought." The 
qualitative background is experienced differently than is 
quantitative thought: 
If we designate this permeating qualitative unity 
in psychological language, we say it is felt rather 
than thought. Then, if we hypostatize it, we call 
it a feeling. But to term it a feeling is to 
reverse the actual state of affairs. The existence 
of unifying qualitativeness in the subject-matter 
defines the meaning of "feeling".3 
Thus the qualitative background is feeling and is 
I  
experienced as feeling. The feeling is prior to any 
cognitive effort to define or delineate it. Dewey calls 
this feeling "qualitative thought." He goes on to explain 
how quantitative thought rises out of qualitative thought: 
When it is said that I have a feeling or impression 
or "hunch" that things are thus and so, what is 
actually designated is primarily the presence of a 
dominating quality in a situation as a whole, not 
just the existence of a feeling as a psychical or 
psychological fact. To say I have a feeling or 
impression that so and so is the case is to note 
that the quality in question is not yet resolved 
into determinate terms and relations; it marks a 
conclusion without statement of the reasons for it, 
the grounds upon which it rests. It is the first 
state in the development of explicit distinctions. 
All thought in every subject begins with just such 
an unanalyzed whole. When the subject matter is 
reasonably familiar, relevant distinctions speedily 
offer themselves, and sheer qualitativeness may not 
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remain long enough to be readily recalled. But it 
often persists and forms a haunting and engrossing 
problem. It is a commonplace that a problem 
stated is well on its way to solution, for 
statement of the nature of a problem signifies that 
the underlying quality is being transformed into 
determinate distinctions of terms and relations... 4 
Quantitative thought makes explicit various parts of 
the qualitative background by defining it and delineating it 
into objects, properties, distinct qualities, names, 
relationships and so on. In other words, all intellectual 
thought, including the perception of distinct objects, 
language and number is called quantitative. 
In Art and Experience Dewey goes on to say that 
emotion is the qualitative force that selects and cements 
quantitative aspects of thought. The emotion operates like 
a magnet, drawing to it material appropriate because of its 
emotional affinity and excluding all material that is 
uncongenial to it. This is true for both the perception of 
an object and the construction of an idea. Ideas form 
coherent trains of thought because "they are phases, 
emotionally and practically distinguished, of a developing, 
underlying quality."5 We cannot grasp any idea until we 
have felt and sensed it "as much so as if it were an odor or 
a color."6 Compare the following passage by Dewey to the 
opening quotation by Coleridge: 
Different ideas have their different "feels", their 
immediate qualitative aspects, just as much as 
anything else. One who is thinking his way through 
a complex problem finds direction on his way by 
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means of his property of ideas. Their qualities 
stop him when he enters the wrong path and send him 
ahead when he hits the right one. They are signs 
of an intellectual "stop and go." If a thinker had 
to work out the meaning of each idea discursively, 
he would be lost in a labyrinth that had no end and 
no center. Whenever an idea loses its immediate 
felt quality, it ceases to be an idea and becomes, 
like an algebraic symbol, a mere stimulus to 
execute an operation without the need of thinking. 
For this reason certain trains of ideas leading to 
their appropriate consummation (or conclusion) are 
beautiful or elegant.7 
A model of thinking proposed recently by a psychiatrist 
and a brain systems analyst seems to echo both Dewey and 
Coleridge. The Grey-LaViolette Model suggests that thoughts 
are always imbedded in emotional codes. When an emotional 
code, or feeling tone, becomes strong enough, it develops 
into an idea. The stronger the feeling behind the idea, the 
more powerful and meaningful the idea can become.8 
Dewey described both mystical and religious 
experiences as those that give us an intense feeling of 
belonging to a lar,ger, inclusive, qualitative whole. "Any 
experience becomes mystical in the degree in which the 
sense, the feeling of unlimited envelope becomes 
intense."9 
John Dewey was not religious or mystical in any 
conventional sense of these words; on the contrary, he was 
one of the originators of the Humanist Manifesto, which 
expressly denied the existence of a deity. This is a 
critical point since the next group of theorists I will 
invoke in developing the distinctions between two aspects of 
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thinking are specifically religious and mystical. Dewey 
recognized the existence of a basic type of thinking that, 
by its very nature, makes us feel connected with a vast, 
inclusive qualitative whole. He did not ascribe any kind of 
"ultimate reality" to this feeling of the whole. Some 
people believe in this whole as more than a feeling and do 
see it as the basic reality of the universe. These people 
include both mystics and scientists, as we shall see. Some 
describe this whole in deistic terms, others in scientific 
terms. My point is that there are these two types of 
thinking, one of which essentially connects us with some 
type of underlying whole. No matter what kind of metaphors 
are used to describe them, the two ways of thinking remain 
the same. 
I have chosen to use Dewey's terms, qualitative and 
quantitative thought. According to the Unabridged Random 
House Dictionary,, the word quality derives from a Latin word 
meaning "of what sort" and the word quantity derives from a 
Latin word meaning "how much." Quality means the character 
or nature of a thing and quantity means the amount or 
measure of a thing. These definitions capture the essence 
of the distinction that I am making here. Qualitative 
thought is about the nature or essence of things; 
quantitative thought is about the measurement or description 
of things. 
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Qualitative and Quantitative Thought and Other Dualities 
As I stated in Chapter One, there have been a variety 
of metaphors and theories proposed to explain the duality o£ 
human thought. I will examine in some' detail a number of 
them in the following sections of this chapter. I will 
demonstrate that most of these are concerned with the same 
basic duality that Dewey proposed in the 
qualitative/quantitative thought distinction, although they 
may be explained, elaborated and applied in various ways. 
This is important because I am equating a number of 
theoretical constructs that are not usually seen as having a 
common ground. The fact that the majority of these 
constructs can be seen through one particular lens, even 
though they may also be able to be seen through others, 
underlines the significance of this way of seeing the 
duality of thought. Some of the other constructs are not 
equatable in this way, but they are worth discussing because 
of their relationship to the qualitative/quantitative 
duality. 
Pure Experience and Reflective Thought 
Both John Dewey and William James were pragmatists. 
Pragmatism encourages individuals to derive philosophy from 
their own personal experience of the world rather than from 
a prior set of theoretical premises. It encourages an 
orderly, experimental approach to understanding self and 
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world. The nature of the thought process is particularly 
important to the pragmatist. The effectiveness of various 
types of thought processes are ultimately judged by the 
results produced. 
The role of direct experience is perhaps the key 
pragmatic concept. Pragmatists view experience as an 
immediate and nondualistic event, uniting mind and body, 
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inner (mental) and external events and seemingly disjointed, 
separable experiences. It is our reflective, conceptutal 
intellect that attempts to separate experience, but actually 
all of life is an experience. 
It is easy to see this concept in Dewey's qualitative 
theory. We experience life qualitatively. We reflect on it 
quantitatively. William James wrote about " a world of pure 
experience"10 as the primary, underlying process of human 
life : 
The instant field of the present is always 
experience in its "pure" state, plain unqualified 
actuality, a simple that, as yet undifferentiated 
into thing and thought, and only virtually 
classifiable as objective fact or as someone's 
opinion about fact.11 
Experience in its immediacy seems perfectly 
fluent. The active sense of living which we all 
enjoy, before reflection shatters our instinctive 
world for us, is self-luminous and suggests no 
paradoxes... When the reflective intellect gets at 
work, however, it discovers incomprehensibilities 
in the flowing process. Distinguishing its 
elements and parts, it gives them separate names, 
and what it thus disjoins it cannot easily put 
together.12 
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Like Dewey, James believed that it is the emotional 
component of an experience that guides its transformation 
into cognitive content. "It is by the interest and 
importance that experiences have for us, by the emotions 
they excite, and the purposes they subserve, by their 
affective values, in short, .. that their consecution in our 
several conscious streams as 'thoughts' of ours is mainly 
ruled."13 In other words, affect is the power behind 
thought. 
O n t o l o q i c a l  T h o u g h t  a n d  R a t i o n a l  T h o u g h t  
For Paul Tillich, the "ground of being" is the whole, 
an absolute that underlies all other absolutes. 
This "being" transcends everything particular 
without becoming empty, for it embraces everything 
particular. "Being" in this sense is power of 
being, and it is an infinitely full, inexhaustible 
but indefinite absolute. It is the basis of 
truth, because it is the transcendence of subject 
and object. It is the basis of good, because it 
contains every being in its essential nature and 
(as we shall see) the norms of every ethical 
command. And it is identical with the Holy, the 
ground of everything that has being.14 
We experience this Being as eros: 
the love of being as such, a mystical relation to 
being-itself. This is what Augustine called "amor 
amoris" ('love of love') and Spinoza called 'amor 
intellectualis' ('intellectual love'). One could 
also call it a feeling for the holiness of being as 
being, whatever it may be.15 
Tillich characterized knowing as an act of love. H e  
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distinguished between ontological reason and technical 
reason. Ontological reason is powered by love and is the 
structure o£ the mind that allows it to understand and 
transform reality. Classical philosophers from the Greeks 
to Hegel understood knowing in this sense. Tillich wrote: 
"The denial of reason in the classical sense is antihuman 
because it is antidivine."16 
In the technical concept of reason, reason is reduced 
to cognition and the capacity for "reasoning." Reasoning in 
this sense is logical, linear reasoning. Tillich explained 
that this type of reasoning is one aspect of ontological 
reasoning. When it is elevated to mean the only type of 
reason, human understanding is gravely misunderstood, and 
this has been true in the last several centuries of 
intellectual thought. 
According to Tillich, the depth of reason is the 
ground-of-being or being-itself. Our minds are equipped to 
experience this ground-of-being directly, although we can 
only describe this experience metaphorically. This 
experience becomes the source of truth, beauty, creative 
inspiration, justice, love and ultimately, meaning in our 
rational constructions and in our lives. 
Mystical Thought and Logical Thought 
Scholars of mysticism might note the danger of 
generalizing about a subject that takes diverse forms and 
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has been interpreted In many conflicting ways. However I 
have found that certain insights based on an 
interdisciplinary study of mysticism and on my own 
experiences have been fruitful for my conceptualization of 
the nature of knowing, and thus I offer these as my 
personal understanding. 
The concept of mysticism revolves around a sense of 
unity, the essential unity of the entire cosmos and of the 
mystic with this entirety. William James suggested that 
"states of mystical intuition may be only very sudden and 
great extensions of the ordinary 'field of 
consciousness'."17 James also explained that "this 
overcoming of all the usual barriers between the individual 
and the Absolute is the great mystic achievement."18 Arthur 
Deikman wrote: "Experiencing one's self as one with the 
universe or with God is the hallmark of the mystic 
experience, regardless of its cultural context.19 Deikman 
suggested that mystical thought is due to the 
"deautomatization of the psycholgical structures that 
organize, limit, select, and Interpret perceptual 
stimuli."20 By deautomatization, Deikman meant that 
habitual motor, perceptual and thought patterns are 
dropped, and attention is reinvested in a fresh way. 
Combining these statements and using Dewey's terms, we 
could say that mystical experience involves dropping 
habitual quantitative thought patterns and reinvesting 
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attention on the qualitative domain, which vastly extends 
consciousness. Dewey's distinction between the feeling of 
qualitative thought and the logical delineation of 
quantitative thought also applies well to the ways in which 
mystical thought is frequently contrasted to logical 
thought. 
Hazrat Inayat Khan, a Sufi mystic, wrote: "Mysticism-
may be considered as the essence of all knowledge, the way 
to realize truth...It is a fact that mysticism cannot be 
defined in words or in the form of doctrines, theories, or 
philosophical statements, for mysticism is an inner 
experience."21 Margaret Smith, a scholar of mystieism, 
asserted that mysticism is "an attitude of mind, an innate 
tendency of the human soul which seeks to transcend reason 
and to attain to a direct experience of God."22 The 
psychologist William Ernest Hocking wrote: 
"Mysticism...might be described as an organic cultivation of 
reason--though not of the 'reason which can (as yet) be 
reasoned': its fruit is an insight without reasons 
(without palpable roots in other insights)...The vital 
function of mysticism is origination, the creation of 
novelty."23 
K n o w l e d g e  a t t a i n e d  t h r o u g h  m y s t i c i s m  i s  f e l t -
k n o w l e d g e .  T h e  m y s t i c  " k n o w s "  b y  m e a n s  o f  a t t a i n i n g  a  s t a t e  
o f  d e e p  f e e l i n g  i n  w h i c h  k n o w l e d g e  i s  r e v e a l e d .  I n  T h e  
V a r i e t i e s  o f  R e l i g i o u s  E x p e r i e n c e .  W i l l i a m  J a m e s  w r o t e :  
"Although so similar to states of feeling, mystical states 
seem to be to those who experience them also states of 
knowledge. They are states of insight into depths of truth 
unplumbed by the discursive intellect. They are 
illumination, revelations, etc."24 Margaret Smith noted 
that "mysticism is the immediate feeling of unity of self 
with God."25 "God may be well loved, but not thought" 
stated the anonymous author of The Cloud of Unknowing. one 
of the best known mystical statements. Similarly, the 
philosopher Henri Bergson wrote: "God is love and the 
object of love: herein lies the whole contribution of 
mysticism."26 
The philosopher Louis Dupre discussed the contribution 
of an understanding of mysticism to a general philosophical 
understanding of personhood: 
Thus the ultimate message of the mystic about 
the nature of self-hood is that the self is 
essentially more than a self, that transcendence 
belongs to its nature as much as the act through 
which it#»is immanent to itself, and that a total 
failure on the mind's part to realize this 
transcendence reduces the self to less than 
itself. It is in this dynamic view of 
potentially unlimited mind that I find the most 
significant contribution to a philosophical 
understanding of self.27 
Intuition and Logical Thought 
Dewey sometimes said that we intuit the qualitiative 
domain, and writers about mysticism often refer to mystical 
thought as intuitive thought. The word intuition is used 
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frequently in philosophical, psychological and popular 
writing. It is usually used to denote a type of knowing 
that contrasts with logical knowing, and it is frequently 
left undefined. 
In The Encyclopedia of Philosophyr the philosopher 
Richard Rorty gave "immediate apprehension" as the broadest 
definition of the term. He goes on to say that apprehension 
can mean either sensation or knowledge or mystical union and 
that immediate has at least six meanings. Therefore the 
term cannot be generalized. Yet he did go on to 
distinguish four main meanings of the word.28 
Jerome Bruner began with Webster for a definition of 
intuition: "immediate apprehension or cognition." He 
contrasted intuitive thought with analytic thought, which 
involves explicit, step-by-step logical methods. He said 
that "intuition implies the act of grasping the meaning, 
significance, or structure of a problem or situation without 
explicit reliance on the analytic apparatus of one's 
craft."29 Bruner did not grapple with the philosphical 
issues underlying the concept. Instead he assumed that it is 
a valid mental process and concerned himself with its 
practical applications. Conclusions arrived at using the 
intuitive mode are subjected to the "usual methods of proof" 
to confirm or deny their validity. Intuition acts like a 
broad map, outlining new areas of thinking that we will 
later define and refine using logical methods. "In the end, 
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intuition by itself yields a tentative ordering of a body of 
facts that is self-evident, aids principally by giving us a 
basis for moving ahead in our testing of reality."30 
The Italian psychiatrist Roberto Assagioli gave a 
similar description of the role of intuition in mental 
functioning: 
We will consider intuition mainly in its cognitive 
function, i.e. as a psychic organ or means to 
apprehend reality. It is a synthetic function in 
the sense that it apprehends the totality of a 
given situation or psychological reality. It does 
not work from the part to the whole-as the 
analytical mind does- but apprehends a totality 
directly in its living existence... To speak more 
directly, and without metaphor, of the true 
relationship between intuition and intellect, 
intuition is the creative advance towards reality. 
Intellect has, first, the valuable and necessary 
function of interpreting, i.e. of translating, 
verbalizing in acceptable mental terms, the results 
of the intuition. Second, to check its validity; 
and third, "to coordinate and to include it into the 
body of already accepted knowledge.31 
Carl Jung is widely known for his theory about the four 
functions of consciousness — thinking, feeling, sensing 
and intuiting — and about the personality types based on 
these functions. Intuition is seen by Jung as an 
unconscious process. To appreciate the meaning of this term 
in its fullest sense, I will briefly examine Freud's 
concept of the unconscious. 
The concept of the unconscious is at the heart of 
psychoanalysis. As Freud said, "Psychoanalysis aims at and 
achieves nothing more than the discovery of the unconscious 
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in mental life."3^ Both Freud and Jung were dedicated to 
bringing the contents of the unconscious to light. Today 
this does not seem like a revolutionary concept. The 
existence of the unconscious is so widely understood and 
accepted that it is not really necessary to define it in 
technical writing and in literature. But in the early 
twentieth century, this was not so. Clinical psychiatry of 
the time recognized only a psychology of consciousness. 
Psychoanalysis was a radical intellectual movement defined 
by the postulation of the unconscious mind and its massive 
effects on conscious behavior. 
The unconscious in the most basic sense refers to all 
of the contents of the mind of which we are not conscious or 
aware. One of the major concepts upon which Freud and Jung 
parted ways was the origin of the content of the 
unconscious. Freud's belief was clear: "the Unconscious 
is the infantile mental life."33 (his italics). In other 
words, all of the contents of the unconscious arise from 
early childhood experience which has been forgotten or 
repressed. 
Jung's unconscious contains a personal aspect that has 
the same antecedent as Freud's. However, it also contains 
"all psychic material that lies below the threshhold of 
consciousness, material that is not necessarily acquired in 
childhood, forgotten or repressed."34 Part of the 
unconscious is material that "has not yet reached the 
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threshhold of consciousness."35 
Another part of Jung's Unconscious is the collective 
unconscious. 
The contents of the collective unconscious have 
never been in consciousness and therefore have 
never been individually acquired, but owe their 
existence exclusively to heredity. Whereas the 
personal unconscious consists for the most part of 
complexes, the contents of the collective 
unconscious is made up essentially of 
archetypes.36 
Archetypes are "definite forms in the psyche which seem 
to be present always and everywhere."37 He gave the 
example of the dual mother, or second birth. 
Jung defined intuition as an unconscious process: 
Intuition is an unconscious process in that its 
result is the irruption into consciousness of an 
unconscious content, a sudden idea or 'hunch'...It 
is a process analogous to instinct, with the 
difference that whereas instinct is a purposive 
impulse to carry out some highly complicated 
action, intuition is the unconscious, purposive 
apprehension of a highly complicated situation. 
The primary function of intuition is "to transmit 
images, or perceptions of relations between things, 
which could not be transmitted by the other 
functions or only in a very roundabout way."38 
Jung also defined intuition as "perception of the 
possibilities inherent in a situation."39 Since the 
contents of the collective unconscious are accessible to the 
intuition, we have the capacity to draw on the inherited 
wisdom of all of humanity, expressed as archetypes. The 
intuition of archetypes allows us prophetic foresight 
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because the archetypes "represent laws governing the course 
of all experienceable things."40 
Thus Jung offered two different kinds of uses of 
intuition. The first is similar to that put forth by Bruner 
and Assigoli. Intuition unconsciously precedes analysis in 
our ordinary thought processes by seeing the totality, all 
of the possibilities, and the relationships between things. 
The second type of intuition allows us direct contact with 
our ancestral knowledge. This aspect has more in common 
with the religious and mystical belief that intuition 
directly contacts an underlying reality, but it is somewhat 
different than this. 
In Awakening the Inner Eyer Intuition in Education, Nel 
Noddings and Paul Shore presented an historical view of 
intuition in philosophy and psychology before developing 
their own theory of intuition and relating it to educational 
practice. Noddings and Shore were careful to distance 
themselves from mystical views of intuition, those which 
claim a direct apprehension of the nature of ultimate 
reality, or the noumena behind phenomena. For them the 
ground-of-being is Schopenhauer's Will as thing-in-itself. 
We each feel the Will in ourselves as "ultimately and 
basically real, as that which is more directly known than 
anything else."41 Intuition informs the Will, but the Will 
does not depend only on intuition for its knowing. 
We prefer to regard an individual's relation to the 
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Will as neither knowledge nor pure affect but 
something clearly beyond either. In its 
manifestations it comes to light through intuition 
as feeling or sensibility or insight. Sometimes it 
comes to us as pure feeling, as a sure sense beyond 
knowledge that we are and that we are in relation 
to other forms of being beyond their 
manifestations. We shall not be concerned with 
this fundamental being- to- being contact, for it 
must by its very nature belong to the mystical. 
This does not mean that we deny such contact but 
only that we cannot be concerned with it in the 
present context. We are concerned, rather with 
occasions that approximate such pure contact: when 
we feel what the other feels, when we are on fire 
with inspiration, when we see with breathtaking 
clarity. Each such situation occurs in the 
phenomenal world; what happens guides us and seems 
properly a form of intuitive knowledge or of 
intuitive feeling; the understanding that flashes 
upon us may be used to trigger activity in the 
instrumental world. We accept such occurrences as 
real not only because people say that they have 
experienced them but, also, because there are 
products resulting from them: tender acts of human 
love, symphonies, paintings, mathematical theorems. 
Now, of course, both analytic thinking and physical 
activity have also been involved in producing 
products that can be observed by others. But we 
are here concerned with that intuitive activity 
that, under the influence of a Will striving to 
manifest itself, presents us with vivid 
representations. We shall continue to use the term 
Will as a shorthand designation for the dynamic 
center of self--the heart of being.42 
Will, as thing-in-itself, is beyond force, but it can 
act as a force to direct and support all of our activities, 
including intuition. Intuition is seen as a function that 
contacts objects directly (non-cognitively) and represents 
them to the Will. Sometimes intuition is represented more 
as a feeling and sometimes more as a cognition. Every 
thought is derived from an intuitive representation. 
Intuition "precedes and makes possible the experience from 
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which knowledge is constructed."43 
Thus Noddings and Shore proposed another theory of 
knowing that resonates with those presented above. All 
offer a type of knowing that is experienced as some type of 
feeling-intuition and that is the basis of logical, 
cognitive knowledge construction. Noddings and Shore stopped 
short of saying that we are "mystically" contacting ultimate 
reality, but what was important for them was that we feel as 
if we are. We feel as if we know with certainty what 
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someone feels, and this inspires us to act with great 
compassion. We become charged with an inspiration that 
seems to come from somewhere beyond us, and this leads to a 
grand symphony. Our intuitive feelings become a basis of 
love, justice, beauty and creativity for Noddings and 
Shore, as well as for Tillich, Dewey, and myriads of 
religious and mystical thinkers. 
Tacit Knowing and Explicit Knowing 
In The Tacit Dimension Michael Polyani proposed "a 
novel idea of knowledge from which a harmonious view of 
thought and existence, rooted "in the universe, seems to 
emerge."44 His starting point was the fact that "we know 
more than we can tell."45 Polyani suggested a tacit power 
that shapes and integrates bits and pieces of information, 
isolated perceptions and facts, into wholes capable of 
comprehension. "This shaping or integrating I hold to be 
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the great and indispensable tacit power by which all 
knowledge is discovered and, once discovered, is held to be 
true."46 We can talk about the knowledge we have attained, 
but we cannot really talk about the underlying tacit 
dimension that has formed it. We attend from the tacit 
dimension to the external appearance of another thing, and 
this results in our apprehension of the meaning of the 
thing. 
Research and the creation of knowledge in any field 
cannot be explained without the tacit dimension. "For to 
see a problem is to see something that is hidden. It is to 
have an intimation of the coherence of hitherto not 
comprehended particulars . "47 We have a "tacit foreknowledge 
of yet undiscovered things"48 that allows us not only to 
make new discoveries but also to appreciate the 
fruitfulness of them, the magnitude of their possible 
consequences. 
We feel sure of this because in contemplating the 
discovery we are looking at it not only in itself 
but, more significantly, as a clue to a reality of 
which it is a manifestation. The pursuit of 
discovery is conducted from the start in these 
terms; all the time we are guided by sensing the 
presence of a hidden reality toward which our clues 
are pointing; and the discovery which terminates 
and satisfies this pursuit is sustained by the 
same vision. It claims to have made contact 
with reality: a reality which, being real, may yet 
reveal itself to future eyes in an indefinite range 
of unexpected manifestations.49 
For Polyani, real does not necessarily mean tangible; 
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it comes closer to meaning significant. "And since I regard 
the significance of a thing as more important than its 
tangibility, I shall say that minds and problems are more 
real than cobblestones. "50 Reality is that which yields 
meaning. 
Thus tacit knowing underlies explicit cognitive 
knowledge and allows us to uncover more and more of the 
hidden reality. Tacit knowing is the power that allows us 
to shape and make meaning of bits of logical information. 
All creation arises from the relationship between tacit and 
explicit knowing. This resonates with the theories of 
Dewey, Tillich, various "mystics", Bruner, Assigioli, and 
Noddings and Shore. 
Polyani also wrote about the sense in which all 
knowledge, including scientific knowledge, is personal. 
To engage in the search for scientific knowledge is to be 
deeply committed to the conviction that there is 
something there to be discovered. It is personal, 
in the sense of involving the personality of him 
who holds it ...The discoverer is filled with a 
compelling sense of responsibility for the pursuit 
of a hidden truth, which demands his services for 
revealing it. His act of knowing exercises a 
personal judgement in relating .evidence to an 
external reality, an aspect of which his is seeking 
to apprehend."51 
Polyani said that the positivistic ideal of objectivity 
is clearly a failure, yet it is difficult to find a 
plausible alternative. He suggested that his own theory of 
tacit knowing is a preparation for this task. 
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Waves and Particles 
The theories of the "new physics" have shaken this 
positivistic notion of objectivity, this Cartesian split 
between the person and the thing observed. Fritjof Capra 
has written about ways in which the discoveries of the "new 
physics" parallel the wisdom of ancient mystics concerning 
the nature of the universe and human understanding. 
"Classical" physics proposed that matter consists of 
small, solid particles, whose behavior could be explained 
and predicted by mechanistic laws. These laws were 
shattered when it was demonstrated that atoms were not solid 
but consisted mostly of space in which minute particles 
moved. Then quantum theory showed that these particles were 
not"'even solid, but more like "abstract" entities that have 
a dual aspect. Depending on how we look at them, they 
appear sometimes as particles, sometimes as waves. 
The apparent contradiction between the particle 
and the wave picture was solved in a completely 
unexpected way which called in question the very 
foundation of the mechanistic world view--the 
concept of the reality of matter. At the subatomic 
level, matter does not exist with certainty at 
definite places, but rather shows 'tendencies to 
occur.' In the formalism of quantum theory, these 
tendencies are expressed as probabilities and are 
associated with mathematical quantities which 
take the form of waves. This is why particles 
can be waves at the same time. They are not 
'real' three dimensional waves like sound or water 
waves. They are 'probability waves,' abstract 
mathematical quantities with all the 
characteristic properties of waves which are 
related to the probabilities of finding the 
particles at particular points in space and at 
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particular times. All the laws of atomic physics 
are expressed in terms of these probabilities. We 
can never predict an atomic event with certainty; 
we can only say how likely it is to happen. 
Quantum theory has thus demolished the classical 
concepts of solid objects and of strictly 
deterministic laws of nature. At the subatomic 
level, the solid material objects of classical 
physics dissolve into wave-like patterns of 
probabilities, and these patterns, ultimately, 
do not represent probabilities of things, but 
rather probabilities of interconnections. A 
careful analysis of the process of observation in 
atomic physics has shown that the subatomic 
particles have no meaning as isolated entities, 
but can only be understood as interconnections 
between the preparation of an experiment and 
the subsequent measurement. Quantum theory thus 
reveals a basic oneness of the universe. It shows 
that we cannot decompose the , world into 
independently existing smallest units. As we 
penetrate into matter, nature does not show us 
any isolated 'basic building blocks', but rather 
appears as a complicated web of relations 
between the various parts of the whole. 
These relations always include the observer in 
an essential way. The human observer constitutes 
the final link in the chain of observational 
processes, and the properties of any atomic 
object can only be understood in terms of the 
object's interaction with the observer. This 
means that the classical ideal of an objective 
description of nature is no longer valid. The 
Cartesian partition between the I and the 
observed, cannot be made when dealing with atomic 
matter. In atomic physics, we can never speak 
about nature without, at the same time,speaking 
about ourselves.52 
The "ground of being", using the metaphors of this "new 
physics," consists of wave-like patterns of probabilities 
of interconnections. Individual particles can be "seen" to 
rise out of this background, but the particles do not lose 
their wave-like patterns. They are not isolated building 
blocks, but parts of the whole. The classical notion that 
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the world is composed of independent parts is reversed. 
Quantum interconnectedness becomes the ultimate ground for 
particular forms. This whole process does not occur apart 
from the observer of the process. The existence of the 
observer is necessary to account for the properties of the 
object observed. In other words, things do not exist 
independently of our perception of them, or at least they do 
not exist in the same ways that they exist when we perceive 
them. We are a part of the entire interconnected 
process. 
Another concept of the "new physics" relevant to this 
discussion is that of complementarity, introduced by the 
atomic physicist Niels Bohr. The principle of 
complementarity states that the nature of reality is such 
that several different but complementary descriptions of a 
particular aspect of it may be necessary to give a full 
desciption. For example the particle picture and the wave 
picture are each only partially correct and both are needed 
to give a complete description of atomic reality. Bohr 
applied the principle of complementarity to other areas than 
physics, such as psychology. 
It is obviously possible to use the metaphors of 
physics in relationship to modes of thinking, and I intend 
to do that. However, I want to make it clear that I am 
using these as metaphors. It is not valid to claim that 
knowledge about the physical universe can be applied 
directly to the mind. But quantum physics does show that 
these two things can never really be separated. And the 
appropriateness of the metaphorical application is striking. 
We could say that the wave properties of the universe, the 
underlying wholeness, are intuited by qualitative thought 
while quantitative thought apprehends the particle 
properties. In ordinary life most people are aware of 
neither the underlying wholeness nor our qualitative thought 
process. 
R i g h t  B r a i n  T h i n k i n g  a n d  L e f t  B r a i n  T h i n k i n g  
In 1972 Robert Ornstein published a book, The 
Psychology of Consciousness. which contained the essay "Two 
Sides of the Brain." This essay prompted the massive 
popularization of the idea that right side of the brain is 
responsible for holistic, intuitive thought whereas the the 
left side of the brain takes care of linear, logical 
thought. Ornstein suggested that these two basic modes of 
consciousness are physically located in the two hemispheres 
of the brain. If this were clearly true, the qualitative-
quantitative thinking distinction I'm making would have 
found a home in the body. 
The most commonly reported research based distinctions 
between the functions of the hemispheres are the following: 
left hemisphere -- language, mathematics, logic, sequential 
information processing; right hemisphere -- spatial 
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orientation, musical orientation, some emotional functions, 
holistic thought, synthetic information processing. On 
initial inspection, this seems to support some overall 
delineation into two basic modes of consciousness. 
However, there are two major reasons for not claiming 
that the two hemispheres represent the rational and the 
intuitive modes of knowing. The first is simply that the 
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data is not all in yet. In his 1987 book The Mind's New 
Science Howard Gardner wrote: 
Many sentences have been written about the 
optimal way in which to describe the dominance 
patterns of the two hemispheres. Characterizations 
range from the mundane (language in the left, 
spatial function in the right) to the grandiose 
(science or rationality in the left, art or 
intuition in the right) to a distinction that 
captures current debates in neuroscience (localized 
function in the left hemisphere, synthetic or 
holistic functioning in the right.) The precise 
characterization of the functions of the two 
hemispheres — or, more probably, determination that 
such a neat dichotomization is simply not possible-
-awaits the results of further studies... Yet 
whatever the mission of each isolated hemisphere, 
there is clearly a clearly dynamic interaction 
between the two hemispheres. When the left 
hemisphere is aroused (for instance, by the sounds 
of language), it promotes certain kinds of analytic 
and linguistic functions. In contrast, arousal or 
stimulation of the right hemisphere brings spatial 
and holistic functions to the fore...53 
The second reason is that if we do want to make a 
^summary delineation, subject to change as more data is 
available, it would seem more accurate to say, as 
psychologist Ken Wilbur does, that the left hemisphere 
specializes in sequential-digital-logical thought whereas 
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the right hemisphere specializes in pattern-analogic-spacial 
thought. Although this certainly seems to bear a 
relationship to the qualitative/quantitative distinction, it 
is not precisely clear what the relationship' is. 
Separate and Connected Knowing:"Masculine" 
and "Feminine" Modes 
The psychologist Carol Gilligan has written extensively 
about the absence of women as subjects in the research upon 
which most predominating psychological theories are based. 
Several theorists, including Gilligan, David Bakan, and 
Nancy Chodorow have suggested as well that psychologists 
have studied characteristics associated in the Western 
tradition with the more valued "masculine" rather than the 
"feminine." Thus we have a body of knowledge focused on 
autonomy and independence, abstact logical thought and the 
morality of abstract justice. We know little about empathy, 
interdependence, intimacy, and personal, connected ways of 
tbink ing. 
In Women's Wavs of Knowing. Belenky et al wrote: 
Nowhere is the pattern of using male experience to 
define the human experience seen more clearly than 
in models of intellectual development. The mental 
processes that are involved in considering the 
abstract and the impersonal have been labeled 
•thinking' and are attributed primarily to men, 
while those that deal with the personal and 
interpersonal fall under the rubric of 'emotions' 
and are largely relegated to women.54 
Both Gilligan and Belenky et al spoke of "separate and 
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connected knowing." Gilligan's concept refers more 
specifically to the relationship between self and other, 
whereas Belenky et al refer to the relationship knowers and 
the known, whether object or person. 
I will draw on Belenky et al's concept since it relates 
directly to the theory that I am developing here. Separate 
knowing is "based upon impersonal procedures for 
establishing truth."58 It is based on analytic, critical 
thought processes, on traditional reasoning processes, on 
objectivity, on doubt. In connected knowing, on the other 
hand, truth emerges through care. Connected knowing is 
subjective, based on personal knowledge, on the capacity for 
empathy with the known, on a sense of connection between 
self and other, self and object, self and world. 
It is clear that the characteristics of connected 
knowing overlap with qualitative thought. However, there is 
a difference in the sense in which these concepts are used 
by Belenky et al. The studies upon which this theory is 
based were a series of interviews conducted with adult 
female learners. The mode of connected knowing and separate 
knowing are presented more as different learning styles than 
as two aspects of the basic thought process. However, I 
believe that there is a strong connection between these 
understandings that merits further examination. 
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K n o w i n g  a n d  B e i n g  
A direct relationship between the qualitative thought 
process and a prior given reality, the "ground of being" or 
"God" or "the wave properties of the universe," has been 
suggested by some of the theories described above. Plato, 
Aristotle, and Hegel believed that there is a depth of 
knowing inherent in the structure of the mind that allows 
us to understand reality directly. Tillich stated that 
ontological reason, powered by love, is the ground of being. 
The concept of mysticism is based upon a sense of unity with 
the Absolute or God in which one experiences the basis of 
all knowing. Some theories of intuition, contain the belief 
that intuition allows us to contact reality directly. Other 
theorists discussed above do not make a direct claim for an 
ultimate reality but suggest that there is a type of 
thinking that at least makes us feel connected to a ground 
of being. Polyani's tacit knowing connects us with a hidden 
reality that is real simply because it yields meaning. 
Noddings and Shore do not know if we can contact ultimate 
reality directly, but what is significant is that' intuitive 
knowing makes us feel as if we do. For Dewey, the context 
for human knowing is the qualitative background, the feeling 
of reality as being an inclusive but unlimited whole. 
Is there an ultimate ground of being that we 
experience directly through what I am calling "qualitative 
thought," or does the process of qualitative thought merely 
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give us access to a wider consciousness, a wider frame of 
reference? Does qualitative knowing rise directly out of 
being? And does this knowing automatically give us access 
to some kind of ultimate reality? All of the theories 
discussed above seem to have in common the assumption that 
qualitative thought (ontological thought, mystical thought, 
intuition, tacit knowing) is automatic, relatively 
unconscious and always a part of the entire thought process, 
tn this sense we could say that these theories suggest that 
knowing does rise out of being, in the sense of an 
individual human being. 
But does being imply Being in some ultimate sense? 
This is where the theorists divide. Clearly one can offer 
no conclusive "proof" one way or another. The theoretical 
concept of "qualitative thought" is useful in either case. 
Qualitative and Quantitative Thought Revisited 
I have presented a number of theories that I believe 
express the same basic understanding of the process of 
thinking. I will review the key elements of this 
understanding, suggesting my own beliefs and making explicit 
any contradictions or differences among the variety of ideas 
outlined. 
1. There is a mode of knowing that is prior to 
logical, intellectual, cognitive thought processes. This 
mode of knowing is our most direct experience of reality, 
whether that reality is seen as "ultimate" reality or 
personal reality, or some combination of both. Although I 
am calling this mode of knowing "qualitative thought," it is 
not thought in the way in which that word is generally used. 
It is experienced more as an emotion or an intuition. 
2. Qualitative knowing precedes and makes possible 
logical or quantitative thought. Every explicit thought is 
derived from an an underlying, prior feeling-intuition. 
3. Qualitatitive thought has a shaping and 
integrating power that provides the meaningful context for 
quantitative thought. Qualitative thought energizes and 
guides quantitative thought along lines that allow us to 
make explicit sense of our experience. Just as in quantum 
physics where particles have no meaning as isolated entities 
but only have meaning when seen against the framework of 
interconnected waves, quantitative thought only has meaning 
when seen against the background of qualitative thought. 
4. Quantitative thought is a secondary thought 
process which gives us indirect knowledge about our 
experience. This information is necessary for complete 
understanding. Quantitative thought defines and delineates 
experience by dividing it into distinct objects, properties, 
names and relationships. 
5. We cannot fully understand self and world without 
quantitative thought just as we cannot make meaning of 
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quantitative information without the underlying qualitative 
thought. This is analagous to the complementarity principle 
of physics: the nature of reality is such that several 
different but complementary descriptions of a particular 
aspect of it are necessary to give a full description. 
Qualitative and quantitative thought together allow us 
to make meaning of our experience. Taken in its fullest, 
sense this process of making meaning is the creative 
process. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE MAKING OF MEANING: THE CREATIVE PROCESS 
The making and surrendering of meaning, it is 
suggested, is a 'universal' activity; but not 
because Someone remembers to make each person this 
way. It is universal because it is a single 
activity, there where the dance is, an activity 
which may itself be the Someone.1 
The M a k i n g  o £  M e a n i n g  a s  C r e a t i v e  E x p e r i e n c e  
During "this century the view that the making of 
meaning is the central activity of the human being has began 
to influence the fields of philosophy and psychology. 
Between 1910 and 1930 "Gestalt" psychologists Koffka and 
Kohler challenged traditional views of perception by 
suggesting that even the simplest visual perception involves 
a creative and personal insight. Existential philosophers 
such as Sartre and Frankl posited the individual human being 
as the source of all ideas, ideals, values and 
institutions, the creator of all "reality". John Dewey and 
Jean Piaget theorized about the development of our ability 
to make meaning and the change in the process through time 
in an individual life-span. 
I believe that to be a human being is to desire 
meaning and to attempt to make meaning, or more accurately, 
as psychologist Robert Kegan said: "Thus it is not that a 
person makes meaning, as much as that the activity of being 
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a person is the activity of meaning-making."2 There are 
myriad variations and levels of depth of meaning-making, 
from habitual perceptions or the dry memorization of word 
meanings for a vocabulary test to profound experiences of a 
sudden grasping of the meaning of one's existence, 
"conversions" that literally change one's life. 
The making of meaning is always an emotional and 
intuitive as well as a cognitive experience. Or, in the 
terms I developed in the last chapter, the making of meaning 
involves both quantitative and qualitative thought since 
all thinking involves both a qualitative and a quantitative 
dimension. Thoughts vary along the ranges of the strength 
of intensity of the qualitative, and the complexity of the 
quantitative. Thinking that is strongly rooted in the 
qualitative and varied and complex in the quantitative 
allows full participation in life; it is creative, which is 
to say that it is involved in the business of making, 
inventing, producing and discovering new forms, fresh 
avenues of understanding and expressing meaning. 
Creative experience involves bringing something new 
into being, discovering a new form that meaningfully conveys 
information. We can be creative in any number of ways, such 
as words, perceptions, mathematical symbols, artistic 
symbols, body movements or human relationships. 
A creative experience is not necessarily one that has 
never been experienced by any one else before. It is 
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creative because it contains meaning that is fresh and new 
for a particular individual. I can perceive the tree 
outside my window habitually without really experiencing 
it, or I can perceive it creatively, a novel and emotional 
experience every time I look at it, an experience that feels 
meaningful. Each three year' old child who discovers that 
blocks or stones stack one on top of each other to make 
towers is making a tremendously exciting discovery, even 
though this discovery has been made millions of times 
throughout history and will be made millions more. Whether 
or not the form a person uses is totally new historically 
may be significant in the long run, but in the esthetic 
sense it is our own personal discovery of it that is 
Important. 
All types of experience are potentially esthetic, 
including intellectual experience. Esthetic experience is 
characterized by its immediate quality. Ideas, no matter 
how complex, must be immediately and intuitively felt and 
sensed if they are to be fully understood. Creative 
thinking is with relations of qualities, not just with signs 
and symbols. Intellectual experience is different from 
artistic experience only in that it uses signs and symbols 
to express itself instead of physical materials. Both are 
based on emotional, imaginative thought. Scientific," 
phil osophic and artistic creativity all proceed by "means 
of meanings that exist immediately as feelings having 
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qualitative color."3 
In AiLt and Experience Dewey was concerned with 
esthetic or creative experience and thought, in contrast to 
experience and thought that has become mechanical, lifeless 
and routine. For Dewey the esthetic experience was one that 
combines qualitative and quantitative thought. He saw 
esthetic experience as natural, and ordinary experience as 
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the result of the artificial conditions of modern times that 
have separated art from life. Dewey believed that human 
beings are "programmed" so that all thought and experience 
should be creative, characterized by full immersion in the 
qualitative and appropriate expression in the quantitative. 
In other words, all thought and experience is intended to 
feel meaningful. However, this does not characterize the 
experience of most people in the world today. Creative 
thought and experience have become separate from everyday 
living. At one time the central function of the arts and 
religion was to "intensify the sense of immediate living." 
For example, domestic utensils were works of art, and 
dancing and theater were a part of religious and civic 
celebration. Dewey believed that the rise of capitalism, 
industrialization and technology, as well as increasing 
compartmentalization of occupations and interests, have 
separated art from life. Dewey was trying to recover "the 
continuity of esthetic experience with normal processes of 
living."4 He began by attempting to understand those 
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processes. What are the essential operations o£ a natural 
life? 
All of life consists of the interaction of organism 
with environment. The gap between organism and environment 
must be narrow enough to keep the organism alive but wide 
enough to support growth. Growth occurs when the organism 
encounters tension in the environment, and in reacting to 
it, forms a new equilibrium and a greater order around a 
more extensive balance of energies. This kind of internally 
developed order brings a harmonious feeling to living 
creatures. The constant rhythm of disequilibrium with the 
environment and then recovery of union with it is 
characteristic of all of life, but humans become conscious 
of it. This consciousness is the basis of the esthetic or 
creative quality. It is the basis of meaning. 
Dewey said that there are two kinds of worlds in 
which esthetic experience could not occur: 
In a world of mere flux, change would not be 
cumulative; it would not move toward a close. 
Stability and rest would have no being. Equally is 
it true, however, that a world that is finished, 
indeed, would have no traits of suspense and 
crisis, and would offer no opportunity for 
resolution. Where everything is already complete, 
there is no opportunity for fulfillment... Because 
the actual world,, that in which we live, is a 
combination of movement and culmination, of breaks 
and reunions, the experience of a living creature 
is capable of esthetic quality...The moment of 
passage from disturbance to harmony is that of 
intensest life.5 
Alfred North Whitehead also discussed the necessity for 
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both order and expressive change. In deciding which 
civilizations are both stable and creative, Whitehead said: 
"Order is not sufficient. What is required is something 
much more complex. It is order entering upon novelty; so 
that the novelty is always reflected on a background of 
system."6 
Dr. Ilya Prigogene won the 1957 Nobel Prize in 
physics for his theory of dissipative structures. This 
theory explains how creation comes from chaos. Prigogene 
said that all life in the universe is part of a dynamic 
state that fluctuates between rest and perturbation. 
Periodically, living sysems become so perturbed that they 
seem to dissipate, and in fact, their existing form is 
destroyed. At that point they either die altogether or are 
recollected in a less frivolous state, one with a more 
coherent, "higher" order of organization. The greater the 
turbulence, the more complex the structure, the more often 
it seems to go into perturbation.7 
These three theoretical constructs illustrate the idea 
that the process of esthetic or creative experience has 
parallels at all levels of life, from subatomic to societal. 
What is potentially unique about the esthetic experience of 
the human being is the consciousness of the meaning of the 
experience. 
Experiences all consist of receptive and active phases, 
which Dewey referred to as "undergoing" and "doing". In an 
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authentic experience, these phases are united. William 
James compared the course of a conscious experience to 
alternating flights and rests of a bird, which are 
intimately connected with one another: "Like a bird's life 
(thought) seems to be made of an alternation of flights and 
perchings."8 
The "undergoing" or resting phase corresponds to 
qualitative thought while the "doing" or active phase 
corresponds to quantitative thought. However, in actuality 
these phases are so united as to be inseparable. ^ In an 
interview on the day before he died, Niels Bohr said this 
his understanding of quantum mechanics was greatly 
influenced by this idea of James. The "flights and 
perchings" as well as the inablity to separate the two seem 
to suggests Bohr's theory of the behavior of atomic 
particles as well as the principle of complementarity. 
When applied to thinking, the principle of 
complementarity suggests that several different but 
complementary descriptions of thought are necessary to give 
a full description. These different but complementary 
descriptions have been named here qualitative and 
quantitative thought. Not only are they both necessary 
to make meaning of our experience, but they are usually 
virtually inseparable in terms of the way that we experience 
them. They are the two intertwined components of meaning 
making, of our natural human ability to transform raw 
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experience into our own unique creative existence. 
Esthetic experience is the conscious fulfillment of the 
human being in her struggles and achievements in the world. 
For fulfillment to occur, successive parts must flow 
together, must comprise a unity: "There are no holes when 
we have an experience."9 The unity is constituted by 
the qualitative background, which unites emotion, senses, 
perception, intellect, body, purpose, interest and action in 
a single experience, the transformation of a form. The form 
may be be a thought or concept, as in the intellectual 
experience; it may be the body, as in athletics, dance or 
theater; it may be material substance, as in painting, 
sculpture or architecture; or it may be a relationship with 
a living being. In any case, esthetic experience implies 
full participation in and communion with the world around 
us. Self and object cooperate so fully in experience that 
each disappears. Dewey quoted Goethe: "Nature has neither 
kernel nor shell."10 
Another way of saying this is that qualitative thought 
provides the underlying unity that guides creative 
production in the quantitative domains. Or in Polyani's 
words, tacit knowing shapes and integrates explicit creative 
discoveries. Or in Capra's words, intuition guides logic in 
the creative process. 
Every complete aesthetic experience develops an 
appropriate expressive form. Form is inherently connected 
with substance in esthetic experience because it is not 
imposed from without but rather created from within as the 
most perfect consummation of a particular experience 
available to its creator. Technique is the skill with which 
the inner form is outwardly displayed. Advances in 
technique grow out of the need for new kinds of experience 
or out of a desire to express a novel kind of experience. 
The Creative Process 
The term "the creative process" is generally used in a 
more specific sense than the way in which I have referred 
it. I have suggested that by its very nature all experience 
is potentially creative experience. I have also suggested 
some of the forces that interfere with this natural process. 
But now I am referring to the use of the term as the 
process that results in the production of some definite, 
tangible creative product: a symphony, a mathematical model, 
a child's painting, a recipe, a new solution to a human 
relations dilemma, etc. This creative processs has been 
extensively pondered on by a variety of philosophers, 
artists, scientists and psychologists during the past 
several thousand years. Plato and Aristotle both speculated 
about it; such artists as Blake, Wordsworth, Coleridge, 
Shelley, Keats, Henry James and Van Gogh pondered it; 
Einstein and Poincare are among scientists and 
mathemeticians who have instrospected about their own 
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creative processes; and in the field of psychology, Arthur 
Koestler, Jerome Bruner, Rollo May, Carl Rogers and Howard 
Gardner are among many who have had a good deal to say 
about the subject in recent years. 
Naturally there is a great variety in theoretical 
orientations and conclusions about the creative process. Yet 
the differences allow certain widespread agreements to stand 
out vividly. Most theorists agree that creativity is based 
on these two kinds of thought processes: conscious, 
logical, systematic ones and unconscious, inspired, 
intuitive ones, those which I am calling qualitative and 
quantitative thought. One of the more fascinating aspects of 
recent creativity literature is the reporting of careful 
analysis of the accounts of hundreds of artists and 
scientists concerning their own individual creative process. 
The results of this analysis have been synthesized into 
general agreement on four steps in the creative process of 
adults working on a problem in a field in which they are 
already proficient. The steps are the following: 1) a 
preparatory period of conscious effort to grasp the solution 
to a problem, 2) a period in which the person "gives up" and 
turns to another activity, theoretically allowing deeper 
parts of consciousness to work on the problem, 3) the "flash 
of insight" in which the solution to the problem is 
intuitivly understood, and 4) a period of verification, 
testing, and rational understanding. 
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Capra wrote about scientific research: "The rational 
part of research would, in fact, be useless if it were not 
complemented by the intuition that gives scientists new 
insights and makes them creative. These insights tend to 
come suddenly and, characteristically, not when sitting at a 
desk working out the equations, but when relaxing, in the 
bath, during a walk in the woods, on the beach, etc. During 
these periods of relaxation after concentrated intellectual 
activity, the intuitive mind seems to take over and can 
produce the sudden clarifying insights which give so much 
joy and delight to scientific research."11 
The writings of great theoretical mathematicians and 
physicists abound with examples of how intuitions guided 
their discoveries. Einstein had great gifts in both the 
fields of mathematics and physics; he wrote about his 
decision to pursue physics: "...my intuition was not strong 
enough in the field of mathematics... In (physics) however, I 
soon learned to scent out that which was able to lead to 
fundamentals and to turn aside from everything else, from 
the multitude of things that clutter up the mind and divert 
it from the essential."12 
The mathemetician Henri Poincare wrote about the 
process of creation in mathematics: 
In a word, my memory is not bad, but it would be 
insufficient to make me a good chess player. Why 
then does it not fail me in a difficult piece of 
mathematical reasoning where most chess players 
wouldlose themselves? Evidently because it is 
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guided by the general march of the reasoning. A 
mathematical demonstration is not a simple 
juxtaposition of syllogisms, it is syllogisms 
placed in a certain order, and the order in which 
these elements are placed is much more important 
than the elements themselves. If I have the 
feeling, the intuition, so to speak, of this 
order, so as to perceive at a glance the reasoning 
as a whole, I need no longer fear lest I forget 
one of the elements for each of them will take its 
allotted place in the array, and that without any 
effort of memory on my part. 
We know that this feeling, this intuition of 
mathematical order, that makes us divine hidden 
harmonies and relations, can not be 
possessed by everyone. Some will not have either 
this delicate feeling so difficult to define, or a 
strength of memory and attention beyond the 
ordinary, and then they will be absolutely 
incapable of understanding higher mathematics. 
Such are the majority. Others will have 
this feeling only in a slight degree, but they 
will be gifted with an uncommon memory and a 
great power of attention. They will learn by 
heart the details one after another; they can 
understand mathematics andsometimes make 
applications, but they cannot create. Others, 
finally will possess in a less or greater degree 
the special intuition referred to, and then not 
only can they understand mathematics even if 
their memory is nothing extraordinary, but they 
may become creators and try to invent with more 
or less success according as this intuition is 
more or less developed in them.13 
Some examples from the writings of artists show the 
same process at work. In a letter to his brother, Van Gogh 
said: "emotions are sometimes so strong that one works 
without knowing that one works, and the strokes come with a 
sequence and coherence like that of words in a speech or 
letter. "14 In analyzing the process of musical composition 
as discussed by famous composers, Howard Gardner presented 
Aaron Copland's view as representative: 
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The sole element of the mystery, in Copland's view, 
is the source of an initial musical idea. As he 
sees it, themes initially come to the composer as a 
gift from heaven, much like automatic writing. And 
that is the reason why many composers keep a 
notebook around. Once the idea has come, the 
process of development and elaboration follows with 
surprising naturalness, eventually with 
inevitablity, thanks in part to the many techniques 
available as well as to the accessibility of 
structrual forms or "schemes" that have evolved 
over the years.15 
The poet Amy Lowell described the poetic process in 
similar terms: 
Let us admit at once that the poet is something 
like a radio aeriel—he is capable of receiving 
messages on waves of some sort; but he is more 
that an aerial, for he possesses the capacity of 
transmuting these messages into those patterns of 
words we call poems. 
It would seem that a scientific definition of a 
poet might put it something like this: a man of an 
extraordinarily sensitive and active subconscious 
personality, fed by, and feeding, a non-resistant 
consciousness. A common phrase among poets is, 'It 
came to me.' So hackneyed has this become that one 
learns to suppress the expression with care, but 
really it is the best description I know of the 
conscious arrival of a poem. 
Sometimes the external stimuli which has produced a 
poem is known or can be traced. It may be a sight, 
a sound, a thought, or an emotion. Sometimes the 
consciousness has no record of the initial impulse, 
which has either been forgotten or springs from a 
deep, unrealized memory. But whatever it is, 
emotion apprehended or hidden, is a part of it, for 
only emotion can rouse the subconscious into 
action.16 
Scientists, poets, musical composers, mathematicians, 
and artists have all described the creative process 
peculiar to them as a powerful underlying feeling or 
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intuition, a qualitative thought, that transmits some kind 
of information that is translated into the quantitative 
language of the particular discipline. 
Imagination 
Two of the definitions of imagination given 
in Webster's Dictionary are these: 1) "the act or power of 
forming a mental image of something not present to the 
senses or never before wholly perceived in reality; 2) 
creative ability." Creativity and imagination are thus 
linked by definition; they are also closely linked in most 
theories about creative process. In Imagination Harold 
Rugg says: "Imagination is the instrument of discovery. 
The poet and the scientist agree. Discovery is conceiving 
in imagination, or, more succinctly, discovery is imagined 
conception."17 In writing about the creative process Arthur 
Koestler said: "Artists treat facts as a stimuli for 
imagination, whereas scientists use imagination to 
coordinate facts."18 
Imagination can be experienced as visual images, as 
auditory sounds, as tactile or kinesthetic experiences, or 
even as tastes or smells. Albert Einstein described his 
process of imagination as it linked the qualitative and the 
quantitative: 
The words or the language, as they are written or 
spoken, do not seem to play any role in my 
mechanism of thought. The psychical entities which 
seem to serve as elements in thought are certain 
signs and more or less clear images which can be 
"voluntarily" reproduced and combined.19 
Imagination allows us to hold a mental image of a thing 
or event not present before our physical senses. This thing 
or event can be an actual remembered one or one not yet 
created, existing only as a picture in the mind. Thus 
imagination is the process that allows past and future to 
impact on the present. All esthetic experience involves 
the use of imagination. 
In the terms we have been using, imagination links 
qualitative and quantitative thought. Thoughts begin as 
emotional, intuitive, qualitative experiences. They are 
translated into concrete forms through the use of 
imagination. 
Esthetic Experience and Morality 
By definition qualitative thinking gives us the 
capacity to feel a profound sense of connection between self 
and the entire world outside self. This sense of connection 
can be a part of a feeling of caring and commitment to 
all of life, as well as specific manifestations of 
life. I do not believe that the feeling of qualitative 
connection is sufficient to guarantee moral feeling and 
action, but I do think that the presence of a strong 
sense of qualitative knowing can be one important component 
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of commitment to the welfare of others. 
The imagination can also contribute to moral sympathy. 
The poet Shelley suggested that "the great secret of morals 
is love, or a going out of our nature and the identification 
of ourselves with the beautiful which exists in thought, 
action or person not our own. A man to be greatly good must 
imagine intensely and comprehensively."20 In this sense 
sympathy through imagination can be seen as one of the 
roots of friendship and a just society. Dewey said that 
morals are shared values, and since both esthetic experience 
and morality are based on felt values, he believes that they 
are nurtured simultaneously. 
Herbert Read believed that esthetic experience is a 
tool that helps the individual to achieve an inner 
discipline combining organic growth, harmonious form, and 
the self-knowledge that leads to selflessness. He asserted 
that esthetic experience reconciles individual uniqueness 
with social unity by enhancing awareness that self-
expression arises from organic wholeness of community. He 
argued that the purpose of education should be the same as 
that of esthetic experience, "to preserve the organic 
wholeness of man and of his mental faculties, so that as he 
passes from childhood to manhood, from savagery to 
civilization, he nevertheless retains the unity of 
consciousness which is the only source of social harmony and 
individual happiness."21 
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I believe that esthetic experience contributes to 
morality in the ways suggested by Dewey and Read. I also 
recognize that there are many other contributing factors 
outside of the major focus of this dissertation, such as 
critical awareness of the roots of injustice, and strength 
of personal will and commitment. But I think that this 
theory of the development of creative thinking can 
• 
contribute to an understanding about the way human beings 
can live together harmoniously. 
Creative Imagination in Children 
The creative imagination is commonly recognized as 
being strongly present in two groups of people: creative 
geniuses such as Einstein, Poincare, Van Gogh, Aaron 
Copeland, and Amy Lowell; and young children. As Howard 
Gardner, who studies children's creativity, said: "The 
preschool years are often described as a golden age of 
creativity, a time when every child sparkles with 
artistry... Step into almost any nursery school and you 
enter a world graced with the imagination and inventiveness 
of children."22 
What is the link between the creative imagination of 
childhood and the imagination of later adult genius? Edith 
Cobb spent many years searching for the childhood roots of 
genius in autobiographies of well-known creative adults. In 
The Ecology of Imagination in Childhood she suggested that 
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there is an "ecology of imagination in childhood from which 
all later creative activities evolve."23 Since it is the 
genius who is responsible for leaps in human consciousness, 
it is the creative imagination of childhood that is the root 
of human evolution. 
What is the relationship of creative thinking to the 
human developmental process? How and when do qualitative 
and quantitative thought develop and combine? Why do most 
children seem to lose their ability to think creatively as 
they grow older? Why are exceptional adults able to retain 
the power of the creative imagination? These are some of 
the questions that I will address in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE THOUGHT AND THE 
PROCESS OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 
Person is understood to refer as much to an 
activity as a thing--an ever progressive motion 
engaged .in giving itself a new form. 1 
For, unlike all other animal species, the human 
child displays a spontaneous striving to go beyond 
biological fulfillment and maturation and to add 
form and novelty to the environment. 2 
Every child is an artist. The problem is how to 
remain an artist once he grows up. 3 
Human Development as an Idea 
What do we mean when we talk about human development? 
The concept of development suggests growth, progress and 
evolution. In Religious Education Development. Gabriel 
Moran suggested that this is a decidedly modern and Western 
view. In fact, he said: "The very existence of the word 
modern is probably linked to a doctrine of progress."4 
Ancient philosophers saw development as proceeding backward 
and downward or in a circle, as well as forward and upward. 
Kegan called developmental ism "the cultural symbolic of our 
time." 5 The modern meaning of development implies not only 
progress but evolution through predictable stages. As Kegan 
put it: " organic systems evolve through eras according to 
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regular principles o£ stability and change." 6  The idea o £  
development applied to human beings results in the concept 
that we evolve from birth through predictable stages. 
Main Schools of Human Development 
Two distinct approaches currently dominate the field of 
human development. The psychoanalytic approach to 
personality development once reigned supreme but in recent 
years has lost much of its power in popular and academic 
circles. The most prominant psychoanalytic developmentalists 
are Freud and Erik Erikson. 
Freud's developmental theory is based on the concept of 
a biological energy, libido, present at birth in a fixed 
amount and moving to different areas of the body -- mouth, 
anus, genitals -- in a predetermined timing that fixes the 
psychological stages of the human being. Intense emotions 
arise from the relationship of the libidinal energy at any 
given stage to the human beings in close proximity. Freud 
saw thought as largely subject to this intense emotional 
experience. The massive unconscious content of the adult 
mind that Freud postulated results largely from the 
repression of infantile thoughts commingling with 
overpowering emotion. 
Erickson retained the concepts of libido and the 
dominance of emotionbut made social experience primary to 
biology in determining the course of development. 
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Erickson's stages are based on the outcome of a psycho­
social issue dominating each period of development. For 
example, in the first stage the infant struggles' to attain 
"basic trust" of the world. Whether the outcome is trust or 
mistrust depends on the infant's social experiences. 
For Freud, Erickson and other psychoanalytic theorists, 
emotion is the critical force in the developing human being. 
/ 
The mind is subservient to emotion as the organizing energy. 
The other major approach to human development, the 
cognitive developmental approach, asserts that the mind is 
the major organizing force in the developmental process. 
Piaget, the dominant theorist of this approach, charted 
stages of mental growth resulting from the interaction 
between the internal structure of the mind at any given time 
and the outer environment. In other words, he believed 
that thinking develops in stages through the dialectic 
between the inquiring human mind and unresolved questions in 
the environment. 
When Piaget theorized that thinking is the organizing 
and developing force in all human experience, he meant what 
I am referring to as quantitative thinking, the ability to 
abstract reality into symbols, to analyze it into smaller 
component parts, to delineate it into objects, properties, 
distinct names, relationships and so on. Piaget saw this 
type of thinking as leading and controlling emotional 
growth, social growth, and moral growth. He viewed the 
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developing human being as basically rational, a philosopher 
or scientist. 
Many psychologists have followed in Piaget's footsteps, 
building corollary theories based on his stages of 
development. For example, Lawrence Kohlberg theorized 
about moral development; James Fowler wrote about the 
development of faith; Howard Gardner is concerned with 
esthetic development. In these theories, cognition leads and 
all else follows. The development of morality, faith or 
esthetic ability in any person can proceed no farther than 
that person's level of ability in quantitative thinking. 
The Hierarchical Nature of Developmental Theory 
The cognitive developmental perspective is a 
hierarchical one. Development is seen to proceed through 
sequential, ordered, increasingly complex stages. As 
Kohlberg and Mayer explained in "Development as the Aim of 
Education," "The educational goal is the eventual 
attainment of a higher level or stage of development in 
adulthood, not merely the healthy functioning of the child 
at the present level...A more developed psychological state 
is more valuable or adequate than a less developed state."7 
The child's view of the world becomes more accurate, in a 
scientific sense, as development proceeds. 
If the ultimate criteria for judging the objective 
truth and thus the validity of any mental, moral, religious 
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or esthetic experience is its place on the cognitive 
hierarchy, then childhood experience is always subtly 
denigrated. This remains true despite the great 
contribution of cognitive psychology in demonstrating the 
uniqueness of each stage of development.For a child does 
not come into the world knowing how to quantify it. 
Her increasingly complex ability to do so, in many different 
forms, is evidence of mastery of critical developmental 
tasks. However, if a certain level of quantifying ability 
is taken as the "entrance requirement" for a more valuable 
and adequate cognitive or moral or religious or esthetic 
experience, then the experience of childhood will never be 
viewed as complete. 
Psychoanalytic stage theories of development are also 
hierarchical. If the intended outcomes occur, the intense 
libido-powered emotions of infancy and early childhood 
increasingly come under the control of the ego and superego. 
Desires are tamed in the service of society, although the 
danger for regresssion to the intense emotional desires of 
infancy is never completely vanquished. In psychoanayltic 
developmental theory, as well as cognitive developmental 
theory, we have the capacity to become "better" as we 
proceed toward adulthood. 
But this idea follows inherently from the modern 
meaning of development as progress. In this sense, 
development is inherently hierarchical. 
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Relevant Alternative Theories of Development 
There are some theories of human development that 
attempt to come to terms with human knowing in a broader 
sense than the quantitative one. Some of these cast a 
different light on the hierarchical nature of human 
development. Since a complete review of this literature is 
not possible in the scope of this chapter, I want to briefly 
discuss several of the most relevant. 
In The Evolving Self Robert Kegan presents a theory of 
the psychology of human development that integrates the 
Piagetian cognitive perspective with the Freudian 
psychoanalytic perspective, or, to put this in other terms, 
personal meaning-making as thought, viewed from the outside, 
with personal meaning-making as feeling, felt from the 
inside. Kegan noted that no psychology has ever 
successfully integrated these two components. He certainly 
has begun the process. He wrote: 
Psychoanalytic theory is sometimes thought of as a 
theory about affect, and cognitive-developmental 
theory as a theory about cognition; but in truth 
each is a theory of both, arid each makes one 
dimension the master of personality and the other 
the slave.8 
Kegan's theory does not exactly overlap with mine since 
he was conceptualizing about personality development as 
a whole, whereas I am dealing with the development of 
thinking. As such I write about the emotions underlying 
thought but not about emotional development as an aspect of 
personality. That these are not really separate is true 
and is also one of Kegan's major theses. It is more a 
matter of the particular focus or lens one is using to view 
the human being. My lens in this dissertation is somewhat 
different than Kegan's. 
Kegan viewed "person" as synonoinous with- "creative 
activity," as quoted in this chapter heading. He quoted 
Hegel as saying: "The spirit is never at rest but always 
engaged in ever progessive motion, in giving itself a new 
form."9 Kegan said that it is this motion he wrote about. 
It is the activity inherent in human being. A human being 
is inherently a maker of meaning, an active creator of self 
and world. 
Kegan saw neither emotion or thought as dominant over 
the other but both as subject to a prior experience, that of 
meaning-making. "There is thus no feeling, no experience, 
no thought, no perception, independent of a meaning-making 
context in which it becomes a feeling, an experience, a 
thought, a perception, because we are the meaning-making 
context."10 
In my terms I would say that qualitative thought is 
our initial and our most basic experience of ourselves as 
meaning-making context. This felt experience underlies all 
other more specific experiences, feelings, thoughts and 
perceptions. 
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In The Radiant Child Thomas Armstrong presented a dual 
theory of child development that integrates traditional 
psychological frameworks with religious and spiritual 
perspectives. 
According to Geoffrey Hodson, an esoteric 
philosopher, 'the child like all human beings, is 
primarily dual: an immortal spiritual being in a 
mortal spiritual body.' Within this context, 
I can begin to speak of two different dimenstions 
or lines of development within the child. One line 
describes the growth of the child ultimately in 
biological/material terms. This strand has been 
very well explored and documented by contemporary 
developmental psychology. I call this line the 
development of the child from the body up. 
I would claim that there is a second line of 
development which parallels, interacts with, and 
may even ultimately support the development of the 
first line of growth. This hidden line of 
development I call the growth of the child from the 
spirit down.11 
According to Armstrong, spirit down development has its 
roots in some realm of existence beyond explanation, a realm 
of spirit postulated by various religious and mystical 
traditions. He also mentions the Jungian concept of 
collective unconscious as a way of conceptualizing the 
realm. 
Hazrat Inayat Khan wrote about mystical beliefs of the 
spiritual origins of the human being: 
The infant that is born on earth brings with it the 
air of heaven. In its expression, in its smiles, 
even in its cry you hear the melody of the heavens. 
The Sufi point of view it that an infant is an 
exile from heaven, and that is why its first 
expression on earth is a cry. The soul that comes 
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from above feels uncomfortable on the dense 
earth.12 
This way of looking at development changes its 
hierarchical nature. In one respect, infants are 
more evolved than adults, because of their link with the 
roots of spirit or "heaven." Armstrong's imagery of 
development proceeding in two directions, "top down" and 
"bottom up" is more akin to that of the ancient rather than 
the modern philosphers: development proceeds in both 
directions, or possibly in a circle. 
Although many religious and spiritual teachers have 
written about the process of human development, there are 
three who have written most extensively and whose works 
contain remarkable similarities. These are Hazrat Inayat 
Khan, the Sufi quoted above; Rudolph Steiner, a German 
Christian; and Aurobindo Ghose, A Hindu. In Educating for 
wholeness: The Visions of Human Becoming and Qf gflygaUon 
of Rudolf Steiner. Aurobindo Ghose. and Inayat Khan, David 
Marshak examined and compared the theories of these men. 
Despite all the distinctions that draw the visions 
of human nature of Steiner, Aurobindo, and 
Inayat Khan apart, their common center holds 
fast. This commonality articulates a vision of 
human nature in which each of us consists of at 
least four separate yet integral sub-systems: a 
physical being, a life-force being, a mental being, 
and a spiritual being. Each of these sub-systems 
exists primarily though not exclusively on its own 
plane of being, each of which is composed of 
vibrations that grow higher and finer from the 
material to the life-force, from the life-force to 
the mental, and from the mental to the spiritual. 
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Finally, this common center describes the true self 
within each of us as the spiritual being. This 
true self is a spark of divinity that seeks to 
emerge into consciousness, for such an emergence is 
the next step in the evolution of our species.13 
Marshak noted that the discoveries of all of these 
teachers are in conguence with those of Piaget and other 
cognitive developmental psychologists, but they go beyond 
them. Of the four beings postulated by these three 
theorists -- physical, mental, life-force (which roughly 
corresponds to the emotional) and spiritual — contemporary 
developmental theories only deal with the first three. 
The theory of qualitative knowing offers a way of 
understanding our connection to an aspect of ourselves that 
could be called spiritual or religious. On the other hand, 
it does not have to be called spiritual or religious. It 
can simply be seen as our most basic way of knowing about 
the universe, one that can be explained with "scientific" 
and well as "religious" metaphors. 
Ken Wilber is a psychologist who has spent many years 
writing about the integration of traditional views of human 
development with views of human development from the world's 
contemplative religious traditions. In "The Spectrum of 
Development," he summarized his nine-stage system, based on 
structures of consciousness that include the body, the 
mind, the emotions and the spirit. The ultimate stage of 
his system is the fundamental ground of being: "Strictly 
speaking, the ultimate is not one level among others, but 
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the reality, condition, or suchness of all levels."14 
Wilber's first five levels of consciousness correspond 
directly to Piaget's. The last four are higher levels of 
knowing that include the most advanced levels of spiritual 
understanding. Wilbur's system is completely hierarchical. 
Infants begin by developing the rational mind; after 
that is developed, "higher" modes of consciousness can be 
attained. 
Wilber explicitly denies that infants and young 
children are capable of true spiritual experience. He 
rejects the idea that the infant's feelings of connectedness 
have any spiritual basis. Infantile unity is based on 
fusion with the mother due to the lack of development of a 
separate sense of self. This material union is "the lowest 
possible unity of all--there is nothing metaphysically 
•high* about it." 15 
One of Wilber's best known concepts is that of the 
"pre/trans fallacy."16 This fallacy occurs in two 
directions. The first is when a theorist mistakenly reduces 
authentic adult spiritual experience to a lower infantile 
level. The classical psychoanalytic position on mystical 
experience as infantile narcissisistic regression 
illustrates this. The second is when the infantile material 
unity consciousness is elevated to the level of genuine 
religious experience. 
I have found the pre-trans fallacy to be a useful one 
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in critiquing certain theoretical formulations. But I feel 
that it lacks sophistication due to the linear nature of 
Wilber's model. In Armstrong's terms, Wilber recognizes 
only the "body up" and not the "top down" line of 
development. In my terms, he believes that access to 
qualitative knowing can develop only after we have 
completely developed quantitative modes. I do not see any 
reason why this should be true, and I see plenty of evidence 
that it is not. Wilber's confusion is illustrated by the 
fact that he places "ultimate ground of being" at the top of 
his system, as stage ten, but then says, as I quoted above, 
that in reality it is the ground or suchness or condition of 
all of the levels. It seems to me that if it is the 
condition of all of the levels, it must be accessible from 
all of the levels. 
In "A Transcendental Developmental Ideology of 
Education," James Macdonald proposed a system of human 
development similar to my own. He critiqued technical, 
rational, hierarchical thinking as an outdated way of 
viewing our contemporary world. He said that an 
understanding of quantum physics calls for a new 
interpretation of the physical universe and new 
understanding of modes of knowing. While the cognitive 
developmental perspective explains the linear rationality 
underlying mechanistic physics, only the new developmental 
perspective that he called transcendental can account for 
\ 
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the wave properties underlying quantum physics. 
Transcendental development is based on intuitive, 
tacit, personal modes of knowing. Macdonald said: "A 
transcendental ideology would shift the predominant 
rationality toward the aesthetic, intuitive, and spontaneous 
in the mutual process of centering."17 Knowledge gained 
through centering is rooted in an ultimate "ground of 
being": "the possibilities of accessibility to knowledge 
from 'hidden' inner sources operating on a-causal, or 
integrative, or serial or synchronistic basis point directly 
toward the awareness of another ground of knowledge in human 
beings."18 
According to Macdonald, knowledge occurs through a 
"dual dialectic." The first dialectic is the same as 
Piaget's, between outer world and rational mind. The second 
dialectic is between the inner self, the ground of being, 
and the rational mind. These two dialectics result in an 
expanded understanding of knowledge: "Thus, knowledge is 
not simply things and relationships that are real in the 
outer world and waiting to be discovered, but it is a 
process of personalizing the outer world through the inner 
potential of the human being as it interacts with outer 
reality."19 
My understanding of knowing is consonant with 
Macdonald's. In my terms, qualitative knowing underlies 
quantitative knowing. Although knowledge can be acquired 
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through a purely qualitative mode, most of our knowing is a 
result of the relationship between qualitative and 
quantitative modes. 
In liue Original Vision. A study of the Religious 
Experience of Childhood. Edward Robinson suggested that "the 
original vision of childhood" is a form of knowing that is 
indispensible to later adult knowing. The phrase is from a 
passage by Edward Muir: 
A child has a picture of human existence peculiar 
to himself, which he probably never remembers after 
he has lost it: the original vision of the world. 
I think of this picture or vision as that of a 
state in which the earth, the houses of the earth, 
and the life of every human being are related to 
the sky overarching them; as if the sky fitted the 
earth and the earth the sky. Certain dreams 
convince me that a child has this vision, in which 
there is a completer harmony of all things with 
each other than he will ever know again.20 
Robinson suggested that childhood be seen as a 
dimension of life, rather than a chronological period. It 
is only as adults, exploring our childhood memories, that we 
can become fully conscious of the meaning of this dimension. 
Robinson's data is from an Oxford University study of 
religious experience in which 4000 adults who "felt that 
their lives had in any way been affected by some power 
beyond themselves"21 wrote accounts of the experiences and 
the effects they had on their lives. About 15% of these 
people offered experiences from their early childhood 
years. Studying these accounts led Robinson to the belief 
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that developmental psychologists, notably Piaget, typically 
underate childhood capacities for insight and understanding. 
Robinson wrote : "The starting point for all Piaget's 
thought about childhood is the incapacity of children to see 
the world as adults see it...Piaget is in fact continually 
setting children an exam in a subject that adults are good 
at and children bad. Predictably, the children fail."22 
Robinson associated the unitive vision of childhood 
with the adult process of inductive reasoning. Both 
synthesize, see relationships between the parts that form 
the whole. However, the first does not depend on logic, is 
immediate and holistic, while the second is logical, and he 
is not sure about the relationship between them. 
Robinson concluded that there is a childhood faculty 
for knowing that exists in us throughout our lives, an 
organic unity that can be symbolized as an unchanging 
circle. We can return to this original knowing at any time 
in our adult lives. This knowing may be labeled religious, 
spiritual, mystical and esthetic, but it doesn't have to 
be called any of these. It is essentially a unitive 
understanding of the relationship between all things, the 
meaningfulness of life. 
My theory is completely in line with Robinson's. I 
label his unitive vision of childhood "qualitative knowing " 
and understand it to be the given root of all thinking and 
knowing. I like his use of the symbol of the circle for 
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this type of knowing; we could add the symbol of the line 
to stand for quantitative knowing, and the picture would 
look like this: 
We begin with the circle; the line develops as we mature, 
but the circle contains the line. 
Images of the Developing Human Being 
The cognitive developmental perspective has provided 
our culture with an image of the developing child as 
miniature scientist, determined to experiment with and 
understand the world. This image is slowly rising to 
dominance. It has supplanted the image of the 
psychoanalytic perspective of child as wild animal instinct 
demanding fulfillment. 
Another prominent view of infancy and childhood comes 
from the behavioral psychologists. Behavioral psychology 
does not postulate regular stages of development. The 
newborn infant is seen as a "blank slate," which culture 
fills with its dictates. In this view, the child is 
completely molded according to her experiences. As 
behaviorist J.B. Watson said, "Give me a dozen healthy 
infants, well-formed, and my own specified world to bring 
them up in and I'll guarantee to take any one at random and 
train him to become any type of specialist I might select-­
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doctor, lawyer, artist, merchant-chief, and even yes, 
beggarman and thief."23 Behaviorial psychologists are not 
interested in inner experience of any kind, including 
thinking. The infant is her behavior; thus infants are 
conditioned through positive and negative reinforcement to 
behave in desirable ways. I would argue that the most 
accurate image depicting the behavioral view of infants is 
that of animals needing to be trained, domestic animals, 
rather than the wild animals I associate with the 
psychoanalytic view. 
There is another very different image of babyhood and 
early childhood in Western culture. It is the mystical 
image of the exiled angel, or Robinson's image of original 
vision. Its best known source in Western culture 
derives from the Romantic movement. Wordsworth invoked 
this image in his "Ode: Intimations of Immortality from 
Recollections of Early childhood:" 
Our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting 
The Souls that rises with us, our life's Star, 
Hath elsewhere its setting, 
And Cometh from afar: 
Not in entire forget fulness, 
And not in utter nakedness, 
But trailing clouds of glory do we come 
From God, who is our home: 
Heaven lies about us in our infancy!" 24 
In this view the infant, straight from "heaven," has a 
fresh view of world and can perceive what adults can no 
longer perceive. The baby communes with nature and lives in 
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kind of paradise, until the harsh realities of this world 
cloud her clear consciousness. In this sense the 
perspective of the child is not denigrated but elevated. 
Young children see a greater and higher reality than the one 
adults see. 
Thus the mystical and Romantic view elevates infants to 
the state of angels; the behavioristic and psychoanalytic 
perspectives reduce them to the state of animals, and the 
cognitive developmentalist sees them as budding rational 
human beings, many steps behind adults but capable of full 
human status once the top of the hierarchical ladder of 
stages of thinking is reached. 
The Child as Creator 
I offer another image. I suggest that infants and 
children can be validly seen as sharing some 
characteristics of all of the images mentioned above: 
angel, animal, and scientist. Very loosely speaking, 
qualitative thinking can be seen as the mystical-Romantic 
angelic ability to percieve the world in a fresh and 
unconditioned way and to intuit the principles underlying 
"reality." Quantitative thinking fits well under the 
metaphor of scientist. 
From my own perspective, the animal image is the least 
accurate and therefore the least fruitful as a metaphor for 
human beings. But I do not deny or belittle instinct, and 
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there is a small place for positive and negative 
reinforcement in my belief system. But also, since my 
theory is about an expanded vision of thinking and knowing, 
the Romantic and cognitive developmental images are more 
germane. 
I would like to add a fourth image, that of infants and 
children as creative artists, not just "tuning into" or 
scientifically understanding the world around them, but 
doing both and also creating the world and themselves as 
they proceed. This view results from seeing the place of 
both qualitative and quantitative thought in human growth 
and development. 
For as true and important as the cognitive 
developmental perspective on human growth and development 
is, I believe that it is flawed by the same "conceptual 
trap" that dominates most of psychology. The trap here is 
that the word "thinking" is nearly always used to mean 
"quantitative thinking." Qualitative thinking is not 
addressed because its validity is not recognized. 
When qualitative knowing is seen as the context for 
quantitative knowing, we can approach the hierarchical 
nature of development in another way. The development of 
quantitative knowing clearly is hierarchical in nature. But 
I maintain that qualitative knowing is a given from our 
birth. Qualitative knowing is an aspect of the nature of 
human being. (As Kegan said:11 a writer has to strain to 
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make the reader recover the process in the words 'human 
being.•"25) 
One of the major theses of this dissertation is that 
infants come into the world with the ability to think 
qualitatively already fully in place. In other words, 
infants experience through feeling-intuition some kind of 
either ultimate or personal reality in a direct, unmediated 
way. In this sense, they are connected with and "know" the 
world in the Romantic sense. This qualitative knowing also 
provides the motivating and shaping and integrating power 
that guides the infant's subsequent explorations of the 
quantitative aspects of the world. It is the meaning-making 
power of the qualitative that defines us: "Thus it is not 
that a person makes meaning, as much as that the activity of 
being a person is the activity of meaning-making."26 
We come to the world qualitatively ready to create. 
The world provides us with the raw material necessary to 
complete creation. Qualitative and quantitative combine; we 
are ready to continually give ourselves and our lives new 
shapes and new meanings. 
The presence of the power of qualitative knowing gives 
infants and young children access to a kind of wisdom that 
connects them with all things and beings and drives them to 
exlore the world with wonder, curiosity, love and hope. 
Children do not have to "grow up" to attain a higher level 
of quantitative cognitive development, for their 
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understanding of the world to be real and valid. Each stage 
of development offers its own particular type of knowlege, 
resulting from various mixtures of qualitative and 
quantitative knowing. In the following chapter, I will 
examine closely the characteristic knowledge of each stage. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT OF CREATIVE THINKING 
"It's only the idiotic way they have of talking," 
said John."I don't believe I'll ever understand Grown­
ups. They all seem so stupid. And eve-n Jane and 
Michael are stupid sometimes." 
"Urn," agreed Barbara,thoughtfully pulling off her 
socks and putting them on again. 
"For instance," John went on, "they don't 
understand a single thing we say. But worse than that, 
they don't understand what other things say. Why, only 
last Monday I heard Jane remark that she wished she 
knew what language the wind spoke." 
"I know," said Barbara. "It's astonishing. And 
Michael always insists-haven't you heard him?-that the 
Starling says 'Wee-Twe-ee-ee!' He seems not to know 
that the Starling says nothing of the kind, but speaks 
exactly the same language we do. Of course,one doesn't 
expect Mother and Father to know about it-they don't 
know anything though they are such darlings-but you'd 
think Jane and Michael would-" 
"They did once,"said Mary Poppins, folding up one 
of Jane's nightgowns. 
"What?" said John and Barbara together in very 
surprised voices. "Really? You mean they understood 
the starling and the Wind and-" 
"And what the trees say and the language of the 
sunlight and the stars-of course they did! Once," 
said Mary Poppins. 
"But-how is it that they've forgotten it all? 
said John, wrinkling up his forehead and trying to 
understand. 
"Aha!" said the Starling knowingly, looking up 
from the remains of his biscuit. "Wouldn't you like 
to know?" 
"Because they've grown older," explained Mary 
Poppins. "Barbara, put on your socks at once, please." 
"That's a silly reason," said John, looking 
sternly at her. 
"It's the true one, though," Mary Poppins said, 
tying Barbara's socks firmly round her ankles. 
"Well, it's Jane and Michael who are silly," John 
continued. "I know I shan't forget when I get older." 
"Nor I," said Barbara, contentedly sucking her 
finger. 
"Yes, you will," said Mary Poppins firmly. 
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The twins sat up and looked at her. 
"Huh!" said the Starling contemptuously. "Look 
at 'em!- They think they're the World's Wonders. 
Little miracles I don't think. Of course you'll forget 
-same as Jane and Michael." 
"We won't, said the Twins, looking at the 
starling as if they would like to murder him. 
The Starling jeered. 
"I say you will," he insisted. "It isn't your 
fault,of course," he added more kindly. "You'll forget 
because you just can't help it. There never was a 
human being that remembered after the age of one--at 
the very latest-except, of course, Her." and he 
jerked his head over his should at Mary Poppins. 
"But why can she remember and not us?" said John. 
"A-a-a-h! She's different. She's the Great 
Exception. Can't go by her, said the Starling, 
grinning at them both. 1 
Aaes and Stages 
In the last chapter I introduced, some developmental 
theorists: Freud, Erickson, Piaget, Kegan, Armstrong, Khan, 
Steiner, Aurobindo, and Wilber. Great similarities and 
differences can be found among these, but one commonality is 
striking: the approximate ages suggested as transition 
times for the developmental levels. All divide human life 
into approximately the same stages: the first lasting from 
zero to two years of age; the second from two years to six 
or seven years; the third from six or seven to eleven or 
twelve years; the fourth from eleven or twelve years to 
adulthood. After that the theorists may or may not divide 
adulthood into stages. Although these stages are called by 
various names, I will label them simply with age-names: 
infancy, pre-school, school-age, adolescent, and adult. 
In all of the systems, passage from one stage to 
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another is marked by the acquisition of a set of 
characteristics rather than by simple change of 
chronological age. The chronological ages are approximate, 
and it is the sequence of the stages, not the actual age of 
change that is of most significance. Yet the fact that all 
the systems use similar ages as transition times is 
important. 
All of these theorists who observed children closely 
noticed significant changes in constellations of behavior at 
certain times of human development. These changes were not 
merely quantitative -- children do more and different 
things as they grow older — but qualitative as well — each 
stage is characterized not merely by more or less of a 
variety of characteristics; it also has different feel to 
it. As Jerome Kagan wrote in The Nature of the Child: "But 
infants are qualitatively different from older children and 
should not be conceptualized as having less of some quality 
than ten year olds possess."2 
The First Stage: Infancy 
The initial passage of this chapter from Mary Poppins 
serves as a metaphor for the process of qualitative thinking 
in infancy. It also raises questions about who and why are 
the Great Exceptions, but those will be dealt with later. 
In the last chapter I suggested that as Infants we come 
to the world equipped to think qualitatively. What evidence 
do I have for this assertion? What are the characteristics 
of this stage of development in terms of thinking and 
knowing? 
Kagan wrote: "The properties of the infant are so 
distinct from those of the older child that it is not 
surprising that all societies regard the first two years of 
life as a special period of development."3 However, 
cultural and individual beliefs about human nature have 
historically greatly influenced the way infants are 
perceived by any given culture or theory. This is 
demonstrated by contrasting the views of Freud, Erickson 
and Piaget. Freud saw the infant in terms of oral 
instinctive desire; Erickson, in terms of the nurturing or 
non-nurturing relationship between mother and child; and 
Piaget, as active explorer trying to understand the physical 
universe. 
In Piaget's system, this stage is called the stage of 
senso.ry-motor intelligence. The name of the stage refers to 
the belief that intelligence grows and is demonstrated 
through experiences of the senses and of body movement. 
Or, in other words, the infant thinks through movement and 
sensing. The first symbolic thinking that occurs is the 
gradual understanding of "object permanence:" the concept 
that when objects disappear from sight, they still exist in 
the world and therefore are subject to search. According to 
this theory, language and play begin but are purely 
imitative and repetitive, engaged in for the joy o£ movement 
and sensory experience. 
Noted Piagetian scholar Hans Furth said: "Apart from a 
few reflex movements and some vital self-regulated 
physiological activities, there is not much that the baby 
seems to 'know.'4 Cognitive psychologists believe that 
the baby begins life with merely some reflex movements. It 
is out of these reflexes that intelligence gradually 
develops. However, Plaget does not see this as the gradual 
accumulation of isolated reflex responses into an ordered 
intelligence, as behavioral theory would: 
Piaget points out that it is not in accord with 
biological thinking to consider these reflexes as 
isolated responses that somehow work and through 
association develop into more advanced 
coordinations. Spontaneous activity of the living 
organism that reveals itself in rhythmic, global 
movement is at the source of the reflexes; the 
innate differentiation of a reflex from global 
activity does not result in a rigid automatic 
reaction for itself. The biological function of 
the reflex for the total organism is indicated by 
the continuing changes towards more adaptive 
functioning of just those reflexes which are 
particularly important. Within a few days, the 
sucking behavior is stronger, more responsive, more 
functional, than on the first day. In fact, right 
from the start one can observe an active 
assimilation towards exercising and reproducing the 
reflex; this so-called functional or "reproductive" 
assimilation on the one hand prolongs the global 
rhythmic activity of the organism and on the other 
hand provides the intrinsic motor force that 
assures the consolidation of the reflex as a first 
sensory-motor scheme. A scheme for Piaget is here, 
as always, the coordination and organization of 
adaptive action, considered as a behavioral 
structure within the organism, such that the 
organism can transfer or generalize the action to 
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similar and analogous circumstances.5 
The scheme is a behavioral structure that becomes a 
mental structure. The body adapts to the environment in 
exactly the same way that the mind comes to organize the 
environment. Essentially, intelligence was adaptation for 
Piaget. Adaptation and organization are not seen as 
separate processes: "From the biological point of 
view organization is inseparable from adaptation: they are 
two complementary processes of a single mechanism, the first 
being the internal aspect of the cycle of which adaptation 
constitutes the external aspect."6 
This raises an interesting question about Piaget's 
theory as it relates to mine. How does does intelligence 
or knowing begin? How does mind develop out of reflexes? 
How does a behavioral structure become a mental 
structure? From a biological point of view, it is enough 
to say that they are complementary aspects of a single 
mechanism, but from a psychological point of view, it is 
not, for it is an external, not an internal explanation. 
In "The Biological Problem of Intelligence,"7 Piaget 
wrestled with this question. He asked what "hereditary 
structures" exist from the beginning for mental functioning, 
presented five different points" of view, and then argued for 
one of them. It is important to keep in mind that Piaget 
was theorizing and choosing his own preferred theoretical 
outcome to what he said is still an insoluble problem at 
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that time. 
Piaget concluded that intelligence begins with an 
inherited organic propensity towards adaptation that 
presupposes the interaction between organism and 
environment. This propensity must be realized in the 
relationship between organism and environment: 
Intelligence does not therefore appear as a power 
of reflection independent of the particular 
position which the organism occupies in the 
universe but is linked, from the very outset, by 
biological apriorities. It is not at all an 
independent absolute, but it is a relationship 
among others, between the organism and 
things."8 
Thus Piaget posited some apriori mechanism that allows 
intelligence to arise from the interaction of organism and 
environment. This mechanism is an inherited organic or 
biological propensity. But I would argue that theorizing an 
organic base does not explain the origins of the mechanism. 
This explanation once again seems to me to reduce psychology 
to biology. It does not explain the origins of the 
mechanism. 
Obviously my position on this issue is the one that 
Piaget rejects. I am arguing that intelligence does begin 
as an independent power of reflection, an innate ability to 
know, which I am calling qualitative knowing. Since I think 
that Piaget's explanation begs the question,I would suggest 
that his apriori mechanism is qualitative knowing. 
It can be argued that Piaget's greatest contribution to 
developmental psychology is the contruction of a stage 
theory based on in-depth observations of infants and 
conversations and experiments with older children. In the 
twenty years since the the bulk of his theory was 
formulated, many psychologists have turned to the study of 
the infant. We have more "hard research data" to theorize 
from than was available in the past. While there still 
remains vast room for individual interpretation, it is true 
that we now know more than we did about the infant's 
reality. 
The infant is actually functioning in many 
well before birth. From birth the baby can 
smell, taste, and feel touch, pain, and changes 
position. Furthermore, the infant can use this 
to discriminate. Kagan noted: 
The infant can detect the difference between a 
pattern composed of stripes only one eighth of an 
inch wide and a completely gray patch, between 
vertical and oblique gratings, between linear and 
curved lines, and between richly contoured, in 
contrast to minimally contoured, designs. In the 
auditory mode, the young infant can discriminate 
between the musical notes C and C sharp and between 
the spoken syllables "pa" and "ba," and is acutely 
sensitive to rate of change in sound energy during 
the first half-second of an auditory event. If 
change is slow, the baby opens her eyes in 








infant's ability to discriminate one object from 
is demonstrated by habituation/dishabituation 
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experiments. The idea behind these experiments is that the 
more an infant is exposed to one particular object or 
stimulus, the more used to it she becomes and thus the less 
she responds. This reaction is called habituation. When 
the original object is changed or a new object is 
substituted, the infant notices the change and responds 
more, or dishabituates. For example, the more an infant is 
shown a particular representation of a smiling face, the 
less she attends to it. But when a frowning face is 
substituted, the infant will look at it with interest. 
Experiments have further demonstrated that the infant 
can not only make subtle discriminations but can form 
concepts, for example, the concept of smile. This is shown 
by whether or not an infant can discriminate a smile on any 
face, human or simple picture. If she can, then one can say 
that she has an abstract representation (or concept) of the 
unchanging properties of a smile, no matter what changing 
properties surround the smile. 
In The Interpersonal World of the Infant psychiatrist 
Daniel Stern summarizes four general categories of 
information that we have about infants, based on 
experimental data: 
1. Infants seek sensory stimululation. Furthermore, 
they do it with the preemptory quality that is 
prerequisite to hypothesizing drives and 
motivational systems. 
2. They have distinct biases or preferences with 
regard to the sensations they seek and the 
perceptions they form. These are innate. 
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3. From birth on, there appears to be a central 
tendency to form and test hypotheses about what is 
occurring in the world (Bruner, 1977). Infants are 
also constantly 'evaluating.' in the sense of 
asking, is this different from or the same as that? 
How discrepant is what I have just encountered from 
what I have previously encountered (Kagan et al. 
1978)? It is clear that this central tendency of 
mind, with constant application, will rapidly 
categorize the social world into conforming and 
contrasting patterns, events, sets, and 
experiences. The infant will readily discover 
which features of an experience are invariant and 
which are variant — that is, which features 
"belong" to the experience (J. Gibson 1950, 1979; 
E. Gibson 1969). The infant will apply these same 
processes to whatever sensations and perceptions 
are available, from the simplest to the ultimately 
most complex -- that is, thoughts about thoughts. 
4. Affective and cognitive processes cannot be 
readily separated. In a simple learning task, 
activation builds up and falls off. Learning 
itself is motivated and affect-laden. Similarly, 
in an intense affective moment, perception and 
cognition go on. And, finally, affective 
experiences (for example, the many different 
occasions of surprise) have their own invariant 
and variant features. Sorting these is a cognitive 
task concerning affective experience. 10 
Stern goes on to present research evidence that 
infants have an innate capacity for amodal perception, the 
ability to take information received in one sensory channel 
and translate it directly into another. For instance, using 
two different kinds of nipples, researchers discovered that 
infants can recognize the nipple that they previously sucked 
without seeing. This is not accounted for on Piagetian 
theoretical grounds: 
A Piagetian account would have required that they 
first form a schema of what the nipple felt like (a 
haptic schema) and a schema of what the nipple 
looked like (a visual schema); then these two 
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schema would have to have some traffic or 
interaction (reciprocal assimilation), so that a 
coordinated visual-haptic schema would 
result. (Piaget, 1952). Only then could the infants 
accomplish the task. Clearly, the infants did not 
in fact have to go through these steps of 
construction. They immediately "knew" that the one 
they now saw was the one they had just felt.11 
Other experiments demonstrate amodal perception with 
different senses. Infants can also pick the particular face 
that is making the sound they are hearing, with the sound 
actually piped in from another place. Three week old 
infants can correlate sound intensity with light intensity. 
Two day old infants can imitate correctly one of three 
expressions on an adult's face. 
Stern says that this capacity for amodal perception 
argues for the infant's ability to encode into an amodal 
representation that can be translated into any of the 
sensory modes. This is an example of the infant's ability 
to think abstractly from birth. Stern characterized the 
infant's mental reality as follows: 
Infants appear to experience a world of perceptual 
unity, in which they can perceive amodal qualities 
in any modality from any form of human expressive 
behavior, represent these qualities abstractly, and 
then transpose thern to other modalities. This 
position has been strongly put forth by 
developmentalists such as Bower(1974), Moore and 
Meltzoff(1978) and Meltzoff (1981), who posit that 
the infant, from the earliest days of life, forms 
and acts upon abstract representations of qualities 
of perception. These abstract representations that 
the infant experiences are not sights and sounds 
and touches and nameable objects, but rather 
shapes, intensities, and temporal patterns--the 
more "global" qualities of experience. And the 
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need and ability to form abstract representations 
of primary qualities of perception and act upon 
them starts at the beginning of mental life; it is 
not the culmination of a developmental landmark 
reached in the second year of life.12 
Stern suggests, and I believe, that infants experience 
the world qualitatively, simultaneously as perception and 
emotion. Experimental research demonstrates that newborns 
show interest, joy, distress, disgust, anger and surprise as 
they begin relating to the world.13 They also show the 
ability to empathize by crying when they hear others 
crying.14 Since the 1970's the recognition of the 
possibility of an intense emotional experience between 
parent and newborn called bonding has been revolutionalizing 
birthing practices. It is now widely accepted that the most 
positive developmental outcome for both parent and infant 
results from allowing a deep bond of love to be experienced 
between them immediately after the birth. This bonding 
process includes a great deal of fascinated staring at each 
others faces, looking into each other's eyes, the classical 
behavior of lovers. 
The picture of the newborn infant drawn from current 
research data is consonant with the theory I am developing. 
The baby experiences the world qualitatively as perception 
and emotion. This qualitative knowing also provides the 
shaping and integrating power necessary for the quantitative 
organization of the world that begins immediately. The 
process of creative thinking has begun. 
Ill 
The Second Stage : The Preschool Years 
Fairies 
I cannot see fairies, 
I dream them. 
There is no fairy can hide from me 
I keep on dreaming until I find him: 
There you are, Primzose--I see you, 
Black Wing! (by Hilda Conklin, age 6)15 
The first approach to a spiritual experience which 
I can remember must have taken place when I was 
five or six years old at the house where I was born 
and brought up. It was a calm, limpid summer 
morning and the early mist still lay in wispy 
wreaths among the valleys. The dew on the grass 
seemed to sparkle like iridescent jewels in the 
sunlight, and the shadows of the houses and trees 
seemed friendly and protective. In the heart of 
the child that I was there suddenly seemed to well 
up a deep and overwhelming sense of gratitude, a 
sense of unending peace and security which seemed 
to be part of the beauty of the morning, the love 
and protective and living presence which included 
all that I had ever loved and yet was something 
much more.16 
Papa, how can we be sure that everything is not a 
dream? ... Well, I don't think everything is a 
dream 'cause in a dream people wouldn't go around 
asking if it was a dream. (said by Tim, age 6)17 
Around the age of two the child's thinking makes a 
shift that seems to be based on rapid growth in-the ability 
to symbolize. The child's language and play become less 
imitative and more symbolic. She can tell you "birdie 
flying" and then pretend that she is a bird flying. She can 
scribble on a paper and tell you that is a birdie flying. 
She can fashion a bird from clay. She has entered the 
golden age of creativity. 
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This shift is gradual rather than sudden. Before it 
takes place the child's interest and energy seemed bound up 
in exploring and understanding the world and her place in 
it. After the shift,the dominant activity becomes the 
creative transformation of the world. As Hans Furth noted 
about about the end of the first stage: 
The child emerges at the end of this stage as a 
person who by his adaptive actions shows that he 
can master means-end relations, explore new 
features of objects, understand spatial 
relations between objects in the mileau, and 
anticipate proximate events. Most importantly, 
through interlocking mutual coordinations of 
actions the child reaches the stage of the first 
basic invariant of all knowledge, that is, the 
formation of the object, of a thing "out there," 
independent in existence from his own action. At 
this point in development, we witness the 
beginning of a clear separation between the known 
thing, namely the object, and the knowing person. 
Knowledge, in the full sense of its human meaning, 
is found right between these two terms; for 
knowledge is but our way of expressing the mutual 
relation of the knower to the known.18 
Knowledge must be expressed symbolically, and now that 
the child has the means to do that, the world seems to shift 
partially from laboratory to stage. Symbolic, creative, 
imaginative play becomes the preferred activity. 
Piaget saw symbolic play as an example of pure 
egocentric thought, both idiosyncratic and lacking in 
communication: 
There are numerous examples, playing with dolls, 
playing house, etc. It is easy to see that this 
symbolic play constitutes a real activity of 
thought but remains essentially egocentric. Its 
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function is to satisfy the self by transforming 
what is real into what is desired. The child who 
plays with dolls remakes his own life as he would 
like it to be. He relives all his pleasures, 
resolves all his conflicts. Above all, he 
compensates for and completes reality by means of a 
fiction. Symbolic play is not an attempt by the 
subject to submit to reality but rather a deforming 
assimilation of reality to the self.19 
This passage reveals Piaget's limited exposure to 
preschool children playing symbolically in groups. Current 
research data that demonstrates that preschool children are 
not nearly as egocentric as Piaget thought. They are 
capable of communicating superbly and elaborately in 
complex imaginative play, taking a variety of social 
perspectives. In reviewing the research in this area, Rubin 
and Everett conclude: 
It is important that parents and teachers realize 
that the older, perhaps more traditional 
expectations that young children cannot learn to 
cooperate, or that they communicate ineffectively 
because of their egocentric views of the world are 
outmoded. Such perceptions may,have led those who 
live with or teach children to believe that 
preschoolers and kindergartners are not yet ready 
to behave in more socially mature ways. Given the 
findings of recent laboratory studies and given 
those inferences concerning perspective-taking 
skill that can be gleaned from naturalistic 
observations, it is clear that young children do 
enter preschool and kindergarten with a fairly 
sophisticated social-cognitive repertoire. 20 
I believe that the above passage by Piaget is also an 
Interesting commentary on his attitude towards artistic 
activity in general, including adult artistic activity, 
which could certainly be described as "compensating for 
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and completing reality by means of a fiction." Howard 
Gardner pointed out that in embracing the logical 
rationality that underlies Western mechanistic science, 
Piaget neglected the aspects of human cognition that 
underlie the arts. 21 Gardner attempted to fill this gap by 
examining aesthetic cognition. He started Harvard Project 
Zero to study the creativity of children. - He says it was 
called Project Zero because of "the sense of working in a 
new area of study where virtually 'zero' was understood."22 
In "Exploring the Mystery of Creative Activity," he said: 
Step into almost any nursery school and you enter a 
world graced with the imagination and inventiveness 
of children. Some youngsters are fashioning 
intricate structuresout of blocks. Others are 
shaping people, animals, or household objects out 
of clay or Play-Doh. Listen to the singing: 
there are melodic fragments, familiar tunes, and 
other patterns composed of bits and snatches from 
many songs. As the children speak,you hear the 
narratives they weave, and their charming figures 
of speech. 
Beyond their obvious charm, some of these youthful 
creations are powerfully expressive. There is 
poetry: a youngster might characterize a streak 
of skywriting as "a sear in the sky"; a peer will 
describe her naked body as "barefoot all over." 
And, almost without exception, youngsters scarcely 
out of diapers will produce drawings and paintings 
that, in their use of color, richness of 
expression, and sense of composition, bear at least 
a superficial kinship to works by Paul Klee, Joan 
Miro, or Pablo Picasso.23 
As Gardner noted, the creativity of the pre-school 
years is widely recognized. The poem by six year old Hilda 
Conklin that introduced this section is particularily 
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beautiful but hardly atypical of the creative understanding 
and expression that I have encountered in this stage. When 
my daughter was four years old, she spontaneously dictated 
this poem based on her recent experience: 
As I lay in the field looking up 
At the bright dark sky, 
"Oh-oh, I think its going to rain!" 
As I was safely inside: 
"Pitter-patter, pitter-patter," 
Went the soft raindrops. 
This creativity is widely recognized, but it is not 
fully understood. When Gardner turned to creativity, he 
did so with the typical hierarchical bias of the cognitive 
psychologist. He had no key to the mystery of artisic 
creativity In the preschool years; he has much more to say 
about why it disappears in the following stage. Preschool 
children are creative simply because they are compelled to 
play with their newly formed symbolic abilities. He assigned 
to this stage the achievement of a "first draft" of 
artistry. 
Ultimately Gardner seemed to agree with Piaget, 
who asserted that true creativity cannot emerge until the 
final stage of cognitive development. He believed that 
until children have become cognitively and critically aware 
o£ the artistic standards of the culture and incorporated 
them into their work, they cannot be seen as full-fledged 
artists. 
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I would argue that children at this stage are complete 
human beings and complete artists. Their human and artistic 
vision will be different from that of adults and adult 
artists. But it is no less valid. Picasso once said, "I 
used to draw like Raphael, but it has taken me a whole 
lifetime to learn to draw like a child."24 Gardner used 
this remark to support his argument that a complete artist 
must be cognizant of the norms he is rejecting. I do not 
think that Picasso meant it this way. I believe that 
Picasso is talking about recapturing "the original vision" 
of childhood that Robinson described. 
If the cognitive developmentalists cannot solve the 
mystery of creativity in the preschool years, I believe 
that I can. I have already described my thesis that 
creative thinking is the result of the combination of 
intense qualitative and complex quantitative thinking. Pre­
school children are usually still extremely rooted in the 
qualitative domain. They experience its meaningfulness 
and live in the world with a sense of purpose. Everyday 
discoveries and explorations are fresh and emotional. In 
addition, their ability to express quantitative meaning 
symbolically is exploding. Qualitative and quantitative 
combine in the ideal combination for creative thinking. 
Piaget called this period of development "pre­
operational." He defined an operation as "an internalized 
system of actions that is fully reversible."25 An operation 
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allows a person to understand the reciprocal relationship 
between two sets of events or ideas. Piaget called the 
child in this period pre-operational because she does not 
understand these reciprocal relationships. She does not 
know that the actions in the operations are fully 
revers ible. 
Piaget described the "everyday thinking" of the 
two to seven year old child as characterized by egocentrism, 
finalism, animism and artificialism. Egocentrism is 
defined as seeing oneself at the center of reality because 
one is not fully aware of oneself as being separate 
from the rest of reality."26 Animism endows everything 
in the world with life and intention, or consciousness: 
"not a consciousness identical to that of man, but 
the minimum knowledge and intention necessary for 
things to accomplish their actions and, above all, to be 
able to move and direct themselves toward their assigned 
goals."27 Artificialism Is the understanding that 
"everything has been built by man or by a divine being who 
fabricates things in human fashion."28 Finalism is the 
belief that there must be a reason for everything, "there is 
no chance in nature and everything is 'made for1 man and 
children according to an established and wise plan with the 
human at its center."29 
Piaget's biases reflect the rational, technological 
basis of Western culture, as Gardner stated. Robinson 
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explained: "For a culture increasingly permeated with the 
control of its environment and permeated with the spirit" of 
competitive individualism, nothing could have been more 
timely or more appropriate than Piaget's discoveries in the 
field of cognitive development30 At the top of 
Piaget's hierarchy are the opposites of the beliefs that 
he attributes to young children: that we are individuals 
separate from the rest of reality; that many events in 
nature are random and fortuitous; that only humans and 
animals have consciousness, and that since human beings have 
the most consciouness they need to control the rest of the 
world; and that things in the world have not been fashioned 
by a divine being; they have either been fashioned by human 
beings or emerged through evolution, without the help of 
divinity. 
These particular beliefs about reality are currently 
being challenged from a variety of directions. Compare the 
concept of egocentrism to Capra's earlier statement about 
the quantum theory of the universe: 
Quantum theory thus reveals a basic oneness of the 
universe. It shows that we cannot decompose the 
world into independently existing smallest units. 
As we penetrate into matter, nature does not show 
us any isolated 'basic building blocks', but rather 
appears as a complicated web of relationships 
between the various parts of the whole. These 
relations always include the observer in an 
essential way.31 
Robinson's original vision of childhood, which he sees 
119 
as a basic faculty for knowing, includes a sense of 
connection and harmony of the child with all things and all 
things with each other. The second introductory passage to 
this section illustrates this. The egocentrism of the child 
can be compared to this sense of connection and harmony and 
can be seen as an aspect of qualitative knowing, intuiting 
the underlying whole of the universe. 
There is an inherent paradox in the nature of the 
developmental process. In the quantitative dimension 
outlined by Piaget, the child is learning to separate 
herself from the world. Development in this dimension can 
be seen as a process of becoming increasingly less 
subjective towards reality. In the metaphors of the new 
physics, we are becoming cognizant of the "particle view" of 
reality. But this makes no less valid " the original 
vision," "the wave view." The principle of complementarity 
states that the nature of reality requires these two 
complementary descriptions to give a full view.The child's 
original vision is accurate, and so is the growing new 
vision. 
Piaget said that the child believes that everything in 
the universe has consciousness. Well, so do many modern 
physicists. Sir James Jeans said in 1937: "Today there is a 
wide measure of agreement, which on the physical side of 
science approaches almost to unanimity, the stream of 
knowledge is heading toward a nonmechnical reality; the 
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universe begins to look more like a great thought than a 
great machine."32 In the five decades since this has been 
reiterated by many physicists, such as Heisenberg, 
Oppenheiner, Schrodinger, and von Weizsacker. 
Art ificialism and finalism are based on a belief in a 
divine being or a wise intelligence who has made everything 
according to plan, with humans at the center. Not only 
little children, but many religious or spiritual adults hold 
this belief. In addition, some views of science no longer are 
in opposition. In The New Story of Science. Augros and 
Stanciu noted: 
The properties of matter, then, on the smallest 
scale and on the scale of the whole universe appear 
uniquely suited to life. Not only are there many 
instances but in each case a slight increase or 
decrease in the parameter would render life 
impossible... Dyson, surveying this broad pattern, 
concludes that it argues purpose, no coincidence: 
'The more I examine the universe and study the 
detail of its architcture, the more evidence I find 
that the universe in some sense must have known we 
were coming. Certain conditions necessary for life 
were built into the Big Bang from the beginning.' 
Wheeler stresses that 'no reason has ever offered 
itself why certain of the constants and initial 
conditions have the values they do except that 
otherwise anything like observership as we know it 
would be impossible.' Consequently, rather than 
resolving the issue to coincidence, he asks whether 
there is not greater likelihood that 'no universe 
at all could come into being unless it were 
guaranteed to produce life, consciousness, and 
observership somewhere and for some little length 
of time it its history-to-be?' Life is not 
accidental. On the contrary, Wheeler asserts that 
'Quantum mechanics has led us to take seriously and 
explore the directly opposite view that the 
observer is as essential to the creation of the 
universe as the universe is to the creation of the 
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universe as the universe is to the creation of the 
observer.' Though man is not at the physical 
center of the universe, he appears to be at the 
center of its purpose. According to Erwin 
Schrodinger, without man the universe would be a 
drama played before empty stalls. 
A universe aiming at the production of man implies 
a man directing it. For matter on its own cannot 
aim at anything. Hence, the New Story again leads 
to a mind that directs the whole universe, all the 
laws of nature and all the properties of matter, to 
a goal. To that mind we give the name God.33 
I am saying that in a sense young children understood 
all along a view of the universe that some scientists are 
currently asserting. But of course there is a difference. 
Children knew, but they knew in a very different way. As 
Robinson pointed out, there is a vast difference between the 
unitive vision, what I am calling qualitative knowing, and 
the inductive reasoning of mature adulthood. I am not 
suggesting that one can or should substitute one for the 
other. In fact, I am saying that it is the dialectic 
between the two that results in creative consciousness. 
Piaget als.o characterized the thinking of the 
preschool stage as intuitive. By this he meant simply that 
the child "constantly makes assertions without trying to 
support them as facts."34 This stems from her egocentricity, 
viewed as a lack of differentiation between self and other. 
Piaget did not see this intuition as valid, as leading to 
correct answers. 
Yet it is this very lack of differentiation between 
self and others, between self and universe, this sense of 
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underlying connection with all things, that accounts for the 
validity of intuition as a mode of knowing. As I described 
in Chapter Two, intuition is another way of talking about 
qualitative knowing. It allows us to connect with reality 
in an immediate sense, to sense the totality of and the 
relationships between things. It is Bruner's broad map, 
which will later be filled in by quantitative thinking. 
Thus, to say that the young child thinks intuitively 
has a very different meaning for me than it does for Piaget. 
He uses it to mean that the child guesses with no rational 
basis and is usually wrong. I use it to mean that the young 
child knows some things intuitively that adults come to know 
inductively. 
The third passage in the introduction to this section 
is from Gareth Mathew's book, Philosophy and the Young 
Child. Mathews is impressed with the young child's ability 
to reason and to grapple with complex philosophical issues. 
He said: "In fact, such evidence that I have been able to 
assemble suggests that, for many young members of the human 
race, philosophical reasoning—including, on occasion subtle 
and ingenious reasoning — is as natural as making music and 
playing games, and quite as much a part of being human."35 
Mathews, a philosopher, took Piaget severely to task 
regarding his research on young children's thinking about 
the world. He critiqued Piaget's The Child's Conception of 
the World. a study that focuses on young children's 
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responses to the following kinds of philosophical questions: 
What is thinking? What is the relation between a word and 
its meaning? What are dreams, and where are they located? 
What things are alive, and what things are conscious? 
Piaget's usual technique was to chart the stages of 
progressive development in thinking about a concept and then 
'to group children in the age-appropriate stage based on 
their responses to the questions. Mathews called this 
technique itself problematic. First of all, he explained, 
philosphical understanding is unusual in people of any age. 
Second, no one, child or adult, makes regular, predictable 
progress on philosphical questions. Third, Piaget discarded 
deviant responses, the very ones most likely to be 
philosophically interesting. Fourth, Piaget distinguished 
responses that he felt are convictions from those that he 
feels were "mere romancing." Mathews noted that this is a 
false distinction, since to philosophize is to invent, 
explore, joke and "romance." He showed how Piaget actually 
discouraged children from doing philosophy in the way he 
asked the questions. 
But an even more basic problem lies in the way that 
Piaget ordered the stages. For example, Mathews said 
that Piaget's three stages on the notion of thinking each 
correspond to a classical theory of thinking in philosophy, 
each of which is considered a valid philosophical way to 
approach the issue. This leaves us with the dilemma that 
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Piaget would have to place many adult philosophers in his 
lowest stages. Mathews wrote: "In fact, all the concepts 
that Piaget claims to have found in children invite 
philosophical reflection. Moveover, that his third-stage 
notions are generally more nearly adequate or satisfactory 
than his first- or second- stage notions isn't at all 
obvious."36 
Whereas Piaget said that real understanding of 
philosophical issues cannot take place until the stage of 
adolescence, Mathews argued that five, six and seven year 
old children are more likely than children of twelve, 
thirteen or fourteen to to be able to "do philosophy." He 
suggested several reasons for this. First, philosophical 
thinking calls for an innocence and naivete that is natural 
to children at this younger age. Why? Because real 
phil osphical questions are the basic and important ones 
about life that young children naturally ask and that may 
come to seem naive as we grow older. The socialization 
processes of our society discourage us from asking these 
questions. 
Mathews defined "doing philosophy" as "simply to 
reflect on a perplexity or conceptual problem of a certain 
sort to see if one can remove the perplexity or solve the 
problem."37 He said that adults and children do philosphy 
well together because although the adult may have a better 
command of language and concepts, "it is the child, 
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however, who has fresh eyes and ears for perplexity and 
incongruity. Children also have, typically a degree of 
candor and spontaneity that is hard for the adult to 
match."38 
I would suggest that it is the child's connection to 
the qualitative domain that allows for continual freshness 
and spontaneity and lets her grasp the underlying 
connections that reveal the incongruities. In other words, 
it is the young child's ability to think creatively that 
allows her to be philosopher as well as artist and 
scientist. 
The Third Stage: School-Age 
Beautiful mountains, 
Quick rising mists 
Still horse dwells 
At bottom of cliff. 
(by 10 year old girl) 
One device, the oscilloscope, held all the magic of 
a fairy wand for Anna. We'd sit in this room for 
hours on end playing single notes, watching the 
green spot on the 'scope do its glowing dance. The 
whole exercise of relating sound that one heard 
with the ears to the visual shape of those sounds 
actively seen on the little tube's face was a 
source of never-ending delight. 
What sounds we captured, Anna and I! A caterpillar 
chewing a leaf was like a hungry lion, a fly in a 
jam jar sounded like an airship, a match being 
struck sounded like an explosion. All these sounds 
and a thousand more were amplified and made 
available, both in sound form and visible form. 
Amma had found a brand-new world to explore. How 
much meaning it had for her I didn't know; perhaps 
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It was only an elaborate plaything, but her squeals 
of delight were enough for me. 
It was only sometime during the next summer that I 
began to realize that the concepts of frequency and 
wave-length were meaningful to her, that she did, 
in fact, know and understand what she was hearing 
and looking at. One summer afternoon all the kids 
were playing in the street when a large bumblebee 
appeared on the scene. One of the kids said,'How 
many times does it flap its wings in a minute? 
'Must be millions,'said another kid. 
Anna dashed indoors humming a low-pitched hum. 
I was sitting on the doorstep. With a few quick 
prods at the piano she had identified the note, her 
hum, and the drone of the bee. Coming to the door 
again, she said, "Can I have your slip stick?" In 
a moment or two she shouted out, "A bee flaps its 
wings such-and-such times a second." Nobody 
believed her, but she was only a few counts out. 
Every sound that could be captured was captured. 
Meals began to be punctuated by such remarks as "Do 
you know a mosquito flaps its wings so many times a 
second?" or, "a fly, so many times a second?" 
All those games led inevitably to making music. 
Each separate note had by this time been examined 
minutely, and a sound depended on how many times it 
wiggled per second. Soon she was making little 
melodies to which I added the harmonies. Little 
pieces of music entitled "Mummy," "Mr. Jether's 
Dance," ̂ and "Laughter" soon began to echo around 
the house. Anna had begun to compose. I suppose 
Anna had only one problem in her little life--the 
lack of hours per day. There was too much to do, 
too many exciting things to find out.39 
According to Piaget, during this period of mental 
development, the principles of artificialism, finalism, and 
animism disappear, due to the child's increasing ability to 
use reason to structure reality. Piaget noted that this 
change is similar to the historical process of the Greeks 
gradually substituting atomistic for mythological 
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explanations of reality. He says that the concrete 
operational child's world view resembles that of the first 
Greek atomistic theorists.40 
The atomistic view suggests that the world is composed 
of small, simple indivisible particles whose behavior can be 
predicted by mechanistic laws. I have called this the 
"particle? view" of reality. Indeed this stage seems to be 
the natural period for acquiring this understanding. 
Piaget called this the period of "concrete operations." 
This period is called concrete because the child can use 
operations only to solve problems using real, observable 
objects. According to Piaget, she cannot yet use an 
operation on an abstract problem. She can think logically 
only about concrete things. 
In Philosophy and the Young Child Mathews gives examples 
of children in the stage of concrete operations who used 
highly abstract reasoning. A skeptic may argue that his 
examples were drawn from children from highly educated 
families. However, Mathews said that whereas it may not be 
typical for a seven year old to discuss the infinite 
universe, it is not entirely atypical either. He has 
encountered many children in this stage who are extremely 
advanced in their ability to think philosophically. 
My own experience leads to the same conclusion. My 
daughter and many of the children I have taught who are 
theoretically in the stage of concrete operations are able to 
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use operations abstractly. I£ they are in a minority, I 
believe that they should be regarded not as exceptions to 
the rule but rather as examples of what is possible for 
children, given a particular educationalenvironment. 
Children in this stage are described by cognitive 
developmentalists as being literal, conventional, concrete, 
realistic and rule-oriented. The Guinness Book of World 
Records is a favorite book at this stage. This is the 
prototypic period of collections, including baseball cards, 
butterflies, stamps, model horses, dolls and bottle caps. 
Conformity to peer norms and "playing by the rules" 
strongly influence social behavior. 
Psychologists and educators interested in creativity 
frequently note that the creativity so evident in the 
previous stage appears to recede dramatically during this 
stage. Opinion is divided as to whether this is an inherent 
part of the developmental process and/ or due to limiting 
socializing forces. 
Howard Gardner believes that this is simply the nature 
of the stage: 
Let a few years pass and everything has changed. 
The penchant for succumbing to convention, for 
conforming to one's peers, comes to permeate 
children's activities. Even as children at play 
are determined to follow the rules exactly and to 
tolerate no deviation, so, too, in their use of 
symbols they will brook neither experimentation 
nor novelty. 
Children now typically limit their graphic efforts 
to the faithful copying of forms about them. 
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Some stop drawing altogether. Their language also 
exhibits a conservative streak... 
Although artistic work by children appears 
impoverished during this period, the common 
disparagement of this 'literal stage' seems to me 
misguided. Far from being the enemy of artistic 
progress, literalism may represent its advance 
vanguard. That concern with realism that 
pervades the literal stage may be a crucial 
phase of development--the time for mastering 
rules.41 
* 
Or as Eleanor Ruma-Blofson put it: "The child has to 
give up something to get something else. S/he does lose 
spontaneity and magic temporarily to get realistic and 
literal. In adolescence and young adulthood there is the 
possibility of getting it all together, the poetry plus the 
rational. "42 
I have a different understanding of this stage of 
development. In discussing the development of quantitative 
understanding of the world, many of the above descriptions 
seem accurate to me. The purpose of this stage seems to be 
a connection with the "real world," including understanding 
its "particle" properties and its concrete physical nature, 
absorbing its rules and social conventions. However, that 
does not mean that spontaneity and creativity must be 
sacrificed. Their absence is due, I believe, to limiting 
socializing influences such as a materialistic society; 
rigid educational systems; a great deal of television 
viewing, computer game playing and other passive pursuits; 
and a continutally hurried, scheduled routine. 
The poem that begins this section is an example of 
concrete poetic Imagery. It is not the fantasy-laden 
imagery of early chilhood, but it can hardly be called 
impoverished. The next passage describes the activity of a 
very creative "concrete" child. Anna is involved in an 
intensely creative and meaningful way with exploring the 
mechanistic nature of the physical world. Her exciting 
discoveries lead to musical composition. When my 
daughter was seven years old, her creative efforts became 
less oriented toward fantasy and more based in scientific 
exploration. The following observations of my daughter 
during a one week period at seven years of age will 
illustrate this change. 
Wed, Pet 30 
This afternoon S. "played scientist." She lined a 
shelf with empty bottles, plastic containers, a 
thermometer, measuring cups, string, tape, 
magnifying glass, herbs and spices, etc. Then she 
began to devise her own experiments and to record 
the results on small pieces of paper. She was 
completely engrossed in this activity for several 
hours, without comment or help from me. Here are 
several of her records: 
"If y pote watr in a cler plastek contanr and ethr 
pote it on the hot t.v. or pote it unr the lite it 
will evaprate." ("If you put water in a clear 
plastic container and either put it on the hot 
T.V. or put it under the light, it will 
evaporate." 
"If you have some watr and you add a late it stas 
the same tamprechr. It works the same way if you 
-." ("If you have some water and you add a lot, it 
stays the same temperature. It works the same way 
if you subtract.") 
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Friday Nov. 1 
S. uses paper plates and colored paper to 
construct the letters of her name, in giant size. 
She spells it out on my bed, ULJ a present for me. 
SATURDAY, NQV, 2 
S. made two Halloween costumes for a stuffed dog. 
One is "Superdog," complete with cape and sword. 
The other is "Angel," with wings, halo and 
flowing gown. 
Sunday, Nov. 3 
S. and her friend R. played scientist with S's 
"scientist shelf." They spent half an hour 
concocting "medicines" out of herbs and spices and 
liquids. They announced that these medicines 
would cure any ailment, including diabetes, cold 
hand disease, and "spelumuk." After this they 
invented a better-smelling, cleaner-cleaning hand 
soap. 
Mondau Nov. 4 
S. designed a robot today. She said he will be "a 
maid." I asked if he will do our housework. She 
replied: " If I get him built before I'm old 
enough to move out—it will take years." 
Tuesday Nov. 5 
Today S. designed a "car for kids." She did the 
outside and the interior and said she would do the 
engine tomorrow. 
When this child moved into the concrete stage, her 
creative output did not decrease. But it became 
increasingly governed by her interest in and knowledge about 
the concrete world. She realized that building a robot is 
complex and would take a long time. Her comments on the 
diagram of the inside of the robot reflected her 
understanding that she needed more knowledge of the physical 
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world: "Inside the robot is a bonch o£ whells and othr 
thegs. I miself do not undrstand these thegs but I will 
learn. This is what I think a robot loks like but some 
thegs are not rite...vary confuseg...not whte it relley loks 
like...it is like little people are telling the robot whte 
to do." 
In this as in any stage, the ability to think 
creatively is governed by the combination of quantitative 
and qualitative thinking. The nature of the quantitative 
elements in this stage influences the direction of the 
thought; in this case, thought is often directed toward the 
physical world. The intensity of the qualitative dimension 
determines the degree of creativity in the thought. 
Children in this stage can continue to be highly creative. 
But this stage also coincides with formal schooling, which 
usually does not encourage creative thinking. And the 
materialistic, conformist popular culture as reflected in 
the media has a particularly strong effect in a stage that 
is concerned with absorbing social norms. 
The qualitative dimension of thinking includes an 
intense sense of personal meaning, of our own interests, 
talents and ideals springing up from the deep feeling that 
impels us to make individual sense of the world. I believe 
that children in this stage of development thrive on 
strong encouragement and ample time to pursue their 
particular avenues of making sense of and creating in the 
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world, as well as the opportunity to learn skills and 
crafts. The lack of this encouragement and time leads to a 
severing of the qualitative from the quantitative. I am 
convinced that children who spend their time watching 
television, being shuttled from one externally structured 
activity to another, and attending schools that offer mainly 
rote learning gradually lose their connection to the 
qualitative dimension. The stage is set for an even 
deeper alienation during adolescence. 
The Fourth stage; Adolescence 
Milleniums from now a small girl named Serena 
would sit crying softly as the rays from the moon 
dance through the window. The door to her room 
opened, a tall man who wore a blue suit with gold 
stripes down the side walked in. 'What is the 
matter child?' said the man. The body looked up. 
'I'm a Freak,' she said, 'I'm like no other 
person. Why was I bestowed with these awful 
powers?' she sobbed. 'You are not grateful for 
your powers?' said the man. 'No, I hate them. My 
parents bug me all the time, kids stare at me 
like... like... like ... ' The girl started crying 
again. 'It was me who bestowed you with those 
powers. I thought that you with your powers could 
save your planet from disaster.' 'Disaster?' 
thought the girl... 
'You see, many years from now your planet could 
possibly die from pollution and nuclear waste. 
You see, many people call me Starlord. I can see 
into the future and have any other power 
imaginable. To you I gave the power to alter 
forces and change their course and to change into 
any shape as a chameleon would change color; 
therefore I gave thou the name Chameleon Girl.' 
'You mean of all the people in the universe you 
picked me?" "Yes, I picked you because you 
already had a certain power that no one else on 
this unholy planet has.' 
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'And what it that?' 'Love.1 'Love?' 'Yes, I 
scanned your mind and noticed that you loved your 
planet and people.' 'Yes, but how do you know I 
love my planet?' 'Because years ago, as you many 
well remember, you could have gone to live on Mars 
but your love for this world helped you to stay.' 
'But why did you pick this universe to look for 
someone like me?' 'I was on a journey through the 
universe when my powers started to fade. I landed 
on this planet and used the last of my power to 
turn you into what you are.' 'I'm beginning to 
understand,' said Serena. 'I am grateful to 
you. Is there any way I can help you.?' 43 
(by young adolescent boy) 
In Piaget's system, the stage of adolescence marks the 
transition into adult thinking. He calls this final stage 
"formal operations." The child can now abstractly consider 
concrete events that might occur in the future. Thus 
operations can now be reversed in the mind; they are fluid 
rather than concrete. Piaget wrote about this stage: 
By comparison with the child, an adolescent is an 
individual who constructs systems and 'theories.' 
The child does not build systems. Those which he 
possesses are unconscious or preconscious in the 
sense that they are unformulable or unformulated 
so that only an external observer can understand 
them, while he himself never 'reflects' on them. 
In other words, he thinks concretely, he deals 
with each problem in isolation and does not 
integrate his solutions by means of any general 
theories from which he could abstract a common 
principle. By contrast, what is striking in the 
adolescent is his interest in theoretical 
problems not related to everyday realities. He is 
frequently occupied with disarmingly naive and 
chimeric ideas concerning the future of the world. 
What is particularly surprising is his facility 
for elaborating abstract theories. Some write; 
they may create a philosophy, a political tract, a 
theory of aesthetics, or whatever. Others do not 
write; they talk. The majority talk only about a 
small part of their personal creations and confine 
themselves to ruminating about them intimately and 
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in secret. But all of them have systems and 
theories that transform the world in one way or 
another.4 4 
Whereas the concrete child experiments with concrete 
objects and specific skills, the young person in formal 
operations experiments with ideas. Formal operations allow 
one to theorize about past, present and future. 
As we saw in the above discussion of concrete 
operations, many children in that stage are capable of 
"doing" formal operations, but their focus is on learning 
about the physical and social world as it is. What 
signifies the transition into the next stage is an 
increasing focus on what is possible rather than what is. 
This may result in a new kind of focus on fantasy and 
mythology. Many adolescents are enthralled with science 
fiction, others with the tremendous variety of romantic 
possibilities before them. It is natural for adolescents to 
imagine and desire to create a better world for self and 
others. The capacity for formal operations also allows 
for an increasingly critical capacity. If one can imagine a 
better world, then one can also criticize the adults who 
created this one. If one can imagine a better self, then 
one may take ones current self to task. 
During the period of concrete operations, the child has 
been focused on acquiring a variety of facts and skills 
relating to the physical and social worlds. In terms of 
artistry, Gardner postulated a "sensitive period" prior to 
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adolescence that is necessary for adolescent art to thrive. 
If the child has not accomplished some skill in her chosen 
craft, the critical adolescent will not continue her work.45 
This may be true to some degree of all fieldts. The 
adolescent is capable of adapting the standards of the adult 
craftsperson by which to judge her efforts. If she does not 
feel that she is making progess in attaining these 
standards, she may abandon her efforts. 
Piaget, Gardner and other cognitive developmentalists 
have argued that only with the advent of full formal 
operations are people capable of "real" creativity. This is 
because they include in their definition of creativity the 
capacity to judge artistic endeavors critically by accepted 
standards. Obviously my view of creativity is different. 
I believe that creativity occurs at all stages of 
development but varies accordingto the characteristics of 
the stage. The highly creative person at any stage is one 
who is deeply in touch with the qualitative domain and at 
the same time has mastered certain quantitative skills. 
The adolescent and the adult may both be capable of 
formal operations, yet, these stages of development differ 
dramatically. Biologically and emotionally, the adolescent 
is in a time of intense turmoil and transition. According 
to Erickson, she is searching for self-identity and a sense 
of her place in the world. While it is true that this 
search may be a life-long one, it is the central theme of 
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adolescence. What is characteristic about the thinking of 
the adolescent that is tied to this theme are the dual 
qualities of criticism and idealism discussed above. 
Whereas the concrete child masters the world-as-it-is, the 
adolescent strives to create an ideal self and world. 
The introductory passage to this section is a story 
written by an adolescent boy that illustrates the qualities 
of mind that I am discussing. The story is a science 
fiction fantasy that critiques the present world and 
imagines a different possible future. It also is about 
identity and life purpose. The protagonist is alienated 
from her family and friends and the values of her culture. 
She seeks to embody more idealistic values and to find her 
unique life mission to create a better 
world. 
If developmental needs during the period of concrete 
operations have been met, the child enters adolescence with 
a variety of knowledge and skills about the world and 
confidence in her abilities to use them. She also has 
developed her own hobbies and interests and interacts 
creatively with the world with a deep sense of meaning and 
purpose. During adolescence she is prepared to continue 
developing skills in her areas of interest, to refine these 
skills even further and begin to judge them by accepted 
standards. She may also start to critique these accepted 
standards, to push the boundaries of what is possible in all 
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fields. Her natural mental idealism impels her to imagine 
and to begin to create new forms. 
Ideally the adolescent should continue to feel a sense 
of mission and purpose that becomes more defined as she 
grows older. This may be a critical period for identifying 
a sense of "calling" to a field or craft, with the dual 
purpose of fulfilling one's self and making the world a 
better place.Adolescents can find their own individual sense 
of meaning and begin to contribute to any field. 
Alienation from and criticism of adult standards in 
one's field can lead to meaningful development of one's own 
standards and ideals. The emerging creative thinking may 
eventually lead humanity forward into more aesthetic and 
moral ways of living. 
When creative thinking has not been fostered, when the 
qualitative is divorced from the quantitative and 
developing human beings have not been encouraged to pursue 
and create in their areas of interest, the result is deep 
alienation in adolescence. Productive skepticism and 
criticism become negativity and rebelliousness. The lack of 
a feeling of individual meaning and purpose and connection 
with all of humanity leads to materialism and depresssion. 
Some adolescents make the decision not to enter adulthood; 
the rising incidence of adolescent suicide has been widely 
publicized. Others remain emotional adolescents throughout 
their adulthood, continuing to drift from job to job, 
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relationship to relationship, looking for and never finding 
meaning. others settle into roles in family and job that 
offer an identity, yet they may always feel that their lives 
are essentially empty. And some find their way to the 
stages of adulthood with varying degrees of feelings of 
connection to the meaningfulness of life. 
The Fifth Stage; Adulthood 
The interpretative framewoik of the educated mind 
is ever ready to meet somewhat novel experiences, 
and to deal with them in a somewhat novel manner. 
In this sense all life is endowed with originality 
and originality of a higher order is but a 
magnified form of a universal biological 
adaptivity. But genius makes contact with reality 
on an exceptionally wide range: seeing problems 
and reaching out to possibilites for solving 
them...the work of a genius offers us a massive 
demonstration of creativity...46 
The flute of interior time is played whether we 
hear it or not, 
What we mean by 'love' is its sound coming in. 
When love hits the farthest edge of excess, 
it reaches a wisdom. 
And the fragrance of that knowledge! 
It penetrates our thick bodies, 
It goes through the walls-
Its network of notes has a structure as if a 
million suns were arranged inside. 
This tune has truth in it.. 
Where else have you heard a sound like this.47 
In the opening passage Michael Polanyi characterized 
genius as "a massive demonstration of creativity." The 
meaning of the word genius, as it is commonly used, derives 
from Sir Francis Galton, and refers to creative ability of 
an exceptionally high order. 48 
The word genius can be used to refer to someone of any 
age. Many children are highly creative but not ordinarily 
thought of as geniuses. Genius is usually used to refer to 
someone who is highly creative in a particular field. A 
child who is a prodigy in some discipline will be thought of 
as a genius. There are well-known mathematical geniuses, 
scientific geniuses, literary geniuses and artistic 
geniuses. Then there are outstanding humanitarians, such as 
Mother Teresa, who are geniuses in another sense. 
I would define a genius as someone who has mastered 
the quantitative content or skills of any discipline or area 
of human endeavor as well as being deeply in touch with the 
domain of qualitative knowing. Intense qualitative thinking 
implies a sense of profound connection with humanity. Thus 
in my conception, this genius has the sense that her 
creative expression is in some way contributing to the good 
of humankind. 
Although it is rare for an individual to be outstanding 
in more than one field, many famous mathematicians and 
physicists have also been amateur poets and musicians. 
Physiologist A.V. Hill once remarked: "I've never known a 
good scientist who had broad interests... but I've never 
known a great one who did not."49A genius is outstanding in 
one area but often also seems highly creative in general. I 
gave examples in Chapter Three of creative geniuses in a 
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number of fields who recognized that intuition and emotion 
play a pivotal role in creative exploration. The 
underlying qualitative aspects of thinking can be focused 
on any area, but brilliance will particularly shine through 
in disciplines that the person has mastered quantitatively. 
The poem by Kabir in the introduction to this section 
illustrates intense qualitative knowing combined with 
mastery of the craft of poelry. 
In The Ecology of Imagination in Childhood. Edith Cobb 
defined genius as "an evolutionary phenomenon, at 
biocultural levels, beginning with the natural genius of 
childhood and the 'spirit of place'."50 She saw the 
natural genius of childhood as the spontaneous creativity 
common to all children. This creativity is evolutionary 
because it is the source of human evolution when it 
continues into adulthood and manifests in individuals 
creating more beautiful, harmonious and just forms of human 
culture. Cobb understood creativity as a biological force 
that expresses itself in culture. 
Cobb pointed out that the earlist usage of the term 
genius referred to the genius loci, the "spirit of place." 
She interpreted this as "a living ecological relationship 
between an observer and an environment, a person and a 
place."51 Thus for her, genius is the person's natural 
creativity in a living, dynamic relationship with her 
personal environment. 
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I am in agreement with Cobb's theory. I believe that 
all human beings begin life with the spirit of genius. One 
of the most critical questions in human development centers 
on what happens to this spirit of genius as we become 
adults. In this sense it is appropriate to begin this 
section on adult development with a discussion of genius. 
If thought remained alive qualitatively and grew in mastery 
and complexity in some areas or disciplines quantitatively, 
then all adults would be geniuses in a sense, great 
exceptions like Mary Poppins. This is, I believe, what 
nature intended. 
To come to terms with this idea, we may need to change 
our customary vision of genius. Imagine any adult 
interacting creatively with all aspects of her environment 
and particularly bringing her creativity to bear in areas 
or subjects of her deepest interests. These could be 
cooking or gardening or helping other people, as well as 
sociology or mathematics or music. In The Possible Human, 
Jean Houston wrote: "...previous cultures have tended to 
deny some areas of development while acknowledging and 
encouraging others. With the present convergence of the 
findings of anthropology, cross-cultural studies, 
psychological research, and studies into the nature and 
function of the human brain, we are beginning to have in 
hand a perspective on human possibility as profound as it is 
provocative."52 
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One new perspective on the possibilities of the human 
mind worth noting in this context is Howard Gardner's theory 
of multiple intelligences. In Frames of Mind Gardner 
suggested that the human mind has areas of specialty, 
different intelligences, around which thinking is organized. 
In my terms, I would say these intelligences may be 
understood as an organizing force of quantitative thinking. 
Qualitative thinking underlies all of them. Gardner's 
scientific criteria for a specialty of thinking to qualify 
as a separate kind of intelligent are rigorous; he says that 
his list is probably limited by a lack of data. Some day 
other intelligences may be identified. His initial list 
includes linguistic intelligence, musical intelligence, 
spatial intelligence logical-mathematical intelligence, 
bodily-kinesthetic intelligence, and personal intelligences, 
including knowledge of self and others. Genius is possible 
and identifiable in any of these areas. 
Gardner pointed out that the values of Western 
technological culture lead to an emphasis on educating and 
encouraging linguistic and logical-mathematical 
intelligences while virtually ignoring musical and other 
artistic intelligences, kinesthetic intelligences, and 
personal intelligences. I would add that our culture's 
values lead to nearly total disregard of qualitative aspects 
of thinking. Thus I do not find it difficult to understand 
why more adults are not "geniuses," in other words, why they 
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do not interact in a whole and creative way with their 
environment and contribute to the welfare of humankind. 
If there is truth in the theoretical framework that I 
am presenting, the ways that we choose to educate human 
beings are critically important. In the final chapter of 
this dissertation, I will make some suggestions about how 
educational environments can encourage whole thinking, the 
qualitative and the quantitative in all human beings. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
EDUCATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF A CREATIVE 
DEVELOPMENTAL THEORY 
Centering as the aim of education calls for the 
completion of the person or the creation of 
meaning that utilizes all the potential given to 
each person. It is no way conflicts with' the 
accumulated knowledge of a culture; it merely 
places this knowledge in the base of ground from 
which it grows. As such, centering is the is the 
fundamental process of human being that makes 
sense out of our perceptions and cognitions of 
reality. 1 
Educational Ideologies and Creative Thought 
In "Development as the Aim of Education," Kohlberg and 
Mayer identify three main streams of thought in Western 
educational ideology, along with the three psychological 
theories underlying these ideologies.2 They define an 
ideology as "a set of concepts defining aims, content, and 
methods of education,"3 and I will use the term in the same 
sense. The three main streams--romanticism, cultural 
transmission, and progressivism—roughly correspond to the 
psychoanalytic, behavioristic, and cognitive developmental 
schools of human development discussed in Chapter Four. 
Romanticism here is not the classical Wordsworthian 
romanticism raised in Chapter Four, although it is 
historically related to this. Instead, it is Freudian based 
romanticism, with an emphasis on the development of feeling 
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unfolding naturally from within. The metaphor of the angel 
has been replaced by the metaphor of the natural, organic 
growth of a plant or animal. As discussed in Chapter Four, 
both mind and emotions are seen to develop in inborn, 
biologically based stages, and emotional development is 
regarded as largely separate from mental development. 
Rousseau and A.S. Neill are examples of romantic educational 
theorists. 
The cultural transmission ideology promotes the 
transmission of information, rules, and values from the past 
in order to maintain the stability of the culture. 
Classical academic traditions, current educational 
technologies, and instruction by behavior modification are 
all given as examples of cultural transmission. Instruction 
is based on the imitation by children of adult modeling of 
knowledge and values located in the culture. The majority 
of current education institutions are based primarily on 
this model. 
The progressive model is dialectical; education occurs 
through the person's interaction with the environment in 
problem solving situations. Dewey and Piagcl are the major 
architects of this progessive model of thinking. Kohlberg 
and Mayer's cognitive developmental ideology is a more 
recent version. They wrote: "Implied in the term 
'development' is the notion that a more developed 
psychological state is more valuable or adequate than a less 
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developed state."4 Development consists o£ progression 
through ordered, invariant stages, and the goal of education 
is the attainment of "higher" stages of thinking and 
behaving. 
James MacDonald added two other ideologies to these in 
"A Transcendental Ideology of Education."5 The first is 
the radical model, which is dialectical like the progressive 
model, but unlike the progressive model is weighted on the 
side of social reality rather than inner cognition. The 
radical model is primarily concerned with social and 
political structures as they impact on education. 
MacDonald's final ideology is the transcendental 
developmental ideology. The psychological base of this 
model was presented in Chapter Four. Learning occurs 
through the "dual dialectic" between, first, the outer world 
and the rational mind, as in the progressive ideology, and 
second, the inner self and the rational mind. 
MacDonald referred to the process by which we gain 
access to our inner self as centering. He meant this as a 
personal spiritual or religious experience. But he also 
used centering to mean a process that connects people to the 
outer as well as the inner world. He said: "The aim of 
education should be a centering of the person in the 
world."6 In the opening quotation of this chapter, 
MacDonald explained that centering is the fundamental or 
underlying process of human being that can be understood to 
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be the basis of all other modes of knowing and knowledge. 
In this sense, the transcendental developmental ideology of 
education can be seen to underlie but not exclude the 
others. 
MacDonald said that a transcendental ideology is 
necessary because the source of value positions is 
inadequate in the other four ideologies. He wrote: "Values, 
I believe, are articulated in the lives of people by a dual 
dialectic of both reflecting upon the consequence of an 
action and sounding the depths of our inner selves."7 The 
other ideologies leave us with only three possible sources 
of values: 1) our biological nature, 2) conditioning from 
the environment, or 3) cognitive reflection on experience. 
But values are also personal and stem from our deepest 
intuitive experience of a greater reality--the ontological 
ground of being that is the ultimate source of human 
nature. 
This inclusion of "God" in the theory vastly changes 
our perspective on what it means to be human; it widens our 
conception of human possiblities and introduces a morality 
based on our deepest feelings. In this educational ideology 
we are compelled to relate deeply to other beings, to care 
for and about them, both because our rational mind tells us 
that we should and because our experience of the inner 
depths of our being makes us feel connected to all other 
beings. 
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Of course, MacDonald is not new or unique in proposing 
that education should have a "religious" or "spiritual" 
base. All ancient and modern traditional religious cultures 
propose their own particular religious understanding as the 
basis of their educational systems. But MacDonald 
distinguished centering from other similar religious 
experiences: 
It is important that centering be recognized as a 
process that may occur in a religious context, but 
it is not dependent upon any sect or creed, 
whether Eastern Zen or Western Christianity, for 
its validation. It is a human experience 
facilitated in many ways by a religious attitude 
when this attitude encompasses the search to find 
our inner being or to complete one's awareness of 
wholeness and meaning as a person."8 
MacDonald felt that the technical, rational, 
hierarchical thinking underlying the traditional radical 
perspective is outmoded because recent scientific 
discoveries and politcal realities demand that we take 
tacit, intuitive, qualitative, inner modes of knowing into 
account. But MacDonald certainly shared the concerns of the 
radical framework. He was deeply interested in the question 
"How shall we live together?" He used the phrase "personal 
knowledge" to mean not merely individual knowledge, but 
cultural knowledge, the common set of personal constructs. 
He did not intend for the centering process to remove the 
individual from culture and society; he intended for it to 
center the person in the world that includes culture and 
society. 
The Creative Developmental Ideology 
As I wrote in Chapter One, the word "holy" is derived 
from the word "whole." I believe, as MacDonald, that it is 
our inborn capacity for qualitative knowing, or centering, 
that connects us with our capacity for wholeness and 
holiness. When this dimension of human being is ignored, 
discouraged, or punished, as it often is in educational 
environments, it becomes difficult to "complete one's 
awareness of wholeness and meaning as a person." I would 
like to join MacDonald in suggesting that this dimension, 
which I am calling the qualitative dimension, become the 
basis of education. 
When I use the phrase "qualitative thinking," I mean it 
to include the spiritual base that Macdonald referred to. 
In this sense I see my theory as implicitly "spiritual" or 
"religious," although I do not feel that it is necessary to 
use those terms. I believe that assisting in the 
development of whole, creative modes of thinking is 
ultimately a holy task. 
The educational ideology that follows from the 
development of my theory of creative thinking is similar to 
MacDonald's. I will call it the creative developmental 
ideology. I believe that this term describes the 
theoretical framework, including both quantitive and 
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qualitiative dimensions of thought. This ideology is 
relevant to the development of modes of thinking and knowing 
in educational settings. It also has implications for 
emotional, social and moral realms. 
I embrace Macdonald's basic theoretical model, although 
I use different words to describe parts of it. My 
terminology implies less emphasis on transcendence and more 
emphasis on integrating the transcendent with the mundane. 
However, this is just in the words, since Macdonald's goal 
clearly was integration. I believe that the main 
contribution of my theory to Macdonald's work is the 
elaboration of a developmental theory. Of course, I don't 
know if Macdonald would embrace my model of development. 
I do not exclude other educational ideologies from my 
perspective, but I would locate them in relationship to each 
other in a larger theoretical framework. For example, the 
progessive ideology is accurate when seen as describing one 
dialectic in the "dual dialectic" of knowing in the broader 
sense. Its hierarchical nature is descriptive when put into 
a context, in the sense that human beings do go through 
stages in the development of quantitative thought. In other 
words, although the development of quantitative thinking is 
hierarchical, the whole of human development ultimately is 
not. 
The romantic ideology position is similar to the 
transcendental position in its stress on inner experience. 
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However, inner experience is largely conceived by romantics 
as emotional truth, rather than as a form of truth that 
encompasses both emotion and mind. Education is seen as a 
means to personal happiness and emotional stability. It 
seems to me that this ideology makes sense when applied to 
the realm of individual emotional development, but it offers 
limited insight about thought and society. 
The cultural transmission ideology is not necessarily 
in conflict with the transcendental developmental ideology 
in the sense that much of the accumulated knowledge of the 
culture can be seen as important and worthy of passing on 
from generation to generation. One contribution of the 
cultural transmission model is this conserving function. 
But conflict may arise because the relative importance of 
any particular piece of knowledge and the traditional 
methods of teaching it are called into question when it is 
seen in a larger context. The various ideologies use 
different criteria for determining appropriate educational 
curriuculum and instruction. All of the other educational 
ideologies will challenge the cultural transmission's 
conserving assumptions, based on their own particular 
assumptions. 
The central concern of the radical perspective: "How 
shall we live together?" results in an emphasis on social 
action, the tranformation of the social and political system 
in order to bring about social and educational reform. The 
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radical perspective teaches that it is impossible to 
separate an educational system from the culture in which it 
operates. Educational change can only occur on a very 
limited basis without a corresponding or preceding change in 
social and politial realities. On the other hand, the 
system is dialectical. The individual affects society, and 
society affects the individual. Education can be used as a 
tool for social change. Richard Shaull writes: 
There is no such thing as a neutral educational 
process. Education either functions as an 
instrument which is used to facilitate the 
integration of the younger generation into the 
logic of the present system and bring about 
conformity to it, or it becomes 'the practice of 
freedom,' the meanu by which men and women deal 
critically and creatively with reality and 
discover how to participate in the transformation 
of their world. The development of an educational 
methodology that facilitates this process will 
inevitably lead to tension and conflict within our 
society. But it could also contribute to the 
formation of a new man and mark the beginning of a 
new era in Western history.9 
I would argue, along with MacDonald, that the 
development of the aspect of the radical education 
methodology that deals with thinking must be rooted in the 
qualitative domain, or in centering, because this is the 
basis of the thought process that allows us to deal 
creatively with reality and to transform the world. The 
transcendental and the radical ideologies are about 
different but overlapping realms. The transcendental is 
rooted in modes of knowing, in psychological and 
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philosophical views of reality. The radical is rooted in 
social values, in moral ideals of how societies should be, 
in a sociological view of reality. But I believe that the 
radical perspective needs to be based on a mode of thinking, 
just as the perceived truths of the transcendental 
perspective need to be applied to social justice. 
The process of centering, or deep qualitative knowing, 
demands that all of our experiences be tested for the 
depth of their reality, value and truth fcr us against the 
background of our most profound being. Thus, although 
centering is not intended to separate us from our culture or 
society, it can lead us to question the validity of certain 
aspects of them. In this sense the transcendental ideology 
may find itself in conflict with the agenda of cultural 
transmission ideology and overlapping with the concerns of 
the radical perspective as it searches for modes of living 
together that are consonant with our deepest felt values of 
justice. In other words, both the transcendental ideology 
and the radical ideology may lead us to question the given 
order of human life. 
But whereas a concern with justice is a necessity of 
the radical ideology, it does not automatically follow from 
the transcendental ideology. I believe that the process of 
centering, or qualitative knowing, leads to a sense of 
caring connection with others. But there is no guarantee 
that any particular feeling or ideal about a just society 
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will be reached through the centering process, or if it is, 
that appropriate action will follow. That is why the 
transcendental must work in consonance with Ihe radical. It 
must depend on the radical to continue to ask questions and 
find solutions about the connections between society and 
schooling and about social justice in the classroom. 
When the qualitative is accepted as the basis of the 
development of thinking and the corresponding educational 
ideology, the hierarchical nature of development and 
education disappears. The qualitative implies a whole and 
complete way of knowing that is reflected differently in 
each stage of development, as light is reflected differently 
through various lenses. The lenses correspond to the 
changing cognitive structures, the increasingly complex 
ability to quantify knowledge. Both the light and the 
lenses contribute to the particular type of reflection. The 
aim of education is to enhance whatever type of reflection, 
whatever type of knowing and being is possible at any given 
stage of development. 
Curriculum Methodoaies 
An educational ideology must be formulated as specific 
curriculum methodologies before it can be translated into 
instruction in the classroom setting. I will briefly review 
a variety of curriculum approaches appropriate for promoting 
the development of qualitative knowing and creative 
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thinking in the broad sense described in this dissertation. 
First I will discuss the enhancing of the qualitative mode 
of knowing at all stages of development, since I am defining 
the qualitative as a whole mode of knowing, complete from 
the beginning of our lives. Then I will discuss the 
development of creative thinking by developmental stage. 
Because the development of creative thinking results from 
the relationship between quantitative and qualitative 
thought, it occurs in stages that demand varying 
approaches. In each stage, I will speak to both relevant 
curriculum processes and ways of structuring educational 
systems to promote qualitative and quantitative thinking. 
Enhancing The Qualitative Mode of Knowing 
As defined in this dissertation, the qualitative mode 
of knowing is our most direct experience of reality, whether 
we see that reality as "ultimate" reality or personal 
reality, or some combination of these. It provides the 
underlying shaping and integrating power that is the 
meaningful context for quantitative thinking. The 
experience of qualitative thinking is difficult to describe, 
but it is a kind of whole thinking -- feeling — intuiting. 
Qualitative thinking gives us a sense of connection with 
the whole of life. In this sense, it may be described as 
spiritual or religious or mystical. Qualitative thinking 
can also be described as empathic, since it allows us to 
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feel deeply connected with other beings around us. 
One of my major assertions in this dissertation is that 
the ability to think qualitatively is given to us from 
birth. In other words, this whole, meaningful, connecting 
quality of knowing about the world and other people is a 
natural part of human being. I believe that if this kind of 
knowing were recognized and supported at all stages of 
development, then we would automatically feel a sense of 
connection with and caring about the earth and all its 
manifestations of life. But our way of living and 
socializing human beings consistently ignores and/or 
violates this qualitative mode of knowing. It seems to me 
that many individual and group acts of violence are an 
expression of rage at the destruction of the sense of the 
whole holiness of self. 
The qualitative mode of knowing can be enhanced in 
essentially the same ways throughout life. First of all, it 
should be recognized. Human beings of all ages, of both 
sexes, of every race, of all socio-economic classes, of all 
personality and character "types," are regarded as capable 
of this whole mode of knowing. Each person is fully 
respected and honored. This is true even though she may 
have committed "terrible" crimes against humanity or even 
though she may not demonstrate any signs of knowing 
anything. We can and should critique the actions of other 
human beings with the quantitative mind, but the qualitative 
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mind does not judge or reject. It connects with and 
includes everyone. 
Educators who wish to promote qualitative thinking 
will of course honor and respect all of their students. 
They will also strive to promote an atmosphere in which 
their students honor and respect each other. Thus they will 
attempt to structure curriculum and instruction in ways that 
are continually promoting caring relationships between all 
persons in the environment. They will try to foster a 
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sense of group identity, fairness in relationships, and 
positive connections between individuals. 
Qualitative thinking is nurtured by a sense of 
peacefulness, relaxation and unhurried time. When we 
emphasize quantitative thinking, we become caught up in 
quantity rather than quality, in speed, judgement, 
separation, and eventually alienation. On the other hand, 
if we were to emphasize qualitative thinking over 
quanititative thinking, we would lack precision, clarity 
and critical thinking. Both are necessary for ideal human 
functioning. But our society seems increasingly to be 
caught up in an incredibly goal-driven, hurried, 
materialistic mode that doesn't allow time for either 
qualitative or clear critical thinking. 
To retain access to qualitative thinking, each 
individual needs time to relax and to learn at a pace that 
suits her. She must have the freedom to discover her own 
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ideas and inspirations and to feel the sense of 
meaningfulness and connection inherent in qualitative 
thinking. She shouldn't be rushed frantically from 
activity to activity. She should be allowed to find quiet 
spaces to be by herself sometimes. She must occasionally 
be allowed the freedom to "do nothing." 
Any experience that is deeply moving and inspirational 
for an individual will enhance her connection with 
qualitative knowing. Thus it is important that educators 
know each student well enough to understand the kinds of 
experiences that will encourage her to feel greatly 
inspired. However, there are also some general types of 
experiences that seem to inspire many people that I would 
recommend emphasizing in the curriculum in appropriate ways 
for each age, including infants. These include being 
outdoors, directly experiencing nature, and exposure to and 
creative participation in all forms of the arts. 
MacDonald recommended these processes to facilitate 
what I call qualitative knowing, and what he calls 
centering: pattern making, meditative thinking, imagining, 
arts education, physical education (meaning understanding 
our entire biological being), and the education of the 
sense percept ions.10 I concur with this recommendation and 
suggest that all of these processes are relevant in 
different forms for each stage of development. 
Dewey believed that the nurturing of the imagination 
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through esthetic experience should be the basis of 
educational practice because the imagination allows 
communication and participation in the values of life. He 
saw the shared values of a culture as the morals upon which 
a just society rests. Dewey asserted that the central 
dilemma of his book Art As Experiencer that of reintegrating 
esthetic experience with everyday living, could be 
accomplished through education. 
In this sense the nurturing of the imagination through 
esthetic education can be seen as having a moral as well 
as a spiritual dimension, even when the curriculum is 
described in terms of individual creative expression. This 
assumption underlies my description of the following 
recommendations for curriculum at various stages of 
development. 
Infant Creative Thinking Curriculum 
According to my theory, the infant is fully equipped to 
think qualitatively. In other words, the newborn comes into 
the world with the mental ability to shape and integrate the 
world theoretically. This qualitative knowing is 
experienced as an intense emotion that provides the 
motivation to experience and understand the world. In the 
beginning the world is taken in through sensory perceptions. 
But the qualitative mind immediately uses the sensory 
perceptions to form concepts that allow a more complex 
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understanding of the world. For the first several years of 
life, the infant seems "driven" to explore and make sense of 
the physical and social worlds. The infant begins to 
construct a quantitative map of reality. The construction 
of this map is the infant's primary mental activity. 
Social and mental development obviously do not proceed 
separately. Although this theory is about the development 
of the mind, rather than the development of social 
relationships, these two processes are interconnected. The 
qualitative mind allows intimate connections -with both 
people and objects.. , The infant feels qualitatively 
connected with everything and everyone. The fact that other 
people respond from their own qualitative center clearly 
allows for unique and complex relationships to occur. 
Parent-infant bonding results from a connection in the 
depths of both. In the social realm, a positive 
developmental outcome for the infan-t is dependent on the 
presence of one or more adults who are more or less 
continuously responsive to the infant's needs. Given this 
presence, the infant will develop what Erickson calls basic 
trust in the world. Without this presence, the infant will 
experience the world as more, rather than less, painful and 
hostile. The infant will find it necessary to defend 
herself by closing down emotionally. Because the 
qualitative mind is largely emotion, thinking is effected. 
The infant will not feel safe in exploring and theorizing 
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about the world if she does not trust it. 
Thus a good infant curriculum begins with the presence 
of stable, loving, responsive adults. This, of course, 
remains true throughout life, but it is an especially 
critical factor during the earliest years. This issue is a 
particularly crucial one now as more and more infants are 
spending more and more time in child - care arrangements 
outside the home, often from weeks after birth. Due to low 
wages and stressful working conditions, the staff turnover 
in child care centers is very high, and the quality of 
responsiveness in child care workers to any infant is often 
weak. I believe that the effects of this factor on social, 
emotional, and mental development of the infant are strongly 
negative. 
Given the presence of a responsive adult, an infant 
curriculum should provide infants with access to raw 
materials for each of the senses. Infants need a variety of 
materials to look at, touch, mouth, and explore, and a 
variety of sounds and language experiences. They need free 
access to these materials in an environment that is safe for 
crawling, climbing, walking, and running. These raw 
materials provide the data that the infant's mind needs to 
develop quantitatively. The critical mental work of this 
period is to form and test hypotheses out of which a general 
map of the world is developed. 
Thus far the educational environment is basically the 
same as the one that a cognitive developmentalist would 
provide. But there is a vast difference in the ways that 
the cognitive developmentalist and the creative 
developmentalist regards the infant's .learning and the 
infant herself. According to the cognitive 
developmentalist, the mind gradually develops out of 
reflexes and then is constructed "bottom up" from the 
relationship between itself and the world. There is no 
higher level integrating and constructing function present 
from the beginning. In other words, there is no "center". 
The infant's capacity for developing intelligence is 
respected, but still, the infant is regarded "at the bottom 
of the totem pole" in terms of intelligence, morality, 
aesthetics, and so on. 
From the creative developmental perspective, the infant 
is regarded as having a fully functioning ability to feel, 
understand, shape, and integrate the world cognitively. 
This ability arises from the deepest center of being. What 
the infant is lacking is experience with the world, the 
experience that will gradually result in the emergence of 
an increasingly complex ability to understand the world 
quantitatively. 
From this perspective, the infant is also understood to 
have the capacity to connect on a qualitative, empathic 
level with other infants. She will, of course, over time 
have to build up an understanding of the social realities of 
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getting along with others, which the educator will help her 
to do, but the capacity for connection derives from the 
given nature of the qualitative being. 
This way of thinking about an infant results in a 
complete respect for her as an equal whose lack of extensive 
experience with the world naturally means a less developed 
understanding of it, but whose capacity for understanding' 
and experiencing reality in her own way is as complete as 
the adult's. This perspective of the infant has very 
different educational implications than those of the 
cognitive developmental perspective. In the creative 
developmental perspective, an educator is there first to 
relate on a deep being-to-being level with the infant. 
Second, she is there to structure the environment to help 
the infant learn about the quantitive world and about 
qualitative connections with others. Third, she is there to 
teach directly when this is appropriate. But she also is 
aware that she will learn at least as much as she will 
teach. She understands that the infant's connection with 
the qualitative is strong, and she experiences that 
connection when she bonds with the infant. 
The way that a teacher or parent sees a child has an 
influence on how that child develops. I believe that this 
way of seeing an infant results in a strengthening of the 
infant's capacity for creative intelligence and for 
connection with others. 
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Preschool Creative Thinking Curriculum 
In this stage the child continues to explore the world 
actively and to increase the complexity of her conceptual 
understanding of physical and social realities. In 
cognitive developmental terms, by the end of the stage she 
will be able to perform operations, a thinking skill that 
will allow her to be less dependent on physical perceptions 
in her understanding of matter. In order to make these 
gains in thinking quantitatively about the world, the child 
continues to need free access to a variety of toys and 
materials. 
In terms of this aspect of thinking, the creative 
developmental approach to curriculum would again be the same 
as the cognitive developmental approach. The environment 
would contain blocks, sand, water, clay, and many kinds of 
games and manipulative materials. By playing with these 
materials, the child naturally learns about shape, size, 
length, and height and how these change under varying 
conditions. She learns about sequencing these objects by 
size, shape, and color. She begins to develop an 
understanding of the concepts of number, quantity, 
measurement, and space. She learns that objects can be 
classified in a variety of ways. 
In both the creative and the cognitive developmental 
curriculum, the child is also provided with a variety of 
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experiences with language. Adults converse frequently with 
children, and children are given continual opportunity to 
converse with each other. Children sing songs, listen to 
records, hear stories, and dictate stories. The rapid 
growth of language in this period is part of the basis of 
the child's increasingly complex ability to represent the 
world symbolically. 
Both creative and cognitive curriculum environments 
would include games and materials specifically designed to 
teach particular cognitive concepts, such as puzzles, color 
matching games, and size discrimination boards, because both 
recognize the importance of developing the quantitative 
mind. However, unlike some specifically cognitive 
curriculum, the creative curriculum would allow children to 
play with these materials in imaginative ways. For example, 
with a puzzle of squares of decreasing size, the child could 
not only learn to put them in the right hole but could also 
have them become a "family" of squares. 
The creative developmental curriculum differs from the 
cognitive developmental curriculum in this period in its 
emphasis on creative activity and the use of the 
imagination. In Chapter Three I suggested that it is the 
imagination that links qualitative and quantitative thought. 
Thoughts begin as emotional experiences that are translated 
into concrete qualitative forms through the imagination. In 
Chapter Five, Stern suggested that infants are making 
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"global" abstract representations from birth. By this 
second stage of development, these representations become 
specific images. It is this ability to think specifically 
in symbols and then to express these symbols in words and 
forms, combined with the still intensely strong feeling 
force of the qualitative aspect of thought, that allows for 
the tremendous burst in creative, imaginative thought and 
play that was discussed in Chapter Five. 
The child's explorations and thinking in the first 
several years of life have resulted in a general "map" of 
reality. In the second stage, the child plays with 
materials by turning them into synmbolic representations in 
the imagination. A baby might pick up a block, feel it, 
look at it, put it in her mouth, stack it on another one, 
and knock it down. A preschool child would be more likely 
to build a house or a tower with blocks. As she does, she 
is learning about shape, size, length, height, number, 
quantity, measurement, and space. But learning about the 
properties of the world is no longer her primary mental 
motivation, as it was in the first state of development. It 
is a secondary result of the primary desire to imagine. 
An educational environment based on a creative 
developmental curriculum would see the inclusion of raw 
materials such as blocks, sand, and water both as materials 
for the mind to play with imaginatively and as materials to 
teach about the physical properties of the world. Children 
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would have as much access as possible to the out-of-doors, 
the best possible place to learn about the natural world. 
Most learning occurs through play during this period. 
This is true of both mental and social learning. 
Quantitative skills are best learned in the context of 
real life experiences and explorations, followed by 
opportunities for imaginative elaboration. For example, a 
visit to a farm to learn about farm animals is preferable to 
merely reading a story about farms. But in either case, 
putting toy farm animals in the block area allows 
imaginative exploration of the facts and concepts. 
Some direct imparting of basic information, skills, 
values and rules, as in the cultural transmission model, 
continues during this period. But for this transmission to 
be effective, it must be expressed in a way that has an 
emotional or qualitative appeal to the mind of the child. 
Then the information can be used by the child in a 
creative activity to be fully utilized mentally. For 
example, if children are taught about the roles of 
firepersons and police in our society, they are also given 
opportunities to tell stories about, dramatize, and draw 
pictures about their activities. 
It is important in this approach that the amount of 
time spent in creative activity far exceed the amount of 
time spent absorbing information. A four year old child 
might watch half an hour of educational television 
programming on mountain climbing and then spent hours 
drawing and enacting what she saw. If a great deal of time 
is spent passively receiving information on a continual 
basis, the qualitive capacity of the mind and thus the 
overall capacity for whole thought will be diminished. 
The creative developmental classroom would include an 
extensive play house area, many kinds of dress-up clothes, 
and other dramatic play areas on a rotating basis, such as 
store, doctor's office, space ship, airplane, bus, and 
restaurant. Children not only hear and dictate stories but 
also informally dramatize these stories daily. 
An environment based on a creative developmental 
curriculum would include a large variety of arts and crafts 
materials so that children could imagine and design their 
own creations frequently. Materials would include papers of 
all types, cardboard, boxes of all sizes and shapes, rubber 
bands, tapes, glues, discarded food containers, cloth, 
ribhons, etc. On any given day, children might decide to 
design and make their own hats, a monster, a sword and 
shield, a queen costume, a town, or a mouse house. These 
creations often become props in dramatic plays and invented 
games. 
, The educator in a creative developmental curriculum 
completely respects the child's knowing and knowledge. As 
we have seen in Chapter Five, "average" children in this 
stage of development show remarkable creative abilities, are 
173 
capable of grappling with complex philosophical issues, 
frequently have deep "religious," unitive visions about the 
nature of the universe, and seem to intuit explanations of 
physical reality that concur with the latest scientific 
theories. Adults realize their role in helping to 
facilitate the development of the child's quantitative 
thinking, but they understand that the preschool child's 
thinking represents a vision of the world that is accurate 
in its own way. The adult is open to a reciprocal teaching 
and learning role. 
In a creative developmental curriculum, the continual 
use of the imagination through art, play, creative movement 
and dance, story telling and dramatics teaches the child to 
see things from the point of view of other beings. As 
Friedrich Froebel, the founder of the kindergarten movement, 
said: 
What the child imitates, he begins to understand. 
Let him represent the flying of birds and he 
enters into the life of birds. Let him imitate 
the rapid motion of fishes in the water and his 
sympathy with fishes is quickened. Let him 
reproduce the activities of farmer, miller, and 
baker, and his eyes open to the meaning of their 
work. In one word let him grasp in his play the 
varied aspects of life and his thought will begin 
to grapple with their significance.il 
In using their imaginations, preschool children will be 
developing greater empathy for all beings in the world, from 
various kinds of animals to various kinds of people. 
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Global awareness may start here by focusing on different 
cultures, using direct dramatic participation in their 
customs, stories, costumes, music, and dances. Thus 
children can call on their natural qualitative sense of 
connection with all peoples. 
I have suggested that esthetic education encourages 
connection with others, caring, and creation of community 
through the development of the imagination. But I believe 
that educators should also continually encourage these 
attitudes and activities directly. Empathy and connection 
with other children begins in infancy, but in the preschool 
years, the potential for strong friendships, as well as 
negative social behavior, begins Lo emerge. At this stage 
of development, it is appropriate for educators to model for 
children the variety of skills necessary for understanding 
and getting along with others. Children can be shown how to 
communicate their feelings and desires directly, but with 
words instead of actions if these feelings would result in 
pain to someone else (to "talk instead of hit"). They can 
gradually learn to share, to take turns, and to take other 
people's perspectives into account. Educators can help them 
to experience themselves as part of a community in which 
each person is valued equally and uniquely, and individual 
differences are respected. 
In a creative developmental curriculum, adults respect 
the choices and motivations of each child. Each child is 
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understood to feel a deep sense of meaning and purpose and to 
have a strong sense of what she wants to learn and create. 
Adults attempt to support the child's choices, to guide when 
necessary rather than to direct. Most of the direction for 
creative mental development comes from the qualitative mind 
of the child. 
School-Aae Creative Thinking Curriculum 
The name for this stage derives from the fact that this 
is generally when children begin formal schooling. The vast 
majority of formal schooling is based on the cultural 
transmission model. Information, skills, values, and rules 
are transmitted in a behavioristic manner. The teacher, or 
the textbook, gives information, and the student absorbs it 
by memorizing, copying, and repeating in various forms. 
Although, as we have seen, the qualitative is always an 
aspect of thinking, it can become compressed and repressed so 
that thinking is largely mechanical. In other words, some 
minimal emotion is necessary to have a thought of any kind. 
But when a curriculum assumes that thinking will be largely 
selected and directed from outside rather than inside the 
person, as in a traditional classroom environment, then 
either thought becomes lifeless or the person chooses to 
think about something other than the intended curriculum. 
What usually occurs is a combination of both. 
I established in Chapter Five that this is a more 
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appropriate stage for children to learn skills and 
information than the previous stage. This is undoubtedly why 
the majority of cultures begin serious instruction at this 
time. The child becomes more interested in "mechanistic 
scientific" rather than "metaphorical" explanations of life. 
She wants to know about the particular rather than the 
general. She wants to learn facts about things she is 
interested in and learn the skills that allow her to do the 
things she wants to do. She wants to "play by the rules" and 
adhere to the norms of culture, particularly the peer 
culture. 
As I wrote in Chapter Five, cognitive developmentalists 
call this stage concrete because the average child of this 
age is only supposed to be able to use reasoning In 
operations with concrete objects. But I have already pointed 
out that many children of this age are capable of highly 
abstract reasoning. I think that it is more accurate to say 
that the interests rather than the mental abilities at this 
stage should be characterized as concrete. 
As with the first two stages of development, the child's 
mental capacity is influenced to a large degree by the kinds 
of experiences allowed her and by the attitudes of the adults 
who relate to her. Gareth Mathews discovered that children 
"do philosophy" better than most grown-ups or adolescents 
because he was willing to talk to children as if they could 
"do philosophy." He did not have a theoretical orientation 
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that limited his expectations or respect for children. He 
entered into a philosophical conversation with a child as a 
reciprocal relationship. He suggested that adults may have a 
better command of language and concepts, but that children 
have caridor, spontaneity, and eyes and ears for perlexity and 
incongruity. In other words, adults many still have a better 
command of the quantitative in this stage, but children 
usually continue to have a stronger connection with the 
qualitative dimension of thinking. 
It is extremely important to the self-esteem of the 
school-age child that she leave this stage feeling confident 
about her mastery of skills and knowledge in the areas that 
she and society deem important. But it is also critical that 
she acquire these skills and knowledge without losing touch 
with her center, with her deepest sense of knowing, with her 
ability to shape and make decisions about what she wants to 
learn and create. 
One of the problems with cultural transmission based, 
behavorial educational systems is that they ignore or at 
least minimize the qualitative dimension of thought. The 
emotion of qualititive thought is the force that selects and 
breathes life into quantitative thought. The qualitative 
brings a sense of purpose into learning and living. 
Qualitative thought provides a deep inner motivation for 
learning. When qualitiative thought is omitted from 
planning in educational curriculum, then all that is left are 
178 
the facts, the skills, the rules, without the internal 
motivation to master them. 
Yes, of course, there are those multiplication tables 
that simply must be memorized. And no matter how interesting 
the applications of mathematics to "real life" that a vital 
teacher might make, some children will never be particularly 
excited about mathematics. All children will sometimes need 
to learn certain things that they find boring. 
But all children are excited about some things. I 
believe that the majority of a child's time in a formal 
educational setting should be spent on projects that the 
child chooses to do bssed on her own interests. When this 
happens, then education becomes Dewey's aesthetic education, 
no matter what disciplines the projects represent. There can 
be many stipulations about these projects that will insure 
that children learn the "basics". Children can be required 
to read and write some about all of their projects. They can 
be assigned a certain number of projects in basic curriculum 
areas, such as the sciences and social sciences, and the arts 
and crafts. They can be asked to do some projects 
individually and some in co-operative groups, to learn both 
to work well alone and to work well with others. 
At this stage of development, it is approprate for the 
class as a whole to function as much as possible as "a just 
community" to give children an opportunity to learn to live 
well with others. Educators can continue to use real social 
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situations to model ways to help children understand and 
relate fairly to one another, to deal with conflict in a 
peaceful and effective way. Children in this stage have a 
strong sense of justice and fairness. It may be literal, as 
in "an eye for an eye," but they will want to see that 
"right" prevails. School-age children are capable of taking 
a great deal of responsibility in creating and administering 
the classroom community. They can assist in making rules, 
deciding on punishments for violations, and running the 
classroom as a semi-democracy (the educator claims final 
authority for the prevailing of justice), with the group 
making decisions about as many of its activities as 
possible. 
I have suggested that qualitative thinking implies a 
connection with the entire earth and all of its beings. The 
preschool child experiences this connection through the use 
of the imagination, and so does the school age child. But it 
is also appropriate for the school-age child to begin a 
conscious study of and plan of action based on these 
connections. This would include a study of the various 
social groups in the immediate community, such as age, 
ethnic, and socio-economic make-up. Examples of actions 
based on realized connections might include collecting 
canned goods for poor people, "adopting" a lonely elderly 
person, or learning about the culture of African 
Americans. A variety of curriculum experiences that 
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promote global awareness could also be offered, focusing on 
studies of the many of cultures of our one world and 
ecological consciousness about the earth. 
When children decide on many of their own learning 
activities, master the facts and skills as they carry them 
out in appropriate esthetic form, learn to peacefully resolve 
their conflicts, participate in as democratic a classroom 
society as possible, and become increasingly aware of their 
connections with the whole earth and all of its beings, then 
qualitative and quantitiative thought are united in living. 
Curriculum subjects are not kept artifically separate from 
each other or from the process of relating to other people. 
Thinking and living are united. 
During the preschool years, no special techniques are 
needed to encourage creative thinking, although some may be 
fruitfully used. But there are several reasons why 
techniques are probably necessary and appropriate during the 
school-age years. First, by this time the qualitative aspect 
of thinking may have been stifled by limiting outside 
influences. Second, techniques for getting in touch with 
qualitative thinking appeal to many children in this 
stage. There are a variety of curriculum suggestions 
about these, and I can only mention a few in the scope of 
this dissertation. 
To enhance the intuitive mode in education, Nel Noddings 
and Paul Shore recommend first acknowledging to students the 
181 
reality of intuition and intuitive modes. They suggest 
telling stories of the role of Intuition in the creative 
processes of famous artists and scientists. They encourage 
teachers to tell students about the stages in the creative 
process and then to help them use preparation, incubation, 
and illumination as they work on projects and problems. They 
recommend the regular use of deliberate "warming up" 
excercises, such as relaxation and quiet rneditation.12 
In the last decade there have been many books and 
articles published about promoting creative thinking in 
children. The authors ususally point out that creative 
thinking is the opposite of the kind of thinking generally 
called for in traditional educational settings. Creative 
thinking demands flexibility, the abilitiy to come up with 
many possible answers rather than the one right one. 
Shilcock and Bergson offer this comprehensive definition of 
flexibility: 
—the ability to adapt to change 
--the ability to look at ideas and situations from 
different perspectives 
—the ability to make connections among apparently 
unrelated ideas 
--the ability to think about an idea, take a piece 
of it and shape it into a novel situation 
--the willingness to experiment and take risks with­
out being preoccupied with other people's 
opinions 
--the ability to create new combinations of objects 
and ideas 
--the willingness to question assumptions and to 
reach past their apparent boundaries.13 
The educator in the creative developmental curriculum 
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will be aware of trying to encourage these characteristics in 
herself and in her students. These characteristics are best 
enhanced in the general process of everyday life and learning 
in the home or classroom. They are certainly encouraged in 
the context of an integrated model of education. But there 
are also specific actiivities that can be 'used to promote 
them. For example, I have used brainstorming, inventing 
machines for specific purposes, combining random objects to 
form a new invented object, thinking of many interpretations 
for ambiguous pictures, making up different endings to 
stories, thinking of connections between paired objects that 
would not usually be paired, and asking questions that 
challenge current assumptions such as: "How would the world 
be different if everyone was one foot tall?" or "Which color 
is stronger, red or blue; why?" 
If the child's ability to think both qualitatively and 
quantitatively, by herself and with others, is supported in 
this stage of development, she is ready to move into 
adolescence with self-confidence stemming from the feeling 
that she is a competent person with the thinking ability and 
skills to deal flexibly and creatively with her life choices. 
She feels that she is capable of making both connections and 
changes in her world of family, friends, school, community, 
and world. She believes that life has meaning and she has a 
sense of her ability to make a unique contribution to it 
based on her own interests. 
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Adolescent Creative Thinking Curriculum 
Many of the recommended educational practices of the 
earlier stages continue in the later stages to be the most 
effective methods of educating qualitative and quantitative 
dimensions of thought. Adolescents continue to benefit by 
caring adults who respect their ways of thinking and 
knowing, can engage with them in supporting and challenging 
dialogues, and can teach them the skills and information that 
they want to know. 
During this period the adolescent begins to measure 
herself by adult standards, and she starts to measure 
accepted adult standards by her standards. It is important 
for her to feel that she can contribute to some areas of 
knowledge and skill on an "adult level" in critical and 
creative ways. Therefore, it is approriate for curriculum 
to support the continuing mastery of skills and information 
that allows this to happen. 
I believe that education should continue to have an 
aesthetic base, with the interests of adolescents as the 
guiding force in choosing and carrying out both 
interdisciplinary projects and projects in specific 
disciplines, individually as well as in groups. Some form of 
the same processes suggested in the previous section for 
enhancing intuitive modes and increasing flexibility in 
thinking continue to be relevant. 
The organization of the educational environment into a 
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"just society" continues to be of critical importance. 
Adolescents are capable of taking responsibility for major 
aspects of the social organization of their schools. For 
example, Kohlberg experimented with "Just Communities" in 
several high schools. With adult guidance, adolescents 
attempted to establish their schools as communities committed 
to democracy. Although these communities had many-problems, 
the high school students gained skills in using moral 
judgement and administering justice.16 
In Chapter Five I stated that the hallmark of thought 
in this period is the adolescent's interest in experimenting 
with ideas and skill areas, with criticizing the past and 
finding new and better ways of living. If her connection 
with qualitative thought remains strong, it becomes 
increasingly important for her to act effectively on her 
sense of connection and her global awareness, to apply her 
ideals to improving the lives of other beings or healing the 
planet that is her home. 
Ideally the adolescent has intense emotion and 
imagination that fuels her ideas, interests, and increasing 
quantitative mastery. She is idealistic; she believes that 
a better self and a better world can be accomplished. She 
passionately works at the things she enjoys and strives to 
create a better self and a better world. She is strongly 
rooted in the qualitative domain. It is important for her to 
have time and space to carry out her passions, to work on the 
things she cares about, lo discuss and argue and come to 
terms with various conceptions about self and the physical 
and social worlds. All of this does not mean that the 
adolescent is not struggling with the central issue of 
identity or that she is not sometimes in despair or 
rebellion. But despair and rebellion have a different 
feeling in the context of a deep sense of purpose and 
meaning. 
Of course, the ideal is not the usual here. The 
majority of adolescents in our culture have participated in 
educational systems that have alienated them from using their 
deepest interests and passions to create poetry and 
paintings, to make new mechanical models, to write 
philosophical treatises about changing the world, to find 
ways of making their own high schools more compassionate 
places, to work at local "soup kitchens," or to advocate 
for ecological consciousness. As result, many adolescents 
feel either an overwhelming sense of alienation and despair, 
or a need to immerse themselves in the materialistic values 
of the culture, rather that a deep sense of personal meaning, 
connection with others, and creative possibility. 
In general, high schools are structured to carry out 
cultural transmission methods of education. Most efforts at 
reform have attempted to revitalize the teaching of formal 
academic curriculum. There have been fewer attempts to 
institute new forms of education than at the elementary 
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school level. I would suggest that a great deal of 
intellectual and practical effort be directed towards finding 
radically different ways of structuring high school 
curriculum. 
Adult Creative Thinking Curriculum 
In Chapter Five, I suggested that all of us have the 
potential to be "geniuses," that is, the potential to be 
highly creative in a particular field. Another way of saying 
this is that each of us could achieve enough mastery in 
quantitative information and or/skills in some area or 
discipline that we love to contribute to it in a novel and 
evolutionary way. If we remain rooted in qualitative 
thinking and continue to experience a deep sense of 
connection and empathy with all of life, then we will want 
to feel that our creative contribution in some way 
enhances life for other beings. 
This assertion will seem absurd if we assume that the 
current population of adults is representative of adult 
potential. But of course, I do not believe that it is. The 
limitations that culture and education have imposed on human 
thinking are so great that we can barely imagine the 
possibilities. I think that child rearing practices and 
educational systems, which are manifestations of the culture, 
damage the potential for genius and creative contribution to 
life in most of us. 
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Even so, the area of current adult curriculum seems 
somewhat promising to me. In the past decade or so, the 
concept of "lifelong learning" has taken root, and it 
continues to grow. Adults older than the traditional college 
age students are going to schools to get better jobs, to 
"improve their minds," to learn new skills, and to become 
more "whole." The new skills and information that they are 
acquiring are incredibly varied, and some of them deal 
directly with re-connecting with qualitative knowing. Many 
adults are learning techniques for meditation, relaxation, 
body integration and awareness, creative imagination, 
enhancing sensory perception, and enjoying aesthetic 
pursuits. But any skill or area of knowledge that is pursued 
with emotion and interest becomes an aesthetic pursuit. 
One main difference between adult education and 
education at any other level is that adults for the most part 
have at least some degree of choice about whether or not to 
be in school and what to learn about once they are there. 
This is certainly more true for older adults returning to 
college or informal adult educational settings than it is for 
young college students, but there are also generally more 
possibilities for choices based on interest in colleges than 
at earlier levels of education. And although much college 
education is conducted along a traditional cultural 
transmission model, still much of it is not. Some college 
professors do try to incorporate the acquisition of critical 
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and creative approaches to learning. A variety of 
experimental approaches to curriculum at the college level 
and other adult levels do exist. 
Adults who have been extremely damaged by their 
education experiences may never again want to attempt deep 
and meaningful learning experiences that lead to full 
creative thinking. Yet, the human spirit is not easily 
vanquished. Creative thinking may be repressed, but it may 
be revitalized at any time. 
Whole creative thinking rests on qualitative knowing. 
Out of qualitative knowing rises a deep sense of connection 
and empathy with others. The full adult human thinking 
potential is not realized until the fruits of creative 
thinking are dedicated to the welfare of humanity. The 
fulfillment of the genius in each of us brings greater 
beauty, harmony, justice, compassion, or love to the world. 
Conclusion 
In Chapter One I articulated a number of social and 
ecological catastrophes that seem to increasingly 
characterize the state of the world. Through fear and 
ignorance we are losing the possiblity of the creative 
evolutionary contributions to the earth and humanity, the 
genius in all of us that could save us all. The ability to 
think creatively begins at birth, and our first educational 
experiences affect our capacity for whole, holy thinking in 
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either a nurturing or a destructive way. Our natural 
capacity for qualitative knowing is structured so that our 
thinking can connect us meaningfully with all of life. The 
creative imagination of childhood contains the roots of human 
evolution toward more aesthetic and just ways of living. 
Each stage of development is designed to contribute a unique 
dimension to human knowing and living. It is critical that 
the educational experiences of each stage grow out of whole 
and holy thinking about human development and curriculum. 
This dissertation is my attempt at a contribution. 
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